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'l! Role of the Supra1 Court in the Coustitutioual System of the
United Arab nirates - A Qxçarative Study.
Thvii f Rashid Al-ais
This study is concerned with dennstrating the importance of the
Supreme Court in the constitutional system of the United Arab
Emirates, discovering its possible contributions to
constitutional develoçznent and recarnnding measures to improve
the effectiveness of the Court.
A brief analysis of he modern history of the United Arab
Emirates and an outline of the characteristics of this aintry
and its society are provided. The constitutional history of the
country is given, with specific emphasis on the process of
drafting the current constitution.
The role of constitutional courts in federal systems, their
contrib.itions to, and the theoretical basis for participation in
the develorinent and maintenance of, constitutional systems is
discussed.
This study includes a fairly detailed analysis of the arguunts
about the role of the U.S. Supreme Court and the American Federal
judiciary in practising judicial review, and the authority of
judicial interpretations of the constitution. The West German
experience in judicial review and its effecs on federalism is
analysed.
The constitutional system of the United Arab flmtrates and the
position and caiipetence of its Supreme Court is studied. The
legislative regulation of the Supreme Court is evaluated.
A detailed study is provided of the development of the
jurisprudence of the Court since its establishment.
Findings and recaanendations aimed at improving the contrib.ition
of the Supreme Court in the constitutional system of the United
Arab Emirates are provided.
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The purpose of this study is to denonstrate the importance
of the role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional system of
the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), to discuss its possible
contributions to constitutional development and to suggest
measures to improve its performance.
The importance of the court can be discovered through the
study of the ccrnpetence it is given and by analysing the way in
which it discharges its duties. The importance of the canpetence
of the Supreme Court in the constitutional system of the U.A.E.
is based primarily on the pcwer it is given to render binding
constitutional interpretations, ard also on the role it plays in
resolving disputes about the federal system.
Because of their involvennt in constitutional interpretat-
ion and the importance of their canpetence in determining the
distribution of powers and the limits on the use of power,
constitutional courts are often the subject of debate as to their
proper roles and the legitimacy of their interpretations. In
their application of legal rules courts are by no means passive
participants in the legal process. The myth that courts only
interpret the law is supported neither in theory nor in practice.
Constitutional interpretation involves wide use of discret-
ion and choice for those empcered to carry it out. The nature of
constitutions, the language used in them and the fact that they
are intended, generally, to last over long periods of time are
some of the factors that make the interpretation of such
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constitutions involve wide discretion. The framers of a
constitution cannot foresee all possible needs and situations in
which a constitution will apply, so they provide texts that are
general arx allow for wide interpretive choice. Theorists who
call for literal interpretations of constitutional texts cannot
deny the general nature of the language used therein, and cannot
argue that those who framed the constitution had the ability to
predict all future applications. The ultimate result of the
characteristics of language and the purposes of a constitution Is
a large measure of interpretive discretion for the constitutional
judges.
The nature of constitutional interpretation and the choices
available for judges result in critical carirents fran acaduics
as well as from those in power. One basis for criticism of
constitutional choice by judges relies on the traditional theory
of law, that the law is "there" to be discovered, and that judges
have no right to participate in the develoxnent of that law.
Another cause for criticism is that constitutional choices by
judges can be considered undeitcratIc in that It gives unelected
or unaccountable persons the right to make choices that may
contradict choices made by representative institutions.
In the face of challenges to the role of constitutional
courts, these courts maintain the legitimacy of their choices by
dtonstrating judicial coherence in their decisions. This process
begins with reference to constitutional texts, but as their
reliance extends beyond the express rds of constitutions to
include principles such as implied powers and measures like
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balancing the federal systems, more refinement in their choices
and rationalisation of their principles is needed.
Because of the political nature of constitutions, the courts
in their interpretations are bound to affect the political proc-
ess, but the important justification of the courts depends on the
rationalisation of their decisions in the light of constitutional
texts and their underlying values, and established jurisprudence.
In federal systems courts have been an essential part of
maintaining and adjusting federal balance. There is no single
concept of federalism, even within a single state. The federal
balance cannot be left to political organs without the risk of
t nationalisation' by the central government, or the disintegrat-
ion of the Constitution by the action of the governments of the
states. It is of particular importance that the short term aims
of a single state or the desires of central institutions do not
thwart the general caiinitment to federalism.
As federal experiences gather importance and cross national
borders to new areas, and as solutions and adjustments within
such systems are utilised in other countries, a ccrrtparative study
of federal systems and their institutions becanes more important.
Judicial review of legislation is adopted in many places, and the
justifications and challenges it faces are catiron to several
countries.
The importance of canparative investigation into constitut-
ional judicial review is to refute the myth that judges simply
apply the law, to shcM the role of courts in umpiring and rnaint-
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aining federal systems and to show the necessity of justification
arid coherence in the judicial interpretations of constitutions.
Ccmparative investigation is not meant to show that arguments
which have succeeded in a particular jurisdiction must succeed in
another, but rather to demonstrate the core features of the
process which must be present in any jurisdiction if the role of
the constitutional court is to be discharged effectively.
This study will examine the realities and possibilities of
the role of the Supreme Court in the development of the
constitutional order in the U.A.E. The purpose of the study is
to enable those concerned with the constitution of the U.A.E. to
understand the role of the Supreme Court in developing the
constitutional order of the country, and to make suggestions as
to how its functions may be nre effectively discharged.
The U.A.E. has its own characteristics, sane of which are
unique to the country arid sane which have been received fran
other countries and fran earlier experiences. The country has a
written constitution which caine into force on 2 December 1971:
the day of independence fran Britain. The constitution of the
U.APE. adopted the federal system, with the creation of a central
government to which the emirates surrendered parts of their
powers and sovereignties. The constitution of the tJ.A.E. is
labelled "provisional". According to its provisions, the
provisional constitution, intended as a basis for stronger union,
was to be replaced by a new permanent constitution after five
years. As will be seen, this replaceirent has not occurred. The
distrib.ition of powers within the constitutional arrangements
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contains no radical shift away fran the concentration of pcers
with the heads of the emirates. The Supreme Council in the Union,
which is the central focus of legislative and executive pcMer, is
cctnposed of the rulers of the respective emirates.
The continued operation of the constitution beyond the
initial five year period has meant that its provisions are to be
applied to situations and for a duration beyond the intentions of
its framers. Effective answers, solutions and decisions were
needed in the early years c3f the Federation and continue to be
needed as the constitution continues in force. Due to the
importance of the constitution and its necessity for the
continued existence and developint of the country, all problems
created and questions raised about its operation need to be dealt
with effectively. Effective interpretations of the constitution
are needed, and answers where none are clear-cut, not just
clause-bound interpretations of its provisions. As the country
develops and becanes more open to the world, in contrast to a
rigid and closed society, the enquiries and challenges it faces
grow, with the concomitant need to satisfy the demand for
constitutional answers.
The provisional constitution of the U.A.E. adopted judicial
constitutional review. The task of constitutional review and
interpretation was given to the Supreme Court. In addition, the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction in disputes between the member
emirates and between them and the federal government. All of
these matters are within the caupetence of the Court and, because
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of the federal nature of the country, the Supreme Court has an
essential task to perform. It is important to study the possibil-
ities available, the discretion provided and any obstacles to the
Court's full performance of its duty. Improvements cannot be
made unless kncMledge and appreciation are available as to the
obstacles that exist and the potential for such improvements.
Study of the formal and informal factors affecting the Court and
of its past experience is needed for better understanding and
better prospects for improvements.
Several of the institutions and instruments utilised by the
framers of the constitution are closely connected with, and
largely attributed to, the U.S. constitutional system. The
written constitution, federalism and judicial review of
constitutionality are all attributed to the U.S. system.
Examination of the controversies and possibilities in the U.S.
Supreme Court's performance of its duties is helpful to the
achievement of the purposes of this study.
West Germany has a nore nodern constitution (The Basic Law)
than that of the U.S •, and has the three characteristics of:
written constitution, federal system and judicial review of
constitutionality. Study of this system is also of help for this
subject. The West German system has an added benefit of being in
a Civil Law country, which is nore associated with the system
adopted in the U.A.E. Examination of experiences of
constitutional courts' experiences in federal systems is helpful
in shedding nore light on the solutions available to, and ways of
improving the performance of, the Supreme Court of the U.A.E.
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Following this introduction will be a study of the general
history of the emirates, the nature of the society and the
country as a whole. Developments in the twentieth century,
leading to the formation of the federal system will be analysed.
The process of adopting the current constitution will be
reported. All of this introductory information about the
emirates will be dealt with in Part 1.
Part 2 will deal with the role of supreme courts in federal
systems; the necessary interpretive roles of these courts; the
experience of the u.s. in establishing the legitimacy of judicial
review; the role of the West German constitutional court in
maintaining federal balance; and the effect of judicial review of
the caiinerce power of the U.S. and its general effect on the
federal system.
Part 3 will deal with the constitutional system of the
U.A.E.; the actual position of the Supreme Court in this system;
and the performance of the court since its establishment. A
critical analysis of the powers, impediments and possibilities of
the Court's role will be provided. The development of the
jurisprudence of the court will be studied to show the importance
of the court's role and its consistency in the discharging of its
jurisdiction.
The conclusion will list findings and recommendations
resulting fran this study.
PAI?I' !E
'mE (XXJN'IRY, ITS HISW.IRY AND WNE ¶IQARDS UNITY
The United Arab Emiraths is composed of seven emirates,
namely Abu-Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Um-Al--Qaiwain, Ras-Al-
}(haimah and Fajairah. Previously these emirates were autonanous
polities. The geographical location and characteristics of the
country are determinant factors in its past and present socio-
political, economic and strategic affairs. As part of the
Arabian Peninsula it is part of the Arab world and the so-called
Middle East area, and is inhabited by indigenous Arabs. The
United Arab Finirates identifies itself as part of the Islamic
world, having a totally Muslim indigenous population.
The geographical and demographic characteristics of the
country do not differ much from those of the neighbouring
countries. The land is extremely arid, with vast desert areas.
The north eastern part of the country is well known for its Hajar
Mountains which rise fran the sea. These mountains continue
southward into neighbouring Qrian and are rugged, with difficult
passes. They separate eastern United Arab flnirates from the rest
of the country. Due to long separation fran the main part of the
country, the mountain region and the eastern area are marked by
the differences of population and economic status. The mountains
more than simply divide the country into two. They act as a
barrier for clouds caning f ran the Indian Ocean, the effect of
which is to precipitate rain on their peaks. Fran this watershed,
the water runs downhill, providing the underground water which
has for a long time supplied the necessary water for most of the
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population of the country.
The western and south western part of United Arab flnirates
is marked by an expanse of desert, an extension of the flnpty
Quarter, which is ccmprised of a vast ocean of sand and sand
dunes with hardly any vegetation except in small isolated oases
of Liwa villages. The coastline stretches about 430 miles along
the Arabian Gulf and about 60 miles along the Gulf of Qian. The
main populated and econanic centres are along the coast.
The United Arab FLliirates is located on the southern coast of
the Arabian Gulf, bordering Saudi Arabia on the south and west
and Qnan on the south east and north east. The total area of
United Arab Enirates is approximately 32,000 square miles, made
up as follows (1):
AREA
	
SJJARE M1T
Atu-Dbabi
	
28,000
Dubai
	
1 ,500
Shari ah
	
1 ,000
Ras-A1-Ithaimah	 650
Fuj airah	 450
Urn Al-Qaiwain	 300
Ajman	 150
The main cities are situated on natural coastal inlets
allowing people in past and present times to harbour their ships
and exploit marine resources for their living. Agriculturally,
the land is poorly endowed. The people of the country have
traditionally depended for their living on the sea and on the
vary sparse vegetation on the land. There were seasonal
movements, between the sea and the hinterland. In surrner, people
tended to move to the coast in order to pearl and fish. In
thapter 1	
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winter the rainfall is sufficient to provide food for their
camels and goats. A proportion of the population lived in, the
good harbours to work in the local and the inter-port trade.
Other people were employed transporting seasonal crops and pearls
between Iraq, India, Southern Iran, Qnan and East Africa.
In recent years the economic position and financial strength
of the emirates have been deeply affected by the discovery of oil
in several of them, and the subsequent huge sums of money
resulting from the export of crude oil.
The discovery of oil has had far reaching consequences on
the society and its economic well-being. The material developeent
of the emirates since 1965 has been revolutionary. Social,
educational, medical and other services have been generously
provided for the citizens free of charge.
The oil rroney has brought modern technology and diversified
skills. This has transformed and ncdernised the country, which
is ni excellently equipped to provide comfortable living for its
residents. The large influx of rroney and the huge infrastructure
projects and developeent plans have contributed in bringing to
the country alien workers: technical, managerial and unskilled.
The indigenous population form only about 18% or 20% of the total
population resident in the country (2)
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British thtry to the Gulf
For a long time the coast of what is now the United Arab
flnirates was under Cmani rule. Qnani dciiiinat ion spread from the
current Oman to include the Musandam Peninsula and the Gulf
coast, as well as some islands of the lower Gulf and parts of the
Eastern coast, which now comprise part of Iran. Omani rule was
challenged by the Iranians and the Portuguese, as well as by the
rising power of the Qawasim who managed to unite a number of
tribes arid lead them to oust the Cmanis from the United Arab
Eknirates coast and from all their positions in the Gulf.
Although the Portuguese had a stake in the affairs of the
lower Gulf in the 16th century before the rise of the Qawasim,
they departed the area leaving few traces of their presence,
except for some forts. The Qawasim took a position on Qishim
Island and from there they managed seriously to affect the
customs receipts of the British East India Canpariy from Bandar
Abbas by controlling the inter-port trade of the area (3).
The first notable contact between the British and the Arabs
of the southern shores of the Gulf (United Arab flnirates) was a
military confrontation. The ruler of Ras-Al-Khaimah seized
Basidu on Qishim Island and established a trading centre there.
This seriously affected the customs receipts which were being
shared between the British and the Persians. In 1727, the Agent
of the British East India Canpany at Bandar Abbas led a naval
expedition to Qishim Island and recovered the company's share of
dues from the Qasimi representative on the island (4).
British trade with India grew in importance, and the trade
chapterl	
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route needed to be safeguarded, using force where necessary to
prevent any intrusion on their ships en route to and fran India.
Britain took responsibility for policing the southern shore of
the Gulf against canpeting activities, by Europeans as well as
The activities of the British East India Ccmpany remained
mainly commercial until the end of the seventeenth century.
British political and military involvements increased steadily in
the eighteenth century (6)•
Qxifrcntaticxi betwei tI (wasim ar1 the British East Irdia
Qnpany
Britain saw the Gulf area as important for a variety of
reasons. Firstly, it was both a source of Persian silk and off er-
ed a large market for the textiles produced in Surat in India.
Secondly, the Gulf is close to India, and was therefore strat-
egically vital • In order to protect India f ran other European
nations, and to safeguard British passage to India, Britain had
to ensure that no other power, foreign or local, could challenge
them in the Gulf. Thirdly, the route from India and other
eastern dominions, which were spice producing areas, passed
through the Gulf to Basra in Southern Iraq and f ram there to the
Mediterranean, fran where the spices were shipped to Britain and
other European trade centres, was considerably shorter than the
alternative route, used by Portugal and the Netherlands at that
time, which passed around the Cape of Good Hope.
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The rivalry of economic interests between the British and
the Qawasim, the Alliance between the British and the Imam of
Musqat who was the Qawasim's rival in the area, and the further
alliance between the Qawasim and the Wahhabi state, all combined
to make the clash between the two sides inevitable.
The first confrontations between the Qawasim and the British
were on Qishm Island and at sea, bit these were insignificant.
The first real war between the Qawasim and the British was in
1809 when around 18 British warships attacked Ras-A1-Khaimah, the
Qawasim's main base, and destroyed all the ships in the harbour,
berned the city and took whatever they could, returning to sea in
spite of retaliation by the Saudi allies of the Qawasim. The
British discovered after four years that what they had destroyed
was only a small part of the Qawasim navy, and that the Qawasim
had resumed their activities at sea by 1812 (7). In 1812 the Imam
of anan with the assistance of the British, and with the help of
the Bani-Yas tribes of bu-Dhãbi, attacked Ras-Al-Khaimah to
regain a position there, restore the situatiori and put an end to
Qawasimi activity. The attempt failed and the Qawasim proved
again that they were still strong enough to retain their
independence and maintain the area under their rule (8)• In 1814
the Imam of Qan was finally successful, and imposed a truce on
the ruler of Ras-Al-Khaimah by which this ruler relinquished his
claim to Ras-Al-Khaimah and removed to Sharjah. One of his
cousins became the new ruler of Ras-Al-}(haimah with the consent
of the British representative. This step was aimed at dividing
the territory under the control of the Qawasim in order to limit
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their power.
Through time and the weakening of wasimi dctninion, new
cities along the Gulf coast began to claim independence from
Qawasimi. control.
The I epticri ani tve1oçiIEnt of the Treaty Re1aticiiship betwei
Britain arki t1 Enirates
The Qawasim continued their maritime activities against
those who they considered trade or political rivals, in
particular the British, Indian subjects of the British government
in India, and the Qranis. The years from 1808 to 1818 witnessed
the fall of the Saudi state at the hands of the Egyptians led by
Ibrahim Pasha. The British in India were determined to take
conclusive action to restore peace and stability for their trade
in the Gulf. They sent Sir William Keir with a considerable naval
force and instructed him to destroy all piratical vessels and
naval and military stores found at Ras-Al-Khaimah. The British
fleet stormed and occupied Ras-Al-Khairnah in December 1819
Preliminary agreements were signed by the Sheikhs of Sharjah, who
also signed on behalf of the Sheikhs of Ajman and Um-Al-(iwain,
the Ruler of Ras-Al-Khaimah, and the Hinawi rulers of Dubai and
Abu-Dhabi (1 0)
The terms of these preliminary agreements were not always
the same bet they amounted to assuring the surrender of vessels,
fortified towers, guns and British Indian prisoners, while the
rulers were assured of their rights to safe pearling and
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fishing (11)
This occasion marks the first identifiable incident in which
the individuality of the emirates was recognised by an
international power.
The emirates already existed as individual tribal confeder-
ations, but this individuality and independence had extended only
as far as danestic affairs were concerned. These emirates were
increasingly treated as one political catwunity by the foreign
powers entering the area. That the British signed the agreement
of 1820 with each ruler individually, was an act with several
levels of significance. One in particular concerns this study,
that is it gave an extra dimension to the individuality of the
emirates, by recognising their independence in the international
sphere. The British could have signed the agreement with only
one of the rulers, and recognised his authority over all the
area. Such an act would have united the area even though
military force might have been necessary to enforce this unity.
Why did the British choose to sign the agreement with each
individual ruler rather than recognise only one daninant figure?
There were several reasons for this attitude. One factor was
that the British were determined not to interfere in local
domestic affairs. another factor was that the British preferred
to deal with several small (and therefore weak) entities rather
than with one comparatively strong entity. 'A third reason was
that the domestic sphere was so complicated that the British
found themselves obliged to deal with several rulers rather than
with one alone.
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An Evaluaticxi of the G&ieral Treaty of 1820
The name of this treaty is The General Treaty for Cessation
of Plunder and Piracy. This treaty was signed by the British
East India Canpany with the Trucial states and Babrain
The purpose of signing this treaty was to preserve the trade
of the East India Company and other British subjects against
piracy or disruption. This treaty was not concerned with
danestic matters, so it did not prevent the rulers from waging
war against each other (13)
Article 4 of this treaty included a paragraph that the
rulers:
"undertook to be at peace with the British government and
not to fight each other."
But this part was viewed as extending further than the original
purpose of the treaty, so it was not enforced (14)
'fl Perpetual Truce of 1853
The British policy of non-interference in domestic matters
and its lack of interest in inter-emirate disputes left the door
open for conflicts and attacks by sea and on land between the
emirates. There were several reasons why the British were not
keen on preserving local security. These included the difficulty
of cainunicat ion, the sense of nationalism and the rejection of
foreign interference in the local sphere. Another important
reason was that the British were mostly concerned about the
preservation of peace for their trade in the Indian Ocean and in
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the Gulf which they considered not to be threatened by local
wars. The frequency of conflicts between the emirates especially
at sea disrupted the principal economic activity of the
inhabitants, which was pearl fishing. In 1835 the British acting
Political Resident suggested a maritime truce during the next
pearl fishing season. So in August 1835 the rulers signed the
suggested truce. The rulers bound themselves in this truce not to
retaliate against any aggression if it happened in the pearling
season, bet to report the matter to the British naval authority.
The non-retaliation truce was renewed annually to 1853, at which
point the Political Resident consulted the rulers as to the
possibility of signing a permanent peace at sea agreement (15)
In this truce the rulers agreed to a caiplete cessation of
hostilities at sea. The rulers also agreed not to retaliate if
they came under attack frc1n another emirate at sea bet to inform
the British Resident about the incident. The importance of this
agreement is that whilst it was signed between the individual
rulers and the British Representative, its prime objective was to
deal with relations between the emirates themselves to ensure
peace at sea. So in this agreement we can see a major step
towards normalising and pacifying relations between the emirates,
who had for a long time confronted each other at sea and on land.
'the ainprehasive aqreairit of 1892
During the 1870s and 1880s there were various activities of
other states which the British considered to be an unacceptable
chapterl	 -19-
challenge, and intervention in their danination of the emirates
area. The French, Turks, Greeks and Persians all had sane contact
with the emirates. In order - to ensure that other countries had
no political or canrnercial contact with the emirates which might
harm their interests, the British introduced and signed an
agreement with the emirates allowing the British to control all
the foreign political and cctrmercial relations of the emirates.
In this agreement, signed in 1892 with the individual
rulers, the rulers agreed not to enter into any agreement or
correspondence with any power other than Britain, not to consent
to the residence within their territories of any agent of another
government and on no account cede, sell or otherwise give
occupation of any part of their territories to anybody but the
British government. This agreement has been called the
canprehensive agreement. In this agreement it is manifest that
the emirates surrendered a great part of their independence to
the British government.
This was the last of the important treaties between the
emirates and the British government.
'fl Legal Status of the nirates urñer the British Treaty
Relatjcxis
The British government treated the rulers of the emirates as
heads of independent states. On various occasions in the nine-
teenth century, these rulers professed some kinds of allegiance
to more powerful governments in the area. The governments, such
as the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia were interested in extending
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their influence to the area. The fact that the British
government decided to establish direct relations with the
emirates shows that it did not consider that allegiance of the
rulers to the other powers seriously affected their independence.
During the period 1820-1892 the British treaties with the
rulers were all in the nature of military alliances and friend-
ship. The British government exercised no legal jurisdiction
over any part of the territories of the emirates
In the period 1892-191 i treaties of protection and various
other agreements were concluded between the British government
and the rulers of the emirates. These agreements established
closer relations between the British government and the emirates.
Fran 1911 agreements concerning econanic matters and natural
resources were signed, strengthening relations between the
emirates and the British government further and creating a desire
on the part of the British government to define nore clearly the
boundaries of the emirates.
tk)siticxt of tt emirates within tt British Cstithticxa1
franErk urxler tl exclusive agreement of 1892
Under British Constitutional law, Protectorates differ fran
Colonies in that they do not constitute part of the British
Daninions. In all British Protectorates foreign relations are
controlled by the British Crown. However, the extnt of power
reserved by each protectorate internally is the basis on which
British protectorates may be legally classified as:
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(a) Colcziial Protectorates: In these protectorates the amount
of power exercised by the Crown does not differ very much
fran that exercised in the colonies. In general the Crown
reserves most powers of legislation and administration.
However, in contrast to the colonies, these protectorates
are regarded as foreign territories (17)• Powers of the
Crown were acquired by virtue of agreements with tribal
chiefs who agreed to place themselves under the sovereignty
of the Queen. The Crown exercises jurisdiction in these
protectorates over all subjects on the basis of the Foreign
Jurisdiction Act, 1890. Legislation is enacted by Orders in
Council, and an act of the Crown in relation to a native
individual is regarded as an act of state which cannot be
questioned in English courts (18)•
(b) Protected States: In these states the British government
has recognised the sovereignty of the local rulers, who have
retained their independence at least with regard to the
administration of their own governments. With regard to the
external affairs of those states, the powers reserved by the
Crown are based on treaty obligations. In practice the
extent of powers exercised by the Crown in these states
varies from one state to another, according to the
particular circumstances. They are all, however, considered
to be sovereign states and their rulers are granted
innunities fran jurisdiction in British courts.
The difference between Protectorates and Protected States is that
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in the Protectorate the British government assumes and exercises
full sovereign authority, although without annexing the
territory, while in the Protected State the sovereign authority
belongs to the sovereign of the state, and the role of the
British government is derived fran treaty agreements with the
states (19)• In relation to the Gulf states, the first official
reference to them as "British Protected States" was contained in
The British Protectorates, Protected States and Protected Persons
Order in Council, 1949 (20)•
For the purposes of this order the Gulf states, together
with other states, were classified as "British Protected States".
Under this classification and the treaty, the rulers of the Gulf
states, and the states themselves remained, internally
independent of British control. The governments of the Sheikhdans
were headed by absolute rulers who reserved the power to make
laws by proclamations and to administer, through representatives
appointed by themselves, justice, police and various other
functions of government. The British government exercised no
power of legislation over any persons in the Sheikhdans, other
than those subject to the jurisdiction of British courts (21)•
'fl Effects of British Treaties with tI Fni rates
British involvement with the emirates was fuelled by the
search for greater stability and safety for its commercial
interests in India. Raids on its canmercial fleet, and on ships
owned by its subjects, triggered the British attack on Ras-Al-
(haah and the signing of the 1820 treaty. So the original
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British interest was in the sea rather than on land. This goes
some way to explaining why the British were not interested in the
domestic affairs of the emirates, and wished to avoid incurring
unnecessary expense by intervening in domestic politics.
British attitudes and policy had several consequences. By
analysing British policy to, and its treaties with, the emirates
we can note the following effects.
1) The recgniticn by Britain that the rulers of the nirates
are truly sovereign with wl-xxn it xiild have valid agrents
urxler Internaticia1 law
The emirates were comprised of numbers of people residing in
certain areas alongside the Gulf, enjoying constant contact and
relations with other groups of people living around the scattered
oases of the interior. Since the entry into the area of the
British, the rulers have been recognised as independent heads of
tiny states subject to international law. The independence and
sovereignty of each emirate was placed in relation to the whole
world and in relation to each other. Before the treaties, the
influence of each emirate varied through time. Sharjah was
united with Ras-Al-Khaimah and included Ajman, Um-Al-Qaiwain and
Fujairah, and was ruled by the Qawasim. Abu-Dbabi at one time
extended fran the Peninsula of Qatar to the eastern part of the
inlet of Dubai. The 1820 treaty was the first written external
recognition of the individuality of each emirate. Through time,
and change in the balance of power in the domestic sphere, new
emirates appeared (e.g. Fujairah) and other emirates disappeared
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(e.g. Kalba), until the number of emirates stabilised. British
recognition of new emirates was important for the bestowal of
official credibility. British abstention fran recognising the
existence of a new emirate delayed its appearance (as with the
case of Fujairah, which was not recognised by the British until
the 1950s).
The treaties with Britain were an important factor in
recognising the sovereignty and the individuality of the
emirates.
2) 'the strengthening of the aastal rulers as cosed to their
mterparts inland
The British originally signed the treaties because of their
need to safeguard their trade routes to India. Their dealings,
therefore, were with the coastal rulers. Recognition by the
British government of the sovereignty of the coastal rulers made
these rulers the only ones recognised as politically sovereign in
the eyes of the rest of the world. The international emergence of
the coastal rulers was reflected internally by the need of the
leaders of the interior to align themselves with, and be
subordinate to, the coastal rulers. This was done in order to
receive the support and achieve the stability they needed to
establish permanent existence on lands which had previously been
in cariixn use by all the turbulent people of the interior.
The stability resulting fran the signing of treaties with
Britain allowed pearling to flourish and the inter-port trade to
increase. The increased wealth and enhanced econamic status of
the people on the coast had enriched their rulers who taxed the
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incctning pearling ships and canmercial vessels. The enhanced
econcniic status of the coastal rulers was a further incentive for
inland leaders to subordinate themselves and their territories to
the authority of the coastal rulers.
The increasing strength of the coastal rulers helped to
establish the present centres of political importance. The
relative stability and security of the coastal cities, coupled
with their econanic strength resulting fran the treaty, made
these cities attractive to the inland population, resulting in
further concentration of people in the coastal cities.
The emigration of people fran the hinterland to the coastal
cities had many consequences. Politically, it led to the increase
in pcier of the rulers of these cities, and to a tendency for the
cities to become full city states. Profound changes in the
econanic structure of the hinterland took place. Agricultural
activities such as animal husbandry were abandoned in favour of
those activities based on the sea, such as pearling, fishing and
inter-port trade. This shift of econamic importance in favour of
the coastal cities was later consolidated when oil revenues
replaced pearling revenues as the major source of incane.
3) The improvement in inter-emirate relations, and the
forntJxxi of the sevi nirates as ci grc*ip
Inter-emirate relations went through several phases. The
first phase was that prevailing prior to the involvement of the
British. This phase was characterised by the division into
conflicting tribal alliances of the Qawasim and the Bani-Yas.
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Later, the tribal alliances were restructured and a different
pattern of conflict emerged. The restructuring occurred because
of the alliances formed during the C*nani civil war. The Qawasim
allied themselves with the Ghafiri, whereas the Bani-Yas
supported the Henawi. The alliances, however, could not be
maintained. So Bani-Yas suffered internal conflicts, one of which
resulted in the establishment of the emirate of ]i (22) The
Qawasim alliance suffered similar conflicts which resulted in
their sphere of influence being divided into several new
emirates. Inter-emirate relations were far fran frierly or
stable. Rather, there were constant conflicts, ccxnpetition over
econcmic resources and tribal disagreements. The signing of the
1820 treaty with the British started a series of events which
resulted in the signing of a truce, the subject of which was to
end the acts of transgression between the emirates • The British
were not prepared to play the role of perpetual mediator between
the emirates, so they did not maintain an adequate force to do
this job. After signing the treaty with the British, the rulers
felt that although there were no British naval ships in their
area, they were capable of calling on the British military force
in any major conflict. As this feeling strengthened, the
incidence of war between the emirates declined. There were times
when acts of aggression at sea began to increase, jeopardising
the vital pearling in the Gulf. To reduce conflict, the treaties
of 1835 and 1853 were intrcxluced. The 1853 treaty introduced new
factors into inter-emirate relations: because the rulers agreed
not to retaliate against any aggression suffered at the hands of
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other emirates during the pearling season. The non-retaliation
policy activated under the 1853 treaty eliminated a principal
cause of inter-emirate wars and conflicts.
A later treaty added a new dimension to inter-emirate
relations: the grouping of the emirates into one unit. This
treaty of 1897 has been has been called "The agreement for the
mutual surrender of fraudulently absconding debtors". This agree-
ment provided for the establishment of an Arbitration Council
convened on behalf of the emirates' rulers. It was a significant
step towards moulding the emirates into one political .structure
and separating them fran the other Sheikhdoms in the area (23)
The grouping of the emirates into a single unit became
increasingly evident. One reason was the camin treatment by the
British. Treaties were often signed by all the rulers, whilst the
British interests were represented by one representative who was
for a considerable time the native Resident Agent, situated in
Sharj ah.
4) The aboliticn of slavery
The 1820 treaty called upon the rulers to prevent their
subjects f ran carrying of f slaves fran anywhere and transporting
them. This did not end slavery in the area, although the treaties
helped to curtail the slave trade. Later in the twentieth
century, the British representative began to issue certificates
to slaves pronouncing them free. This ended slavery in the
emirates. The abolition of slavery precipitated major changes in
the social and econanic status of the people of the emirates.
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1E 1VEDIENT cF ThE EIR	 n ThE NIE1H CNIURY
1. Political Develcpits
The British expedition and attack against the Qawasim helped
to disintegrate their state into several Sheikhdans which were
subsequently recognised by the British. At the same time, the
Bani-Yas state was left intact because it was an inland-based
state with no maritime power, (and therefore causing no threat to
British trade). This helped to shape the political geography of
the area.
The first signs of change were the appearance of two
emirates, namely Ajman and Um-Al-Qaiwain with local leaders who
had previously fallen under the authority of the Qawasim. These
leaders were now elevated to the status of independent rulers,
with the power to sign treaties with the British. A further step
in the disintegration of the Qawasim state was the division of
the Qawasim themselves into two independent Sheikhdctns, Sharjah
and Ras-Al-Khaimah. In time, the town of Kalba on the eastern
coast was also recognised as an independent Sheikhdan.
The disintegration of the Qawasim state continued into the
twentieth century. Fujairah was recognised as an independent
emirate in 1951, and there have been attempts by two other towns
(Himriyah and Rams) to gain independence fran the Qawasim. In
1838 the Bani-Yas state, which continued to prosper, suffered an
incident of disintegration. Sane Bani-Yas families left to settle
in Dubai, ousting the governor who was appointed by the ba-Dhabi
ruler. They established a new Shei]chdan with the Al-Bu-falasah
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family as a ruling family. The present number of seven emirates
dates fran the 1950s.	 -
The geographical size of each emirate is related to its
history and develoçznent. For example, Aba-Dhabi is the largest
because it is a land-based Sheikhdan, whereas the Qawasim have
two smaller emirates because, being a maritime state, it was
attacked by the British, and eventually disintegrated into
several emirates.
The growth of Abu-Dhabi was enhanced by the strength of its
ruler, Zayed bin Khalifa, who ruled for over sixty years (1855-
1909). During the reign of Zayed bin Khalifa, the capital of
Bani-Yas was transferred fran Liwa to Abu-Dhabi Island; pearling
activities brought economic success to the emirate; and the
daninance of Abu-Dhabi was recognised over the Islands facing its
territory as well as over the important Buraimi Oasis. The
policies followed by Zayed proved successful in gaining the
allegiance of several important tribes, through financial
assistance as well as through marital relationships and well-
conducted diplomacy. The British were mostly interested in
preserving peace at sea for the benefit of their trade and postal
routes, their emerging strategic interests in the area in the
form of air routes to India and telegraphic stations in the
emirates. The British were concerned to preserve the status quo
and were against any change which might undermine the stability
of the area. This policy entailed activities to maintain the
existing emirates and their ruling families, their defence
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against any threat from inside or outside and defending the
emirates from the ambitions of each other.
In their treaties with the emirates, the British undertook
to protect them fran foreign attacks, so they were saved both
from the Saudi expansionist designs and fran Iranian ambitions.
Relationships anong the emirates in the nineteenth century
were marked by continuing aninosity between the Bani-Yas of Abu-
Dhabi and the wasim of Sharjah, and between each of them and
Dubai • This latter was established when part of Bani-Yas seceded
in 1838.
The relationship between the smaller emirates, established
in the former Qasimi territory, and the remaining Qasimi state
was one of continuing unrest. All the rulers of the emirates
used the nomads of the interior as fighting men. To enlarge
their territory, the rulers attempted to gain the loyalty of the
residents. Their success in gaining the loyalty of the nomads
was an assurance of their expanding and increasing power. Abu-
Dhabi was remarkably successful in its alliance with the nomads,
and continued to expand and to gain strength.
There were, however, times when the rulers felt the need to
co-operate in order to achieve their canton ends.
One of the remarkable co-operative achievements was the
signing of the Perpetual Peace Agreement in 1853. In 1905 the
rulers of the emirates of that time (Abu-Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah,
Um-Al-Qaiwain and Ajman) held a meeting to solve a dispute
concerning sane mountain villages. This was the first recorded
meeting of all the Sheikhs in a council (24)•
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The British policy of general non-interference in dctnestic
politics left the different relevant factions to interact as they
chose • What concerns us here is that the rulers felt the need
for joint action and co-operation. Co-operation among the
emirates continued, and later developed into institutional bodies
with the permission and encouragement of the British authorities.
These experiences of joint actions and the later co-operative
institutions had a decisive effect in encouraging the emirates to
accept the Federation when it was time for the British to leave
the area.
British policy appeared to encourage co-operation between
the emirates • At the same time, each emirate retained its indep-
endence. The British policy of guaranteeing the independence of
the emirates fran the ambitions of other emirates entailed the
repeated threat to use force against any emirate which appeared
to be challenging the independence of another emirate (25)
As a general rule, fighting decreased with the passage of
time. Maritime fighting was virtually eliminated by the
Perpetual Peace treaty. Fighting on land decreased steadily,
with sporadic exceptions. The emirates were gradually noving fran
an era of continuous war and hostility into an era of mutual
understanding and co-operation.
The absence of a law of prinogeniture in the emirates has
been a cause for continuous turrroil and unrest. In the event of
the death of a ruler, rulership used to be handed down to the
nearest adult male, but this was not a general rule accepted by
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all the ruling families and their members. Furthermore natural
death was not the only way of ending one reign and beginning
another. There were murders by brothers, nephews and cousins, and
there were depositions and secessions. The challenge of power in
the emirates was continuous. While the people of each emirate
generally accepted the ruling family as their source of rulers,
canpetition airong the members of such families was generally
endless. The murder of sane rulers and the deposition of others
was a feature of all the emirates except Dubai in which troubles
arrong the members of its ruling family were never allowed to
escalate to the level of changing the ruler. A reason for this
may have been that Dubai is the trading centre of the area arid
the ruling family was aware that political unrest on the danestic
scene might lose the emirate its privileged position. Two
emirates experienced the greatest danestic turmoil • These were
the two largest emirates, namely Sharj ah and Abu-Dhabi.
The canpetition for the ruler's post used to begin after a
long reign by a strong Sheikh, so in P3bu-Dhabi the troubles began
after the death of Zayed bin }(halifa (who ruled fran 1855 to
1910), and in Sharj ah the maj or turmoil occurred after the death
of Sultan bin Sagr (who ruled fran 1803 to 1866) (26)
It was cannon for the rulers to regard the threat fran their
family members as more dangerous than the threat from other
emirates or foreign powers, so there were incidents in which the
rulers invited the British to defend them against ambitious
family members, and in other incidents the rulers called on the
co-operation of other emirates to end a danestic challenge by a
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family memler (27)•
Domestic challenges to government played a significant role
in inter-emirate relations. Two emirates could improve relations
at a time when it was important for one or the other to have out-
side support to end a domestic challenge to power. At other times
new anirrosity could erupt and wars begin if the ruler and his
closest family members considered that another emirate was
assisting and providing refuge for one of their family members
trying to wrest the rulership from them.
The final stage of gaining power in an emirate involved
official recognition of the new ruler by the British authorities.
This was signified by the delivery to them of copies of all the
previous treaties and agreements, and by having the ruler agree
to abide by these treaties.
The British, by their recognition of new rulers and new
emirates, were the final arbiters in the settlement of domestic
unrest by recognising the status of the new ruler, or the new
emirate.
2. EcxzEjnic tve1opint of tI Fiiirates and its Effects
Traditionally, the people who resided in the emirate areas
were either camel breeders or fishermen, with both engaging in
date palm plantations. The coastal people also used their boat
building skills to build larger vessels to engage in inter-port
trade between Iraq, Iran, India and Eastern Africa. The desert
people were mostly camel breeders and date palm growers. They
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would drink camels' milk and eat dates as their daily diet.
There was an interchange of goods between the coast and the
interior, so the people of the interior would bring firewood and
milk products to the coast and buy dried fish and sane imported
products. The traditional way of life had implications for the
inter-emirate relations. irong the reasons for friction airng
the emirates were: disputes over grazing areas, inter-tribal
feuds, disputes over water resources and other kinds of
ccmpetition over resources both on the coast and in the interior.
This, then, was the pattern of life until the appearance of
the British and their treaties with the rulers in the early
nineteenth century. Treaties with the British authorities in
India assured the rulers and their subjects of access to Indian
markets, and also gave an assurance of protection if they flew
the appropriate flags on their ships. The ensuing period
witnessed rapid growth in pearling, because of the assured access
to Indian markets and the new markets for their pearls in Europe
and the United States.
During the era in which pearling flourished, new kinds of
inter-emirate disputes arose. Pearl diving needed to be
financed. The money caine fran local financiers as well as fran
Indian merchants living in the area. One problem was that sane-
times (especially towards the end of this era) the pearling
vessels were earning less than what was expected of them.
Consequently their owners suffered loan repayment difficulties,
and sanetimes absconded to a neighbouring emirate where they
could start afresh. The flight of debtors caused disputes, and
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sometimes wars, between the emirates. In 1897, therefore, all
the trucial Sheikhs signed an agreement for the surrender of
fraudulent absconders (28) The disputes referred to in the 1897
agreement were to be decided by a council of the rulers. This was
a positive step towards solving their disagreements by co-
operative efforts.
The pearling era brought with it a new source of income for
the rulers and their families: taxing pearling vessels. The
increased wealth of the coastal rulers and their acquired ability
to support inland nomads and tribes financially, brought them not
only strength but also sometimes new sources of territorial
conflict between the emirates and disputes over loyalty of the
inland tribes. Taken as a whole, the pearling era was beneficial
to the rulers.
The rulers and their people had found a significant source
of income. Overall, this tended to stabilise the region because
it was recognised that unrest and disturbance could ruin their
pearling activities and endanger their economic progress.
Ailong the benefits of the pearling era, and the financial
well-being it brought to the people of the emirates, was access
to the outside world. In contrast with the situation of the
emirates prior to the pearling era, the people were able to
travel to India to sell their pearls and to buy goods. The
people also developed an interest in regional affairs.
By 1930 the Gulf pearl trade was in decline. The
introduction of Japanese cultured pearls; the world recession;
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and the new restrictions imposed by India on the importation of
the Gulf pearls; all had a cumulative effect.
The sudden decline of the pearl trade had several social and
political effects. Large numbers of people migrated to
neighbouring countries looking for work. Once-wealthy pearl
merchants accumulated debts to Indian financiers. Intervention by
the British Political Resident attempted to ensure that the debts
were paid, but the rulers failed to pay their debts, because they
were used to paying for their allies and inland tribes.
Starvation became apparent in most of the emirates, and the
people returned to their old ways of life. The emirate area and
its people lost much of what they had gained in past decades and
returned to being an isolated area with little attention paid to
it by the outside world.
One emirate was excepted fran the sudden return to poverty;
this was Dubai. Its geographical position and the liberal trade
policy adopted by its ruler encouraged commercial activity.
Inter-port trade with the Iranian coast throve. Dubai became the
centre of commercial activity in the area, and a number of
Persian traders emigrated to Dubai in order to continue their
trade. The importance of Dubai was further acknowledged by the
British transfer of their Political Residency fran Sharjah to
Dubai. As a whole, however, the emirate area remained
economically unimportant until the discovery of oil in
neighbouring countries, and the prospects of oil discovery in the
emirates area.
Oil was first struck in camnercial quantities in Abu-Dbabi
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in the late 1950s and increased into the 1960s with oil income
doubling and trebling bi-annually. The other emirates benefited
from oil money even before production carried oil from their ter-
ritories. This was by the payment of rent of concession lands.
The dawn of the oil era was, to an extent, a mixed blessing.
One consequence was the rekindling of territorial disputes
between the emirates, and the challenge by the inland tribes to
the authority of the rulers to grant concession rights over their
home-lands. The British began to take a more active interest in
the domestic politics of the emirates. They formed a new defence
force, gave financial assistance to the emirates, and advised
over concession agreements. Eployment prospects for the people
rose, and modern medical and educational (and other) services
became available for the first time.
The rulers of the oil producing emirates were acquiring
unprecedented financial strength. These emirates were Mxi-Dhabi
and Dubai, and later Sharjah and Ras-Al-Khaimah.
3. Saie spects of Dev'e1opiit in tI 'Iitieth (ntury
(a) The number of emirates fluctuated from just two in the
nineteenth century (the Qawasim and the Bani-Yas) to about nine,
and stabilised at seven emirates in the 1950s. The seven
emirates appeared as independent from each other and were each
recognised by Britain.
(b) As the number of the emirates stabilised at seven, with most
of the emirates having seceded from the original two, a new
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problem arose of how to determine territorial boundaries between
emirates. The problem of defining boundaries was cctnplicated by
several factors:
i	 the absence of clear conventional rules for defining
territories;
ii the fluctuation of tribal loyalty, which was the rrost
important sign of the distribution of land among the
emirates;
iii the discovery of oil dramatically increased the
importance of land, and precipitated vigorous
canpetition between the emirates to claim ownership of
territories which had for a long time been neglected;
iv the scarcity of water had satetimes been the cause of
disputes about the ownership of wells and other water
sources;
v the small original area of sane emirates coupled with
their need for land to provide for residential and
other services, led them to try to enlarge their areas
by claiming ownership of territories lying between them
and other emirates (29) ar&
vi the canplex intertwining of the emirate territories
complicated the problems of defining the exact
territorial boundaries.
Territorial disputes have been a traditional feature of
relations between the emirates. Moreover, territorial disputes
continued, even after Federation. In one instance, the conflicts
led to confrontation between two emirates with the resulting loss
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of several lives. Fortunately most of the territorial disputes
have been settled gradually oyer the past few years.
(c) The gain by the rulers of a new source of power, which was
the money received as royalty payments and concession rentals
fran the oil canpanies. The potency of oil to enhance the power
of the rulers lay in the fact that, on the one hand, ownership of
the natural resources was vested in the government of each
emirate, and on the other hand that the rulers were fiscally
almost unrestricted. Each local econany became dependent on the
local government and the will of the ruler to spend the oil money
on public services and investment projects. Local governments,
and particularly the rulers, were able to strengthen their
positions by providing money for tribal groups and establishing
new services. This resulted in increasing the loyalty of the
people to them. In direct contrast, the old system of financing
the governments of the emirates was mainly fran taxes and custans
duties which meant that the rulers needed the co-operation of the
people to ensure their incanes.
(ci)In the middle of the twentieth century the emirates area
began to open up to the rest of the Arab world fran whence
teachers, doctors and civil servants came. Radio broadcasts
received fran Egypt and other Arab countries transformed Arab
nationalism, and engendered resentment of the heavy presence of
non-Arabs in the area, especially in the 1 950s and 1 960s.
(e) The rapid educational developnent in the area transferred
the attentions arid concerns of the majority of people fran local
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affairs to regional concerns.
(f) The canpetition for power in the ruling families continued
to weaken the rulers and their power in most of the emirates.
The rulers have generally tended to have their family members
share with them their political power and financial gains. The
attention of rulers was mostly divided between the canpeting
emirates and challenging members of their families.
(g) The flow of oil money and the need to spend it on
infrastructure and to provide services made it essential to bring
in foreign workers.
The money brought with it foreign companies and foreign
investors. The result of the flow of foreigners was that they
became the majority - about 85% at one time. The large number of
foreigners in the country had several effects. As well as using
the free health and other services, the foreigners brought with
them a range of problems for emirate society, including an
increase in the crime rate, and the introduction of drugs.
(h) Confirmation about the independence of the emirates and the
new-found strength of the rulers served to make the emirate
governments focal points in emirate political life. To gather
the tribal units and the ncmads, encouraging them to identify
with one of the emirates became politically important. The oil
money strengthened the appeal of affiliation with the emirates,
especially those producing oil. Recognition of affiliation and
the benefits derived fran their governments gradually eroded
tribal loyalties, which transferred to the emirates instead.
With the appearance of the Federal Government and its role of
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bestowing nationality, and providing education, health services,
most of the civil service and social services and allowances; it
began to cctnrnand loyalty.
4. Islam aril its Effects in tl Emirates
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the residential
population of the emirates was a]st haigeneously Sunni Muslim.
The exceptions were a few Shi' a Muslims who had emigrated fran
the Persian coast and India, and even smaller numbers of Hindu
pearl merchants living in the area temporarily. There were no
signs of canpetition between a majority and a minority, and no
differences antng the indigenous residents in their religious
beliefs. The Sunni sect canprises four schools of opinion. All
of these schools agree on the religious beliefs and fundamental
principles but differ in sane of the interpretations of sane
legal and behavioural duties contained in the original sources.
But the differences were minor and had no schismatic effect on
the population, despite the presence of three of the four schools
in the emirates.
The overwhelming uniformity of belief, and the fact that
Islam occupied a supreme position in the people's lives, unified
the population, especially in the face of foreign intervention.
Islam was and still is the basis for both public and private life
of the people in the Gulf area.
Islam was considered the most important basis for constitut-
ional and legal rules in the emirates. Custaiiary law generally
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played a major role in interpreting the general rules, filling
the gaps, and adapting Islamic legal principles to the local
society. There were few educated Judges and Religious Leaders
employed by the rulers. Despite this fact the general rules app-
licable to the different matters of public and private life were
usually known by inheritance fran generation to generation with
ncdification fran time to time. So, Islamic law was applicable,
but its rules were supplemented by custan and usage. The rulers
were the final arbiters in their emirates, but with the passage
of time and the increased canplications of life, the rulers began
to appoint Judges educated in Islamic Law. In the 1 960s, Western
laws were introduced in Dubai and bu-Dhabi with the emirates
applying their rules. Judges with Western legal education began
to appear with the introduction of the new laws • The new laws
were basically concerned with carrnercial, traffic, tax, penal and
emigration matters. Islamic law was to govern in all matters not
provided for in the new codes. The British political agent was
responsible for matters concerning foreigners and this was
provided for by Orders in Council of 1950, 1 956 and 1959.
5. Joint cticzs ani tbe Road to F3eraticxi
The emirates were on the road to greater co-operation and
closer relations with the passage of time. The camnon needs and
characteristics of the emirates were overwhelming and the British
authorities encouraged them to co-ordinate activities and
establish friendly relations towards each other.
The first examples of joint action were treaties for peace
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at sea and other kinds of agreements, further the rulers felt
the need to meet as a council to solve sane problems concerning
tribal disputes. After the Second World War and the beginning of
the British policy of increased attention to the danestic affairs
of the emirates, the British encouraged joint activities and
established projects to institutionalise the new increased co-
operation between the emirates.
British concern about the domestic affairs began with
activities in two different spheres. The first was the provision
and organisation for the deve1oinent of the service sector in the
emirates starting with health and extending to agriculture,
education, roads and other kinds of services. Development
assistance was launched in 1939 with a dispensary in Dubai, then
developed to be administered by the Developnent office. The
second of the British projects was the establishment of a modest
military land force to protect peace under a variety of
circumstances. This force was called the Trucial Quan Levies,
subsequently renamed the Thucial Qnan Scouts. The new force was
needed to protect the oil explorations and the airfield, and to
ensure peace between the emirates. The Trucial Qnan Scouts later
formed the core for the Union Defence Force after independence.
'lb co-ordinate the develoçnent projects and co-operative efforts,
the British established a council of the rulers of the emirates.
This council was called the Trucial States Council (TSC). The
TSC was established in 1952 with the British political agent as
President and the rulers of the seven emirates as members of the
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council. This council was a venue for co-ordination and co-
operation between the rulers. It had neither written documents
regulating its work nor any ieal power to execute its decisions.
However the TSC remained for a period of about 20 years helping
to draw the emirates and their rulers together and to open the
way for closer and more friendly relations between them. To
organise its work, the TSC set up specialised cctrrnittees and
established the Developnent Fund which administered the financial
assistance received from the different sources, channelling the
assistance towards several vital services in the emirates. The
TSC was helpful proof for the emirates that together they could
achieve success and move forward to developments. More
importantly, the rulers came to feel that their independence
would be preserved while the co-operative projects were provided.
The rulers met in the TSC nearly twice annually, so it was a good
chance to forget the age old tensions and begin to strengthen
personal relations between each other.
In the mid 1 960s Chairmanship of the Council was transferred
from the Political Resident to one of the rulers elected by the
Council for a specific period of time (30)• The TSC had an
important effect on the people of the emirates. It gave them a
sense of unity by demonstrating to them that their vital services
of health, caiununication and agriculture were provided to each
emirate by the one council. Towns saw the establishment of work-
shops and offices carrying the name of the TSC and its
Develoçment Fund. These develojinents helped to make the idea of
inter-emirate co-operation acceptable and welcome. Relations
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changed from animosity between the emirates to friendship and co-
operation.
The idea of Federation between the seven emirates, Qatar and
Bahrain was triggered by the announcement by the British
government on 16th January, 1968 of its intention to terminate
its official treaty obligation with all of the emirates and to
leave the area by the end of 1971 (31)•
6. '1 Dihii greaiit of 1968 anl its Effects
The announcement by Britain of its intentions to leave the
area, prompted anxiety and fear of a future full of dangers and
challenges. Politically, militarily and econanically the emirates
had always had the security of Britain as representative,
protector and keeper of the status quo. There were ambitions
fran Iran and other forces in the area for more power. Could the
small emirates face the world as independent States? This
question, and hosts of others, prompted the rulers of the
emirates and the neighbouring countries to start discussions and
speculations about the future of the area (32)
The first concrete result of Union of the area, following
the British announcement was a bilateral agreement between lthu-
Dhabi and Dubai. On 19 February 1968 Abu-Dhabi and Dubai
announced that they had reached agreement on federation between
them, stipulating that the federation should be established under
one flag and be responsible for foreign affairs, defence and
internal security, medical and educational services, and
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citizenship and migration (33).
The rulers of lthu-Dhabj and Dubai extended a pledge in their
agreement for the five other emirates of the coast of Qnan, and
the two other emirates of tar and Bahrain, to consult on the
issue of unifying their efforts to ensure a better future for the
area
A week after the accord between bu-Dhabi and Dubai was
announced, all the rulers of the other seven emirates responded
positively to the invitation extended in that accord. A meeting
of the nine rulers was convened in Dubai frcm 25 - 27 February
1968 for consultation on forming a union of all nine emirates
(35). An agreement was reached to form the "United rab Emirates
Federation" (which we will refer to as the Dubai Agreement).
Objectives of this federation, that were announced in the
declaration, included: stability in the region, cawron defence,
strengthening joint actions and co-operation for develoçnent and
a better future for the people. The agreement determined federal
authorities to be:
1) A Supreme Council canprising the rulers of the emirates to
oversee the affairs of the federation and to be the supreme
legislative and executive authority in the union (36)
2) An Executive Council was provided under the name the
Federal Council. This council was to assist the Supreme
Council and act according to the policies established by the
rulers in their meetings as the Supreme Council. The
decisions of this council do not take effect unless approved
by the Supreme Council
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3) The Federal Supreme Court, which was determined to be the
highest judicial authority in the Union. The composition
and competence of this court was to be defined by law (38)•
The agreement provided in Article 4, that the Supreme Council
shall undertake responsibility for laying down a charter for the
federation, which was to be ultimately called "The Provisional
Constitution".
The Dubai agreement was drafted hastily under pressures of
need, to stabilise feelings of anxiety within the emirates and to
respond to threats fran outside. There was a feeling among all
the rulers that to fill the vacuum left by Britain, the bilateral
agreement between Abu-Dhabi and Dubai presented an opportunity
for the others to join and to satisfy the need of that time. As
to the agreement itself, it was very brief (17 Articles in total)
and was to prove unworkable and too vague in order to form a
basis for a continuing federation.
All the decisions of the Supreme Council were to be taken
unanimously The decisions of the executive body (the
Federal Council) had to be approved by the Supreme Council in
order to be implemented. Ultimately all decisions, legislation
and orders of the federation created by the Dubai agreement had
to be approved urianirrously by the rulers. This fact was to prove
an obstacle to any effective operation for the Union.
The agreement left a host of important areas undecided: Who
was to finance the federation ? Had each emirate a right to
maintain its own armed forces ? How were the executive posts to
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be distributed ? Resolving these and other questions was to
prove very difficult, as through the passage of time canpetition
for power and authority gathered rrcmentum.
The first test for the Dubai agreement proved to be a
disappointment. In preparation for the first meeting of the
Supreme Council, the advisors of the rulers of the emirates met
in Abu-Dhabi on 18 and 19 May 1968 in order to agree on the
minutes of the Supreme Council's meeting. There was a
fundamental disagreement about the interpretation of the Dubai
agreement about whether to discuss details necessary to form a
working union, or else take matters step by step, the first
meeting of the Council focusing on the matter of the permanent
charter. The representatives failed to reach agreement and the
matter was transferred to the meeting on 25 May 1968 of the
Supreme Council, which also failed to agree on the matters to be
included on the agenda of the first meeting. The meeting ended in
failure and reached agreement on no decisions at all (40)
There were two different perceptions about the Dubai
agreement, each perception held by a number of emirates. The
first group saw the Dubai agreement as a preliminary agreement
drawing general outlines, and as such, not self-executing. In
this groups' idea, the full operation of the federation could not
be discussed until the permanent charter was drafted. The second
group were of the opinion that the agreement determined that it
was to cane into force on 30 March 1968 and as such, starting
fran that date, it was a binding agreement which was supposed to
be applied, and therefore the Supreme Council in its first
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meeting, should discuss the details of the formation and
operation of the different federal authorities and draft its
policies (41)
As the first meeting failed, there was the possibility that
the whole federation was endangered, so neighbouring countries
intervened to help solve the problem and save the federation (42),
On 6 and 7 July 1968 the Supreme Council met in Ahi-Dhabi
and agreed to start putting into operation their Dubai agreement.
It was apparent that full enthusiasm for the federation was
missing. So instead of choosing a president for the Union for a
term of one year, the rulers agreed that in every meeting of the
Supreme Council they would agree to choose a president for the
meeting, and there was a clear retreat fran the principle of
choosing a president for the Union into choosing a president for
the meeting. The clear cause for this retreat was the
competition for power between the rulers, and this kind of
ccznpetition and jealousy was continuing. As a consequence of the
decisions of the Supreme Council at this meeting, the Federal
Council (the executive body) was formed. The federation looked
real for sane time, and the Federal Council started operation and
formed several committees to discuss unification in several
areas. The canpetition for power and the disagreements about the
distrib.ition of power and the sharing of the important posts in
the Federal Government, combined ultimately to bring the
federation to failure.
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7. Deve1opnts of tI Idea of tl Ccristituticxi
The Dubai agreement of 1968 was the basis for the federation
of the nine emirates but, according to its provision, it was not
enough to form a basis for a continuing federation. Article 4 of
the Dubai agreement gave to the Supreme Council the
responsibility for drafting a permanent charter for Union. The
matter of the permanent charter (which was to be called the
Constitution and later still, the Provisional Constitution) was
on the agenda of all the meetings of the Supreme Council.
1)	 e First Stage
In the first successful meeting of the Supreme Council, the
first resolution of this meeting was Federal Resolution Number 1:
"The public law expert, Dr. Mimed Al-Sanhouri should be
contacted in order to be entrusted to undertake the mission
of drafting the full and permanent charter of the Union.
The expert should complete his mission in a period not
exceeding six months fran the time of reaching agreement
with him. The expert has the right to seek help from
assistants, provided that these assistants are approved by
the carinittee entrusted with car.nunication with the expert".
(43)
The second resolution concerned appointment of members to
carrnunicate with the constitutional expert ar to represent the
emirates in the committee. Each of the nine emirates was
represented by one person on this cammtttee.
Dr. Al-Sanhouri began by appointing two assistants who would
undertake some of the preparatory proceedings. One of the
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assistants visited each of the emirates on an information
gathering mission on which he travelled extensively throughout
the emirates (44)
Due to illness, Dr. Al-Sanhouri was unable to cc*nplete his
work of drafting the permanent Charter for the Union, making it
necessary for the Supreme Council to look for an alternative
solution in order to get the charter drafted.
2) '11 Sexul Stage
In its meeting fran 10 - 14 May 1969, the Supreme Council
agreed to form a committee of legal experts, nominated by
individual emirates, to draft a charter which would be subriitted
to constitutional experts in order to study it and provide
reccirinendations about it. The draft would then be presented to
the Supreme Council for adoption.
It is noticeable that in this stage, the charter began to be
called a "Provisional Constitution" (1)
The ccirmnittee of legal experts was required to ccnplete its
drafting of the Provisional Constitution within two nnths of its
formation. The caiinittee produced their draft of 126 articles
within the time allocated.
The constitutional expert appointed to review the draft
produced by the caTinittee of legal experts was Dr. Wahid Ra'fat,
who was familiar with the needs and circumstances of the emirates
due to his work as advisor to the government of Kuwait, and his
previous visits accanpanying the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister during
sane of the years that withessed the birth of the federation.
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The constitutional expert, Dr. Wahid Ia'fat, was supposed to
receive, iti addition to the draft constitution, the ideas and
notices from the emirates concerning this draft constitution.
Dr. Ra'fat received only some remarks from Dubai and a full
substitute draft from Qatar (46) He met with the members of the
coninittee of legal experts and discussed with them the concerns
of the emirates,
Dr. Ra'fat considered it appropriate to draft a complete
revision, instead of merely camrenting on the version produced by
the legal coninittee. He contended that he had to re-organise the
constitutional draft and provide for the matters omitted by the
carunittee. The result was a new constitutional draft of 164
articles.
This constitution contained the unanimity condition for
taking decisions in the Supreme Council, so this impediment was
not rved (47)• The matter of the permanent and temporary
capitals of the Union was dealt with vaguely (48)• The provision
for the composition of the consultative council was controversial
in this draft and not in line with the agreed basis (49),
The draft provided by Dr. Ra'fat contained his perception of
the state of defence and the military forces within the emirates,
that only the Federal Government should have the right to keep
armed forces (50)
The draft provided by Dr. Ra 'fat contained ideas that needed
negotiations and concessions to be agreed to, but not a mere
inclusion in a draft constitution. The draft as provided,
therefore, needed more time and major changes to reach a form
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that was acceptable to the emirates.
At the meeting of the Supreme Council in October 1 969, a
project resolution was passed, to transfer the draft Provisional
Constitution to a ccmriittee of experts to study it and present
further recommendations.
The mere fact that the adoption of draft was not agreed on,
reveals a disagreement about the content of the draft presented.
Indeed, the council passed a projected resolution to form a
consultative council composed of equal numbers of representatives
from each of the emirates, and other decisions which were
incompatible with the draft constitution.
The failure of the Supreme Councils' meeting and the failure
of its members to sign the declaration containing the decisions
of this meeting, meant that the issue of the Provisional
Constitution was left without any effective decision to nove it
forward.
3) 'lte Third Stage
At this stage, the future of the federation of the nine
emirates appeared to be increasingly uncertain. The possibility
of separation from the other emirates of Bahrain and tar began
to appear after the failure of the Supreme Council meeting in
October 1969, and their failure to re-convene the council in
November of the sane year.
The caumittee, proposed in the Supreme Council meeting of
October 1969, began its meetings despite the fact that the
decision concerning its formation had not been formally signed,
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since there had been unaninous agreement to its formation. The
work of the carinittee involved the two drafts: the one presented
by the canmittee of legal experts, and the other devised by Dr.
Ra'fat. The result was a new draft of 153 articles (51)
Three main areas proved difficult for the cannittee to agree
about, so the articles dealing with these were left blank and
were referred to a meeting of the Supreme Council, which was
supposed to take place in August 1970, b.it was delayed until
October 1970. These three areas were:
1. The Capital of the Union.
2. Voting in the Supreme Council, and
3. Distribution of seats in the Consultative Council.
Agreement on these matters was expected to be difficult due to
cclTipetition between the emirates, and the difficulty of reaching
agreements due to the unanimity requirement in the Dubai Accord.
The developoents which took place in 1970 and 1971 resulted
in the declaration of Babrain and tar of their independence as
sovereign states. The federation of the seven emirates appeared
a very strong possibility.
Six emirates announced their adherence to the Federation
Agreement in December 1971, followed by the seventh in February
1972. The signing of the Federation Agreement coincided with
these emirates becaning fully independent political entities.
The United Arab Emirates was declared a sovereign entity in
December 1971 F one day after the British agreements with the
emirates lapsed.
The Constitution, which was originally drafted for the
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Federation of the original nine emirates, was modified to fit the
needs of the new government. The Constitution of the United Arab
fl-nirates was called a Provisional Constitution, to be replaced by
a Permanent Constitution after five years.
The strong re-appearance of the TSC was central to the
formation of the seven-member federation. During a regular
meeting of the TSC, all the rulers, with the exception of the
ruler of Ras-Al-Khaimah, agreed to form a federation of their
emirates with Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan of Abu-Dhabi as President
for five years. Abu-Dhabi was chosen to be the temporary capital
of the Union.
Voting in the Supreme Council was agreed to be by majority,
with the condition that votes of Abu-Dhabi and Dubai were to be
airng the majority. Agreement was reached to distribute Cabinet
posts anong the emirates.
Conditions requested by scme of rulers were granted in order
to assure the completion of the Federation. Among these
conditions was one, presented by Dubai, that it kept control of
its own customs regulation and duty collection, this being
central to its econay. The main reason for hesitation by Ras-Al-
Khaimah in joining the federation, was the rejection of its
demands to be given rights on equal terms with Ab.i-Dhabi and
Dubai, namely the same quota of members in the legislative
council and veto powers in the Supreme Council (52)
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PARP '1W
E SIIFI	 P SUEE aJR1S IN FAL SYS
The federal system of government is associated with the
mericari Constitution of 1787, and with constitutions which have
been influenced by it.
There is no all-embracing definition of federalism, as
several authors in this field have each stressed different
aspects of the federal system (1)•
For our purpose, we can identify the federal system as:
A system of government in which there are two layers of
government governing the same people and the same land with
a specific agreement of the division of power enabling each
layer to have a sphere of power in which it is autonarous.
With a written guarantee of autonany for both layers of
government in their respective spheres. (2)
The federal system of government co-exists with other forms
of government in a world of constant change and shifting
variables. The division of power in the federal system is
usually embodied in a written constitution. But the application
of the constitutional provisions which deal with the division of
power (and other important areas) creates controversy. It is in
the application of federal constitution that the supreme courts
and constitutional courts play a vital role.
'1 Role of SupriE Cciirts in Federal Systans
The most important feature of federal systems is the
canbination of unity and diversity. A single national policy is
created but without hindering or jeopardising regional autonany.
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It is argued that for the federal system to preserve its
all-important division of power there should be an arbiter to
decide the points of controversy regarding divisions of power,
and in most federal systems this function is allocated to the
highest Constitutional Court (3).
Constitutional Courts need to be impartial. In order that
they are not influenced in their decision-making by federal or
state authorities, Constitutional Courts need to be protected in
sane way. kreover, the Supreme Courts, through their review of
the federal and state legislation, are supposed to allow for the
adjustment of constitutional norms, reflecting develouent in
various aspects of national life. The judges of the Supreme
Courts have to be protected fran the reactions of either state or
national authorities. The judges also have to be selected and
appointed in a way which allows them to function without
prejudice.
The idea behind the division of power is that aspects for
which national uniformity is considered important are deemed the
responsibility of federal government. Matters which it has not
been possible to add to the sphere of the federal government or
that have been felt not to be important to unity are usually left
to the state.
Changes in local, national and international life demand
legislative responses. ?vbst federal constitutions, however, are
difficult to amend. Constitutional Courts carry the burden of
constitutional construction, liberalising and where desirable
adding to the remit of federal government
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It is by no means acceptable to all commentators that
Supreme Courts involve themselves in expanding the sphere of
pers allocated to national governments, a subject which will be
discussed in the next chapter.
Supreme Court judges are elected or appointed by different
means in different federal systems, but none of these means of
appointing the judges is sufficient to ensure canplete neutrality
In the United States, the President nc*ninates the judges
and the Senate confirms the naninations, a procedure which was
designed to give those who were thcRlght to represent the states a
say in the appointment of the judges. Fran experience it is
obvious that federal government daninates the choice of judges
because the Senate has becane less directly representative of the
states. The act of appointing the Justices of the Supreme Court
has acquired an enormous importance for Presidents in their
attempts th leave a long-lasting imprint on the governmental
matters of the country, xx)t only in federal state relations but
also in other matters. The issue nc in the appointment of new
judges to the Supreme Court of the United States is not one of
national and state control but is really one of party politics
and political ideas (6)
In West Germany half the judges of the Constitutional Courts
are selected by the Bundesrat and thus by the states, while the
other half is chosen by a special electoral camnittee of the
&lrkiestag . igain, n the West German Constitutional Court,
political ideology has cane to figure in the Court' s opinions
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more than supposed national and state interests • So in the case
of the European Defence Community controversy, the position
adopted by each Senate of the Court was based on the daninant
political ideology (8)
JixUcial review in f3eral systens
Judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation is
designed to limit the power of legislative authorities to
disregard the constitution and the limits and values it contains.
The roots of the judicial review lie with the ancient notion that
people have a right to disobey unjust laws . Judicial review
in the United States is based on the theory of the separation of
powers. This is coupled with the American system of checks and
balances. It is arguable that those who framed the United States
constitution did in fact intend to give the judiciary the power
to review the constitutionality of acts passed by Congress. In
1803 Justice Marshall, in his opinion in Marbery v. Madison (10),
did not hesitate to announce the right of the courts to disregard
those legislative acts which it considered to be contrary to the
constitution. Judicial review became one of the bases of the
United States constitutional system. The Supreme Court, through
its power of judicial review, asserted its power to have the
final say about the interpretation of constitutional provisions.
The Supreme Court, through its right to refuse cases, increas-
ingly specialised in constitutional cases. As the constitution
grew older, the importance of the role of the Court in
interpreting its provisions increased.
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Federal-State relations is one of the most important areas
in which the Supreme Court has ccie to play a role.
Article 1 of the United States Constitution contains the
powers of Congress. The States, however, have the power to
legislate on the areas which are not delegated to Congress. Thus
a principle is announced clearly by Amendment X to the
Constitution. The Supreme Court has the power to construe Article
1 of the Constitution, thereby setting the limits it perceives
constitutional provisions contain for congressional powers.
The interpretation by the United States Supreme Court of the
Constitution and especially Article 1 have changed according to
the changing circumstances of the federal government, and have
increasingly tended to favour the federal government. One
important area of federal-state relations in which the develop-
ment of the Court construction of the Constitution is obvious, is
that of carinerce clause cases, with which we shall deal later
(11)
Judicial review became popular in different parts of the
world after World War I.
In Western Europe the legislature was originally seen as the
supreme source of law and there was resistance against any
attempt by the Courts to impose higher or constitutional stand-
ards on the legislative acts. But after such experiences as the
Nazi regime in Germany and the Fascists in Italy, people began to
consider the Judiciary as a means of checking the legislature
(12)
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The majority of Commonwealth countries have embodied in
their constitutions the institution of judicial review. bst of
these Commonwealth countries were federal countries, so in
addition to using judicial review as a means of protecting the
basic ideas and values, it was used to settle differences between
the central and state governments over meanings of federal
constitutions (13)
The most canprehensive statement of judicial review of the
constitutionality of laws is that which is contained in the Basic
Law of West Germany of 1949. The jurisdiction of the constitutio-
nal court of West Germany involves:
- The constitutional disp.ites involving the highest organs
of the federal government.
- The abstract norm control jurisdiction which involves the
difference of opinion or doubts on the compatibility of
federal or provincial laws with the constitution, or the
canpatibility of provincial laws with federal law. This may
be initiated by the federal government or a provincial
government or one third of the members of the lower federal
House (Bundestag). This does not require an actual case or
controversy.
- The challenge to the constitutionality of federal or
provincial laws or compatibility of provincial law with
federal law in an actual case before one of the federal or
provincial courts. The courts should stay their proceedings
in case of challenge of constitutionality or canpatibility
with provincial laws and obtain a decision from the
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Constitutional Court.
- Individual constitutional canplaints. These are canplaints
brought directly to the constitutional court. People have
the right to approach the Constitutional Court if they
consider that their constitutional rights have been violated
by public authorities, provided that they first exhaust the
lesser legal remedies.
- Federal-Provincial conflicts. Involving rights and duties
of each.
- Uniformity of the interpretation of the constitution by
the courts. Any court, if in doubt about the standing cons-
truction of the Constitution, siould apply to the Consti-
tutional Court for a binding construction.
- Appeals about the electoral process.
- Impeachment of the federal President by either house of
the federal legislative authority.
- Rwval of federal judges, by way of an application fran
the lower federal house.
- To decide on the constitutionality of political parties.
- To guarantee the self-government of the municipal
governments within the Provinces (l4)
In Canada, the British North America Act of 1867 did not
create any Canadian federal courts but left to the U.K.
Parliament the power to establish such courts. In 1875 Parliament
passed the Supreme Court Act, which created a court of general
appeal. No lower federal courts have ever been established. The
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same system continues to operate under the Canadian Constitution
and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedans of 1982.
The Canadian courts system is canprised of a single system,
the lower courts termed Provincial and the highest court termed
Federal. The Federal Court has sane power over the Provincial
Courts.
The Supreme Court has discretionary jurisdiction over the
final judgement of the highest court of final resort in any
province. The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction:
i	 in all cases involving writs of habeas corpus or mandarrnis;
ii over advisory opinions issued by the provincial courts;
iii over inter-provincial and daninion-provincial questions and
in those cases where a provincial court considers that a
particular question should be sulinitted to the Supreme Court
(provided that it has the permission of the court of the
highest resort in the province).
The Canadian Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction
except regarding advisory opinions. The Supreme Court has the
duty to answer questions fran certain authorities in the same way
as it gives decisions in regular appeals. The constitution gives
the Governor-Gener1, the Senate and the Lower House the right of
direct questions to the Court. The Supreme Court Act provides
that such questions should be about:
1 the interpretation of the British North inerica Acts;
2 the Constitutionality or interpretation of any provincial or
daninion acts;
3 the powers of the Canadian Parliament, of the provincial
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legislatures, or of the respective governments;
4 any other matters.
The Court has rendered several important opinions regarding
federal relations as a result of this advisory jurisdiction (15)•
In the area of constitutional interpretation, the Swiss
federal system differs fran the federal systems of the United
States, Canada, Australia and Commonwealth federations. In
Switzerlar, the federal legislature is the final interpreter of
the federal constitution, subject to a referendum of the
electorate. The Federal Tribunal has the duty of maintaining the
federal constitution against the Cantonal Constitutions, ar
Cantonal Constitutions against Cantonal laws.
The adoption of a system of judicial review of the constitu-
tionality of legislation has been connected with the desire to
limit legislature. The need to limit the legislatures has been a
product of the belief in separation of powers and sanetimes a
direct result of legislative abuse of power. In countries where
the abuse of power has been connected with the judiciary, like
France where before the French Revolution the judiciary was
believed to have been abusing power, the judiciary is denied the
general power of reviewing the constitutionality of laws.
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Factors affectir Jndicial Review
(a) Aointnent arKi tenure of jiiges
Supreme or Constitutional Court judges in federal countries
play two important roles. Federal constitution judges play a role
similar to that played by constitutional judges in unitary
states, that is, of interpreting the constitution. Like many
unitary government constitutional judges, they have the power to
review the constitutionality of laws and to over-rule those laws
which they regard as contrary to the constitution.
Constitutional judges in most federal systems also perform
the important task of umpiring between national and state
governments through their power to review the constitutionality
of federal laws and the compatibility of state laws and
constitutions with those of the national government.
The recognition of the important roles entrusted to the
federal constitutional judges have sanetimes, but not always,
played decisive roles in designating the method of their appoint-
ment in sane federal countries.
Identifying the nature of the judicial role effectively
identifies the method used to appoint constitutional judges in
federal and unitary countries. There are two main opposing consi-
derations of the nature of the role of the judiciary in applying
constitutional jurisdiction. Traditionally those countries with
strong British influence, such as India and other countries af f-
ected by the traditional Anglo-Saxon view of the judicial role,
tended to look at the role of judges in applying and interpreting
the constitution as being mainly a technical one. These countries
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stressed the technical background of judges. The theory behind
this attitude was that judges announce and apply existing law but
they do not participate in making laws. They failed to recognise
that in applying and construing the constitution, judges make
choices between more than one possible answer in most of the
constitutional cases they adjudicate, and that such choices are
policy decisions. They failed to provide sufficient protection
against the political views or preferences of the judges.
In these countries, constitutional judges were mainly or
usually appointed by federal executives. The states are not
usually given any say in the appointment of constitutional judges
even when these judges are going to decide cases involving issues
of federal-state relations and distril:xition of power between
states and the federal government.
Although there has been considerable development on the
theory of the judicial role, the practice survives of neglecting
the rights of the states to participation in the appointment of
Supreme Court Justices. Obvious examples of the system of
appointment of constitutional judges by a federal executive are
india and Canada (16)
Countries on the other side of this theoretical divide take
the view that judges have an apparent effect on the laws and con-
stitutional rules when they cane to construe the texts and apply
the law. In other words, these countries, fran their appointment
procedures and other measures, can be understood to believe that
judges de facto make law by their 'filling the gaps' in the legal
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rules and by construing the constitutional and other legal texts.
Judges are understood by these countries to be making policy
choices.
The countries which recognise the fact of judicial law-
making take precautions to ensure the principle of separation of
powers is allerted to, or else, through the careful choice of
judges, preclude the abuse of judicial power on the grounds of
political preference alone.
Federal division of powers plays a part in the choice of
judges in those countries which acknowledge judicial law-making.
The states, through their presumed representatives in the
legislature, are given a decisive say in the procedure of
appointing judges.
The most obvious examples of the assurance of state
representative participation in the choice of judges are the
United States and West German experiences. In the United States,
the Senate, which was originally canposed of representatives of
state legislatures, has the power to confirm or reject the
nc*uination by the President for the membership of the Supreme
Court. In West Germany, half of the members of the Constitutional
Court are elected by the upper house of legislature which is
canposed of representatives of state legislatures, and the other
half are elected by the lower house of legislature which is
caiiposed of popularly elected members (17)•
On the question of tenure, those countries which believe
that cctnplete independence is needed for the members of the Cons-
titutional Court, appoint the judges for life so that the judges
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will not worry about the renewal of their term or about their
future careers being affected by the stances they take in their
constitutional decisions. The nost notable of these countries is
the United States where sane judges have served the Supreme
Court for over thirty years (18)•
In sane countries emphasis on the representative electoral
processes, and their relation with the choice of judges, has
caused the tenure of judges to be for a limited period. An
obvious example of this category is the tenure of judges on the
Constitutional Court of West Germany. Here, under the 1971
Amendment to the Statute of the Constitutional Court, judges
serve a non-renewable term of twelve years (19)
'fl nature of Ccxirts Syst9n Particiraticxi in Jixlicial Review of
(stithtick1aUty
Reviewing the canpatibility of laws with rigid constitut-
ions, and judicial participation in this process, are of growing
importance. However, the forms of the judicial systems of review
vary considerably. Differences in the judicial systems of
constitutional review arise in the different legal systems.
We can divide the judicial systems of constitutional review
into two major groups. One of these groups is decentralised and
the other is centralised.
The decentralised system is identified with the American
system of judicial review. This system gives the power of
reviewing the canpatibility of legislation with the Constitution
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to all the judicial organs, and is followed mainly by other
camn law countries.
The centralised system is identified with the European Civil
Law legal systems. This kind of judicial review gives the power
of reviewing the constitutionality of laws to a single judicial
organ. The original archetype of this kind of judicial review was
the system established by the Austrian Constitution of 1920 (20)•
The decentralised system is based on several grounds. One of
the justifications of decentralised judicial review is that which
was mentioned by Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in
Marbury v. Madison. This was that judges are charged with the
job of interpreting laws and whenever they find a law
contradicting a higher law they have a duty to apply the latter
and disregard the former. Because of the supremacy of the
Constitution, it is said by adherents to decentralised judicial
review, whenever a statutory provision contradicts a
constitutional norm, the statutory provision should not be
applied. Another grcBind for decentralised judicial review is the
separation of powers. The base of both legislative and judicial
power is constitutional stipulation, and the legislature should
accept that the judiciary will not apply the statutes which
exceed the legislative limits of power.
The centralised system of judicial review rests on several
bases concerned with the legal beliefs and the legal systems of
the states concerned.
One of the reasons for the choice of a centralised system of
judicial review is the idea that the act of invalidating the laws
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enacted by the legislature is a political act not fit for the
ordinary courts • This is a product of another way of looking at
the principle of separation of powers. Ordinary courts should
not be given the power to over-rule legislative acts because they
should accept legislative acts as they are or refer them to
specially empowered courts capable of dealing with constitutional
construction.
A further reason for centralised judicial review is the
absence of the principle of stare decisis in Civil Law jurisdict-
ions. In countries with decentralised judicial review, where the
system of canton law exists, the decisions of higher courts are
binding on lower courts. The appeals which get to the highest
courts produce decisions on the constitutionality of laws binding
on the entire judicial system of the country. For example, in
the United States, law declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court remains on the books but becomes dead law (until in
exceptional cases the Supreme Court reverses its past decision
and declares the law constitutional). Since the principle of
stare decisis is absent in civil law countries, the fact that any
court can decide on the constitutionality of legislation could
create contradiction and confusion in the legal system of the
country. For instance, a kind of tax could be nullified by one
court while the same kind of tax could be found binding by
another, were decentralised judicial review to operate along with
the absence of the principle of stare decisis.
Another reason for the centralised process of judicial
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review is that, in civil law countries, the Supreme Courts are
unable to give constitutional questions sufficient consideration
if these questions come to them as a result of the regular
appellate process. This is because the High Courts in civil law
countries cannot refuse to take cases which come to them on
appeal fran lower courts. In the United States, the Supreme
Court can refuse to take cases, which has resulted in it being
alrxst entirely specialised in constitutional jurisdiction. In
civil law countries, were the High Courts given constitutional
jurisdiction along with their civil arid criminal jurisdiction,
they would be suhiierged beneath civil arid criminal appeals, and
constitutional jurisdiction would occupy only part of their time
and consideration. This practical lack of emphasis would not be
carinensurate with its importance. Thus civil law countries have
established special courts or institutions, the main task of
which is to construe the constitution and review the
constitutionality of legislation (21)
Federal countries have either a centralised or decentralised
system of judicial review, according to the legal system present.
The archetype of federal states with a decentralised system is
the United States, while an example of a federal system with a
centralised judicial review of constitutionality is West Cermany.
Switzerland does not give the federal courts power to review
the catipatibility of federal laws with the federal constitution.
However it gives the federal courts the power to disregard
cantonal laws which are found not to be canpatible with either
federal laws or the federal constitution. This power is taken
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frciit the principle of the superiority of the federal constitution
and federal legislation over those of the individual cantons.
Ordinary courts in civil law countries do not participate in
the process of reviewing the constitutionality of laws. The
ordinary courts have the right in nst civil law countries to
stop the proceedings of any case before them and refer the matter
to the appropriate constitutional court, if they suspect the
ccinpatibility of the applicable law with the constitution.
In this way, ordinary courts play an important role in the
process of judicial review, by bringing the question of
constitutionality to the special courts, while able to apply the
law without referring to the Constitutional Courts.
Decisicii-nking processes: Civil law aixi ccmixxi law aroades to
cxflegiality of Jlk3ges
The approach to the collegiality of judges on Constitutional
Courts varies frcn country to country, but there are two general
lines taken by civil law and camon law countries.
The traditional civil law system of decision-making
processes in the Supreme Courts is that of collegial
responsibility of all the judges for the opinion of the court.
The judges, as far as outside observers are concerned, act as a
united group. The Courts issue one opinion in each case
reflecting the unity of the court. This system originally did
not allow for dissenting or concurring opinions to be announced
with the Court's opinion.
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The other system of decision-making processes in Supreme
Courts was the plural system. The plural system is connected
with caitnon law countries. The Supreme Court of the United States
is the obvious example of the use of the plural system of opinion
writing by a court. This system recognises the right of each
individual judge to pronounce his own opinion about the cases
presented to the courts whenever he considers it appropriate to
dissent or concur with the opinion of the majority of the court.
Each of these two systems has its own justifications and
philosophical bases. The collegial system favours the unity of
the Court in relation to all outside individuals and
institutions. This system is also justified because it ensures
the clarity and steadiness of the develoinent of legal norms
without the confusion that can be caused by differences in
constitutional or statute construction between judges.
The plural system favours the enrichment of the legal envir-
oninent by allowing competing opinions to be voiced. The
pronouncatnt of opinions by individual judges, either agreeing
or disagreeing with the court's decision, along with the
justifications, can result in the proper develoiiuent of law by
offering the participants concerned a range of opinions and
justifications (22)•
The American Supreme Court is the archetypal plural system
in federal countries. Several Cariionwealth federal countries ad-
opt the plural system of decision-making in their Supreme Courts,
India being one example, which also has a carnon law system.
Canada has adopted an extreme version of the plural system.
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Each judge can write his own decision, therefore there is no real
"majority opinion". The judges on the Canadian Supreme Court
vote "Yes" or "No" on the issues presented to the Court but each
either goes on to write his or her own reasons or else concurs
with another judge. It is difficult therefore to analyse the
decisions of the Supreme court in canada (23)•
West Germany was an example of the use of the collegial
decision-making process, along with other European countries,
until the influence of the American experience prompted the
judges to stress the right of voicing their differences. Now the
judges of the West German Constitutional Court have the right to
publish their dissenting opinions along with the opinion of the
majority of the court (24)
'1t case/oz*itrocrersy requiraint ard advisory opinictis
There is more than one way in which Constitutional Courts
can be brought to decide constitutional questions. The major and
traditional route for bringing constitutional questions to
Constitutional Courts is in a case or controversy which is
ccmpatible with the judicial role of the Courts. In this way the
Court is asked to interpret the constitution or apply its terms
in relation to a case involving a factual situation with real
contending parties.
The other way of.bringing constitutional questions to
Constitutional Courts is by putting questions to the Courts
requiring advisory opinions. The Courts are presented with
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questions which are hypothetical with no contending parties.
This way is exceptional today. The advisory opinion jurisdiction
of the Supreme Courts is incompatible with the traditional
function of the Judiciary which is to decide issues in real
controversies and cases (25)•
The only Supreme Court in the major federal countries with
the power to render an advisory opinion is the Canadian Supreme
Court. This jurisdiction of the Canadian Supreme Court has
proved to be very important in relation to federal questions. It
is reported that sane of the important questions of federalism
have been decided by the Canadian Supreme Court through its power
to render advisory opinions (26)•
The West German constitutional court had the power to render
advisory opinions under Article 95 of its statute, but this power
was abolished in 1956 after dramatic experiences of the Court in
relation to political questions. The Constitutional Court was
accused of becaning too political rather than concentrating on
its proper judicial function (27)•
In several countries, the quest for constitutional opinions
has prompted individuals rather than public authorities to
confront the Supreme Courts with questions regarding the consti-
tutionality of legislation. The United States has withessed
actions brought by individuals challenging the constitutionality
of legislation. These actions have often been rejected for lack
of sufficient interest. The raising of constitutional cases is
hampered by many obstacles. Apart f ran the question of standing,
constitutional cases are often costly and therefore beyond the
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means of st people.
In Canada where the Supreme Court has the power to render
advisory opinions, this power is regulated by the Court's
Statute. The law requires the Court to answer every question put
to it on reference fran the Governor-General or fran the Senate
or Lower House, and to pronounce judgement in such instances in
precisely the same way as if it were a regular appeal in a
regular case involving regular litigants. The law defines the
kinds of cases that can be referred to the Court for advisory
opinion. Such cases should fit into one of the following
categories:
1 The interpretation of the British North America Act (The
Canadian Constitution).
2	 The constitutionality or interpretation of Dominion or
Provincial Legislation.
3 The powers of the Canadian Parliament, of the Provincial
Legislature, or of the Executive Governments thereof.
4	 Any other matters (28)•
Giving power to the Supreme Court to render advisory
opinions led to criticism of the Courts for involving themselves
in political questions rather than legal ones. In the only case
where a federal Supreme Court in a major federal country was
given the power to render advisory opinions it has proven to be
very important in relation to federalism. It is reported that
most of the important decisions of the Court about federal
questions are the results of its power to give advisory opinions.
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Oxiclusicxi
Although there are wide differences between federal systems,
and the organisation and powers of constitutional courts in these
systems vary, these courts have a special significance in most
federal systems.
Among the most important factors contributing to this
significance are the interpretation of federal constitutions and
the resolution of differences over the distribution of powers.
As societies and their respective federal systems continue
to develop, further opportunities arise for constitutional courts
to interpret constitutions and to resolve differences about their
meanings.
Constitutional courts play an important role in the
developoent of federal constitutions, and in adapting them to
changing requirements.
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CAP1R 1REE
JUDICIAL REVIEW ND JUDICIAL ACIVI4
One important task of most of the supreme or constitutional
courts is to review the constitutionality of laws. Constitutional
texts can never be canprehensive and self-explanatory of all the
problems that the courts may encounter.
Constitutional texts have open ended clauses and words with
broad and vague meanings. Constitutional courts are presented
with cases in which, therefore, specific meanings have to be
allotted to general constitutional provisions. In interpreting
constitutional provisions,1 courts have to deal with the entire
range of subjects covered by a constitution, and these
interpretations will substantively affect the different subjects.
The most important subject with which a constitution may
deal is the protection of fundamental rights, but they also deal
with the distribution and organisation of power in the
government. Federalism is a subject which is regulated by the
constitutions of the federal States.
The constitutional interpretations of the constitutional
courts are usually final interpretations binding on all the other
governmental branches. In sane constitutions, the power of the
constitutional courts to render final constitutional inter-
pretations is based on explicit delegation by the constitution;
in other constitutions this power is claimed by the courts as a
necessary requirement of their function of applying the law.
In both cases, whether or not there exist clear provisions
chapter3
	 -85-
empowering the courts with the right of final constitutional
interpretation, arguments exist about the extent and limits of
the power of judicial review. Should the courts make policy
choices or should they leave them to the elected branches of
government (1)
In the constitution of the United States there is no
explicit provision empowering the judiciary with the final inter-
pretation of the constitution. Chief Justice Marshall announced
this right of the court in Marbury v. Madison in 1803 (2)•
The whole matter of judicial review has provoked discussion
and controversy on the proper role for the Supreme court in the
merican constitutional and political system. The United States
experience in judicial review is worthy of examination because it
was the first country in which judicial review, in its present
definition, was recognised and practised.
Jixilcial review arvi jxlicial activisn in tbe United States
The controversy regarding the role of the Supreme Court
involves several areas, all of which are subject to the
constitution. One such area is that of federal-state relations. A
second is that of individual rights. In the former, the court
denies one level of government a certain power, because in its
opinion such power belongs to a higher level of government. In
the second, as a result f its constitutional interpretation, the
court denies a governmental institution a certain power because
this power does not belong to any government or institution, the
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right in question being guaranteed by the constitution.
The debate about judicial review by constitutional writers
and commentators in recent years has evolved around several
ideas.
One argument concerns whether the judiciary should be active
in its constitutional interpretation or whether it should be
restrained. The active judiciary is that which second-guesses the
legislature's value choices and on the result nullifies those
legislative acts with which it disagrees. The restrained
judiciary is one which suliiiits to the ultimate sovereignty of the
legislature over society's substantive value choices. The
argument of the partisans of judicial restraint continues over
how the judiciary should be restrained. Should it be left to
restrain itself or should the restraining come from other
branches of the government? Are the existing constitutional and
legislative arrangements enough to restrain the judiciary or is
there a need to introduce new legislation or constitutional
amendments to curb the ability of the judiciary to interfere with
legislative choices?
There is another argument in constitutional theory between
two contending sides, the "interpretivists" and the "non-
interpretivists". The interpretivists argue that judges deciding
constitutional issues should confine themselves to enforcing
norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written
constitution. The non-interpretivists argue that courts should go
beyond that set of references and enforce norms that cannot be
discovered within the four corners of the document.
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It has been shown that interpretivism, at least in a clause
bound form, is not possible. There are many problems for which
there are no ready solutions in the constitution because these
situations have not been foreseen and there is a large number of
open-ended constitutional provisions which need to be
supplemented with value choices in order to be implemented (4)
As there is no effective restraint by governmental
institutions, then it is impracticable to argue for judicial
self-restraint (5).
But what are the bases for arguing against an active or non-
interpretivist judiciary? .bst of the objections to the non-
interpretivist or active judiciary stem fran the allegation that
this kind of judiciary encroaches on the province of the
legislature because it will be substituting its value choices for
that of the legislature. The opponents of a non-interpretivist
judiciary continue to argue that the active judiciary is anti-
democratic, because the judges, especially federal judges, are
not elected and have secure tenures; they continue to argue that
this is against the democratic and majoritarian form of
government established by the United States constitution.
Although few today deny the need for more than clause-bound
constitutional interpretations, the opponent of the active
judiciary calls for more faithful adherence to the text of the
constitution and more restraint against legislative acts.
We shall return later to the argument of whether or not a
judiciary which makes value choices is against the American
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system of government. Now we shall discuss the developoent of the
theories about the proper role of the judiciary in the American
legal system.
The deve1opint of t1r1es chaflajirKJ t1 traditicxial thry of
law and tI role of tI jixilciary
The traditional theory is that judges only discover and
apply the law and do not create law. It holds that the law is
"there" waiting to be discovered and judges have the duty to find
and apply it to specific fact situations where it properly
applies.
The traditional terican theory of the judicial function is
that the courts have a passive role in making the law. The courts
do not extend protection to property and they do not put people
in jail, it is rather the law which does these things operating
through the courts • The traditional theory goes further to hold
that the extraordinary protections within which the courts
operate were devised in order to guarantee that the responsible
element in the process would always be, insofar as people could
humanly arrange it, the law and not the courts. The courts, this
theory holds, were not protected in order that they might govern
the country according to their wisdait, but they were protected so
that there would be no interference with the laws governing the
nation (6) This theory about the judicial function has been the
daninant theory for the greater part of American legal history.
All the other theories which have challenged this theory did not
achieve the same wide acceptance (7).
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Judicial review has been connected from the beginning with
the traditional theory of judicial function. Although judicial
review was at the time of its announcement a unique American
legal institution, American writers tried to justify it under
Blackstonian traditional theory of judicial function. Judicial
review has been presented as no nore than a particular appli-
cation of a generally accepted idea of the judicial function.
Judges undertaking review of the constitutionality of laws
were considered as exercising "judgement" not "will". In Chief
Justice Marshall's words:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule
to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and
interpret the rule. If laws conflict with each other, the
Courts must decide on the operation of each. (8)
In the twentieth century the traditional theory of the
judicial function has been attacked as an inadequate description
of what takes place in the decision of cases.
The possibility and desirability of the rigid application of
laws has been the subject of wide discussion by American legal
theorists.
The first major challenge to the traditional theory of the
judicial function came from Oliver Weixiel Holmes. Holmes argued
that practical expedients, made necessary by the conflicts and
needs of himan society, were riore important to the develoçinent of
law than were any logical propositions. (9)
Holmes believed that the standard by which law should be
measured is its contemporary usefulness, not the fact that
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saneone in the past has followed it. As Holmes has put it,
Everyone instinctively recognises that in these days the
justification of a law for us cannot be found in the fact
that our fathers always have followed it. It must be found
in sane help which the law brings toward reaching a social
end which the governing power of the caiirnunity has made up
its mind that it wants. (10)
Holmes rejected the idea that the law had an existence of its own
apart f ran the decisions of the courts. He argued that the law
was a means and it was real because it affected the lives of men.
To Holmes law was not an abstract problem of logic, but a
practical question of social managnent. Judges did not in fact
settle cases by deductive reasoning, rather, they necessarily
decided, consciously or unconsciously, what they felt to be
socially desirable.
Holmes opposed the idea that law is a given institution by
"nature" and that logic is a device both for the extension of
legal principles and at the same time for limiting the discretion
of the judge. Holmes held that law moves in a climate of opinion
made up of moral and political beliefs, judgeitent of policy and
sanetimes prejudices, all of which affect the judge.
Holmes, who became a Supreme Court Justice, took the
position that much was to be gained from the acceptance and
recognition of the judicial making of law. Holmes was of the
opinion that it is better to discuss this part of the judicial
function and that judges were actually legislating more under the
traditional theory than. they would have done if they recognised
this process and brought it into the open.
The essence of the arguments advanced by Holmes was a plea
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for judicial moderation and self restraint
The beginning of the twentieth century marked an increase in
opposition to the orthodox theory of law and judicial function
(12)
One of the newer and more important theories was sociologi-
cal jurisprudence, which was led by Roscoe Pound. Pound's
arguments rely extensively on the judicial function in the
process of legal change.
Legal developnent, according to Pound's theory, is a series
of adjustments which are interactions between societal demands
and the legal system which are made necessary by the function of
law as a controlling and stabilising force in a society
constantly tending to change.
The law is both a controlling force in society and a
reflection of the conflicting needs and demands in society,
according to Pound. Society, in his view, should be seen in terms
of the interests active within it. He shifts the emphasis fran
individuals to groups in society.
Because society is in a constant state of change and
deve1oxnent, the law is supposed to be continually modified to
suit these changes and accommodate new situations. The
legislature, situated as it is in the centre of the governing
process, could scarcely devote the required time and attention to
the desired develoixnent of the law. It was therefore necessary to
leave these matters to other agencies of the government (13)
Pound's whole theory canes to rest upon the judicial function.
The courts should be aware of developnents in society and should
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assume their rightful task of bringing the law up to date.
In studying law the student should not only know what the
courts decide, but equally the circumstances and conditions to
which these principles are to be applied. Law as an institution
is the product of social demand and should be considered in terms
of its adequacy to the end for which it exists.
Pound labelled the judge "the pragmatic social engineer" and
argued that judicial activity is rightly the creative element in
the law.
The emergence of sociological jurisprudence marks a
formulation of a general trend in rnerican legal thought contrary
to the traditional theory of law and the judicial function.
The law is a social institution, a product of the society it
governs, subject to the same influences as other social
institutions • The developnent of the law was not achieved by the
logical develoinent of assumed principles, but rather through a
series of adjustments.
Judges have the duty and the right to undertake legal
change. It is socially advantageous for the judges to develop the
law as they consider necessary for the develoirient of society.
The degree to which judges would ndify the law and develop
its rules varies according to the different advocates of
sociological jurisprudence. The difference is rather one of
degree, because all the advocates of this theory consider it
proper and necessary for judges to make law in their decision of
cases.
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The emphasis on the role of the judiciary in the deve1oxnent
of law is the important consideration for our present
investigation. The effects of the sociological theory are very
important because it has been adopted by a number of the irost
respected legal writers in the Anrican legal system.
Among the theories that have challenged the traditional
theory is legal realism. This term has its origin in the Holmes
dictum that law is "prophesies of what the courts will do in
fact".
Legal realism, like sociological jurisprudence, developed as
a protest against the orthcdox theory of law and the judicial
function. Legal realism shares with sociological jurisprudence
the attempt to broaden the study of law with the aid of
borrciings fran the other social sciences.
Legal realism includes several types of juristic thought
according to the type of science effectively used to be connected
with the study of law. Legal realism includes some social
jurists, a group of psychological jurists, several statistical
jurists and sar institutional jurists.
One of the leading legal realists was Jerane Frank, who
called the traditional theory of law "The basic Myth" (14)•
Jerane Frank wished to dispel various popular conceptions about
law and the Judicial process. Frank wrote:
"Modern civilisation demands a mind free of a father
governance ... until we becane thoroughly cognizant of, and
cease to be controlled by, the image of the father hidden
away in the authority of law, we shall not reach that first
step in the civilised administration of Justice the
recognition that men is not made for the law, ]ut that the
law is made by and for men" (15).
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To meet the needs of modern civilisation, in Frank's opinion, Law
must adapt itself to modern mind. Law must be pragmatic in
serving the needs of man and society.
Appearing in the years of the Great Depression, Jerome
Frank's first book (Law and the Modern Mind) (16) had an
effective role in clearing the way to a new set of conceptions of
government and law and to free people fran the old authoritarian
conception of Law (17)
The result of the debate which took place starting at the
turn of this century was the establishment of a wide acceptance
of the existence of Judicial discretion. What remained was to
establish the degree and fields in which this discretion should
be used and for what purposes it should be utilised.
Jixitcial review, deiocracy ard tbe separatkzi of prs
The most common argument against judicial review and
activism is that it is undemocratic, leaving major policy
decisions to unelected judges. The practice of judicial review,
the critics argue, is contrary to the Pmerican cartnitment to
democracy and maj oritarian rule (18)
The critics of judicial review assume that, in the U.S.
political system of popular representation, the exercise of
pcers which cannot find their justification in the ultimate
consent of those governed is difficult if not impossible to
justify (19)• Judicial review, then, is rejected according to
this view. Judges do not acquire their position through popular
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election, and they are not accountable either to the people or to
the elected officials who naninated and confirmed them; rather,
the justices of the Supreme Court are secure in their positions
because of their life tenure and their salaries are guaranteed.
Furthermore, judicial review of statutes is said to be
undencratic because it allows the court to disregard Acts of
Congress which have the sanction, even if indirectly, of the
electorate.
The argument that judicial review is against the darocratic
system has been raised frequently throughout American
Constitutional history. One of the earliest to argue against
judicial review was Thomas Jefferson, one of the political
opponents of John Marshall. He saw judicial review as violating
the constitutionally mandated theory of separation of powers and
as representing a patent denial of the veritable popular will
(2O) Another of the early opponents of judicial review was
Justice John B. Gibbons of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania who
said that it was a "postulate in the theory of our government
that the people are wise, virtuous, and canpetent to manage their
own affairs" (21)
The critics of judicial review further argued that judicial
review and judicial activism is against the principle of
separation of powers. The separation of powers is a system of
separate and co-equal powers and this makes it contrary to
separation to subject the validity of the decisions of one branch
of the government as to the limits of its powers under the
constitution to the judgement of another branch.
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The critics of judicial review and judicial activism argued
that in striking dawn legislation the court is involved in law-
giving, a task for which the courts have not been established.
They argue that courts are not meant to be law givers. They argue
that courts, in striking down legislation, make policy choices;
the courts, they argue, replace the policy choices of the proper
legislature with their awn policy choices.
In reply to the accusation that value choices by the
judiciary are an encroachment on the legislative power and a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, it is
important to remeer that separation of powers is connected with
the system of checks and balances and that the effective
judiciary is the one which can check the other branches of
government. By invoking its power to review legislative acts the
judiciary serves as a necessary and proper barrier against the
excesses of the legislature. One of the rrost farrous advocates of
judicial review is Justice Benjamin Cardozo, who served on the
Supreme court. Cardozo says, in defending judicial review:
By conscious or subconscious influence, the presence of this
restraining power aloof in the background, but none the less
always in reserve, tends to stabilise and rationalise the
legislative judgement, to infuse it with the glow of
principle, to hold the standard aloft and visible for those
who must run the race and keep the faith. (22)
There are several points of argument put to defend against the
anti-majoritarian accusation which is pointed at judicial review
and judicial activism.
The U.S. Constitution (Article III) does provide for an
independent judiciary, by granting judges life tenure and fixed
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salaries, and by making their reroval very difficult, but the
appointment process is entirely political and capable of
reflecting the change in the political consensus.
The political process affects the judiciary by several means
other than the appointment process. Constitutional decisions can
be overturned by constitutional amendments which are entirely
political and which have been used successfully on several
occasions (23)
The critics who argu& against judicial review because it
lacks popular consent do in fact overstate the denocratic content
of the legislative and executive branches because it is shown by
several means and studies that representative democracy in
practice diverges from the ideal notion. So even the
denocratically elected branches may not accurately represent the
popular will (24)•
Finally, isjudicial review the only departure from
majoritarian rule in the American system of government? The
answer is no, the Senate is a major example of departure fran
maj oritariari rule because all states have senators regardless of
the size of their populations, rio equality of representation is
given by such a system which goes against conceptions of the
representative deiiocracy.
The authors of the Constitution did not believe in denocracy
as a solution to all the questions and problems which would face
the nation; one important area of rights, individual rights, has
not been entrusted to the majoritarian will by the Constitution
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(25), The founding fathers did not have canpiete confidence in
the form of denKDcracy they were establishing, so they established
the separation and division of powers to check the work of the
political branches of government. To argue that any departure
from texthook dcracy is improper is not a valid argument since
the founders of this form of derrocracy recognised its needs f or
checks, and that its benefits are not absolute but relative (26),
The binding quality of the Supreme Court's constitutional
decisiczis
There is a group of critics of the Court who argue against
the binding quality of the Court's constitutional decisions on
persons and institutions other than those involved in the case,
on which the decisions are rendered (27), We shall include here
sane of the arguments given by those who argue for the limited
binding effect of the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions.
Attorney General Fdwin Meese, in his address to a Tulane
University audience, tried to distinguish between the Constitut-
ion and constitutional law. He argues that the Constitution is
the supreme law of the land and that constitutional law, which is
composed of Supreme Court decisions, is binding only on the
parties in the case and the executive branch for whatever
enforcement is necessary.
One of the points put forward by Attorney General Meese to
support his position is that if we regard constitutional law in
the same way as the Constitution it will be impossible for the
Court to reverse its previous decisions and change its
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interpretations.
Attorney General Meese argues that constitutional interpret-
ation is not the business of the Court only, bit also properly
the business of all branches of government.
The advocates of the limited-binding quality of
constitutional decisions point to several ways in which the
constitutional structure contradicts the claim of the advocates
of the final constitutional construction of the Court. They point
to some examples: Congress may vote down, on the grounds of
unconstitutionality, a Bill which is similar to one which has
been declared constitutional by the Supreme Court; the President
may pardon men convicted of violating an Act which has been
declared to be ccznpatible with the Constitution.
The rejection of the binding quality of the Supreme Court ts
constitutional decisions will lead to chaos because each branch
of government will claim its zn final interpretation of the
Constitution: the Constitution will mean different things to the
different branches. This will deprive the United States legal
system of an authoritative voice concerning the meaning of the
Constitution, thus making it impossible for the Constitution to
operate effectively to guide primary behaviour. Law is said to
have t roles in society. It provides the ground rules pursuant
to which legal consequences are ascribed to an event that has
already occurred. It also guides primary behaviour so that people
can organise their lives so their conduct will fall within what
the law allows
	 It will be destructive of the guiding value
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of constitutional law if the different governmental organs speak
with more than one authoritative voice about its meaning.
If the executive is permitted to apply its own construction
of the Constitution even if it contradicts the Court's
construction, this will mean that those who have the resources to
challenge the constitutionality of legislative or executive acts
will enjoy judicial protection while others will have to bear the
negative effects of legislative or executive acts. The legal
consequences of any event will becane a function of the resources
and capabilities of the affected parties, which will dartage the
equal protection of the laws in the country (29)•
Depriving the Supreme Court of the binding force of
constitutional decisions on other branches arid individuals will
result in i.mbalance in the U.S. system of separate and coequal
powers. Judicial review, which is the power of the judiciary to
declare constitutionality, is the only judicial power that
balances the powers of other branches of government. Judicial
review balances the power of Congress to pass laws and to raise
and spend taxes, arid the President's power to veto, enforce the
laws arid appoint government officials, including judges (30)•
Jixlicial review and fe:1eral.in
Judicial review, especially the non-interpretivist version,
has been accused of endangering the federal system.
These critics argue that the fact of recognising the Court
as the final interpreter of the national Constitution is against
federalism; they argue that the national Constitution is by its
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nature not merely the concern of central government }xit also
affects the states, and that the Supreme Court as an organ of
central government will consequently ultimately favour the
national government over the states. These critics use the
extension of the Fourteenth mendment and the incorporation of
the Bill of Rights in its application to the states as an example
of the deterioration of federalism because of judicial review and
activism (31)•
Judicial review, which is carried out by an independent
judiciary with sufficient isolation fran the political branches
of government, is the best way to ensure the protection of
federalism in cases of difference of interest between the two
levels of government.
There is sufficient evidence that a majority of those who
framed the Constitution intended the Supreme Court to be the
ultimate protector of federalism (32)•
Judicial review of constitutional issues involving federal
problems is a relief for the legislators from the task of
resolving conflicts between local power and national concern - a
task which might have been felt to call for a duty of insularity
(33)•
Conflicts between localism and centralism, like other
constitutional matters, are not merely resolved by judicial
review. The President may veto a bill on constitutional grounds,
and, if not overridden by Congress, will foreclose the courts
fran receiving the question. By passing new legislation in areas
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of cciierce Congress may change the effects of previous court
decisions which were based on Ccrnmerce Clause grounds. As the
record of the Supreme Court has shown, the court has been
particularly successful in finding vindication for co-operation
in the federal system. In Leisy v. Hardin (34) the Court
announced that in the case of difficulty in drawing the line
between the interests of the two levels of government the line
should be drawn to achieve co-operation for the general good.
Qxclusicxi
My view is that cc*nplete interpretivism is not possible. The
reasons for the impossibility of caliplete interpretivism are
numerous, for example, there are vague words in the Constitution
which need to be given precise meanings and there are open-ended
provisions in the Constitution. What is "due process"? What is
meant by "freedan of speech"? There are other examples requiring
precise meanings when being applied to actual facts (35).
The fact that the judiciary can make value choices in
interpreting and applying the Constitution is not contrary to the
system of government established by the United States
Constitution. The United States Constitution based its system of
government on several principles, one of which Is the system of
checks and balances.
The purpose of having separate and interdependent govern-
mental branches that participate in the checks and balances is so
that more than one branch of government makes and executes the
decision, in order for more discussion to take place into the
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appropriateness of the decisions, thus preventing arbitrariness.
The debate which has taken place in several occasions in
American constitutional history about judicial activism and
government by judiciary has been caused by the differences of
opinion between the political branches of government and the
majority of the Supreme Court.
The constitution has separated the governmental powers and
given the federal judges independence and secure tenure, and it
was inevitable, from the time of ratification of the
constitution, that the judges would deal with the actual facts in
their constitutional decisions and would make substantive value
choices when needed. It is another matter whether or not they
announce in express terms that they are making value choices or
not, what matters is that in reality they make these choices and
properly so.
There are several ways to check the judiciary. Sane of these
are riore effective than others, tut the judiciary is not totally
insulated from being checked. The courts have made and will
continue to make substantive value choices in dealing with the
constitutional provisions which need to be supplemented by
choices by the judiciary. The best approach in dealing with
judicial interpretation of the constitution is by recognising the
fact that the judiciary makes value choices and by using the
different ways to check and influence judicial opinion, not by
trying to limit or ignore the necessity of the judiciary to make
these choices.
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AP1R
JUDICIAL REVIFN PiND JBS'1?iNTIVE C)ICE IN ¶E I TJD STi!1
In the United States the power of the judiciary to review
the constitutionality of legislation is widely accepted at the
present time. There is a debate going on now between ?nerican
constitutional scholars in this field which is mainly about the
basis on which to establish the right of the judiciary to strike
down legislation as unconstitutional. Two major groups can be
identified whose basis ,of difference is about whether the court
should use a value choice in striking down legislation. In each
group there are differences in the details. The first group
denies the court the right to use value choices in reviewing the
constitutionality of legislation. This group takes this position
to avoid the alleged violation of dnDcracy in the court' s value
choices (1)• The other group argues that there are value choices
in the constitution arid that it is a fact that the court shall
and does make decisions based on substantive value choices and
that the procedural tendency of sate constitutional provisions is
meant to achieve a substantive result and that it is therefore
inevitable that the court will consider these values in its
decisions.
Discussion in this chapter will concentrate on arguments
about individual rights. The main reason for this focus is the
extent to which the matter has been debated in the U.S. in
relation to individual rights cases. Similar results can be
achieved in the area of federal-state powers.
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We shall discuss the theory of the first group, which is the
process based group, in order to prove that this approach does
not constitute a ccinplete and sufficient theoretical substitute
for the value based approach.
My view is that the constitution has value choices in it
and it was framed not just to establish procedure but to achieve
a substantive aim. The court has the duty of identifying the
fundamental values in the constitution and of considering the
cctnpatibility of legislation with these values in its decisions.
I am not defending the view that constitutional decisions should
be bound absolutely by the decisions of long-deceased framers. If
Americans wish no longer to retain values in the constitution,
they can amend the constitution to change them. In the meantie
the courts have to construe the constitution to arrive at its
message and values and to apply these values to decide whether or
not legislation is contrary to them. The values remain constant
but nore debate and study of the constitution will result in cla-
rifying them. The social and political circumstances in society
will develop and the details of applying these values will thus
change but the court has the duty to apply them unless they are
changed by a constitutional amendment. The court has the power to
interpret the constitution and to review the constitutionality of
legislation and it should be bound by the letter and the values
of the constitution. The criticism that is directed at judicial
review as being undeirocratic will not be avoided by denying the
existence of the substantive content of the constitution.
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Process based ttries of jixiicial review
The problem with the process based approach is that it takes
a reactionary-defensive line which in the end misleads its
followers. The core problem is the allegation that judicial
review (especially when it is based on value judgement) is
undencratic. The correct approach is to ask sane questions which
can lead to a solution to this problem of reconciling detocracy
with judicial review. The first question requiring an answer is:
why is denocracy important? Is it important for its own sake? -
or does its importance stem fran sane benefits accruing to the
society in which it operates?
The second question is whether democracy as an idea is
perfect and can be applied without any restraints or whether its
benefits are relative depending on the society and whether it
should be restrained in order to avoid harmful effects.
Darocracy is important because it prevents tyranny, gives
value to the human being and provides an opportunity to have the
consent of the governed in the choice of the way they are
governed. Principally this choice is exercised by the election of
those people who will take the legislative and executive
decisions affecting the lives of the voters and the provision of
a way of evaluating how far these representatives fulfil their
duties through re-election. So, to follow this line means to
value not only denocracy for its own sake, but the fulfilment by
derrocracy of its pranise and objective. This is the beginning of
the correct way of reconciling dencracy with judicial review.
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Democracy, like so many other social or political ideas
working in human society, is relative and can be abused. One of
the abuses is through the suppression of minorities, denying them
their rights as citizens and human beings. Another defect of
derrccracy is that a minority may daninate the majority through
the abuse of the electoral process and so the majority and the
minority need to be protected frcni abuse and frau the misuse of
the dencratic idea (2)
My opinion respecting the reconciliation of deirocracy with
judicial review is based on the achievement of the benefits of
deirocracy to society by applying the darocratic idea with the
necessary restraints. The constitution provides several
restraints, one of which is subjective, the others systematic.
The subjective restraint operates by giving the values around
which the political system will function. There are several
systematic restraints. One is the separation of powers, the idea
of checks and balances. Another is federalism. The whole system
is based on the division and distribution of powers in order to
divide the decision-making process so that the system will assure
that no government institution will daninate and tyranny will
thus be avoided.
The best way to answer the accusation of the undeirocratic
nature of judicial review is not to take a defensive approach,
but to analyse the system so that we can renove the points of
objection and understand how democracy and judicial review
coexist to bring about the best results for society.
chapter 4
	
- 111 -
We shall begin by stating and evaluating the leading theory
in the process based group, the process perfecting theory of John
Hart Ely
The process perfecting theory of approach is one which the
court has been tempted to take in the face of criticism that it
was contradicting denccracy by nullifying the actions of the
elected representatives of the people.
The Supreme Court has often invoked a vision of hcw politics
should work. The court justifies its intervention as a proper
action to remedy the harm resulting from the inconsistency
between political reality and the constitutional limits on the
political process (4).
The best knc qn statement by the court of this view is the
Caroline Products footnote in the decision which was written by
Justice Stone (5).
This approach depends on the idea that the role of the
judiciary is to guard against the misuse of the process provided
by the constitution in order to give the political branches of
the government the right to make value choices • In other words,
the court is a referee to make sure that the players abide by the
rules in making choices for the people. This approach denies that
the court should make value choices.
The leading constitutional scholar who elaborated and
defended this theory is John Hart Ely (6) Ely begins by stating
the controversy which exists between interpretivism and non-.
interpretivism. Ely states that non-interpretivism is riot popular
because of the prime importance of detcracy in the 1merican
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constitutional system. Non-interpretivism is clearly contrary to
democracy because it gives the judges, who are not elected, the
power to overrule the choices of the elected representatives,
especially in constitutional matters for which there is no easy
way to respond to the court' s decisions • He then states that
interpretivism is attracting support partly because of the
failure of non-interpretivism to provide clear justifications for
its existence.
Ely next turns to interpretivism and criticises it on
several grounds. His main concern is that even interpretivism
cannot convince him that it cauplies with the democratic theory
which he has stated at the beginning of his argument as an
essential basis of the American system of government and which is
provided for by the constitution. The conclusion of this argument
is that neither Interpretivism nor non-interpretivism is
deiocratic.
Ely then offers the process perfecting theory of judicial
review as a substitute for these theories, and goes on to prove
that it is a democratic theory. Ely objects to the judicial
practice of searching for and announcing fundamental values: he
saw the court as interventionist in its value choices
Although Ely does not accept the court's value choice in its
decision-making, he defends most of the activist record of the
Warren court because it was "process perfecting"; most of this
record dealt with freedau of speech, minority rights, voters'
qualifications, criminal due process and other procedure based
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fields (8)• Frau Ely's acceptance of much of the Warren court' s
record, we begin to see that his theory is not one which limits
cctnpletely the court' s intervention or activism. Like many other
theories it is rather a theory based on avoiding the accusation
that judicial review is antideincratic. The final result of this
theory is to overrule the decisions of dencratically elected
branches of government and at the same time to see these
decisions as a protection of deirccracy.
In Ely's view the constitution is
"overwhelmingly concerned, on the one hand, with procedural
fairness in resolution of individual dispites (process writ
small), and on the other, with what might capaciously be
designated process writ large - with ensuring broad
participation in the process and distributions of
government". (9)
The court's duty, in Ely's view, is to supervise the process
established by constitution. Examples of the court's role
mentioned by Ely are indicated by sane of the chapters of his
book: policing the process of representation, clearing the
channels of political change and facilitating the representation
of minorities.
Ely's picture of the constitution and its various provisions
is constructed to arrive at the conclusion he wants. This picture
of the constitution, however, is not a complete one and if
completed and pursued in more detail, will lead us to a
conclusion that Ely tried to avoid.
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Substantive values in the cxxstibiticzi arri the process-perfecting
theory
There are several problems with the process-perfecting
theory. The rrost serious problem with this theory is that the
substantive cannitinents of the constitution cannot be avoided in
the application of constitutional provisions to actual cases.
Indeed sane constitutional provisions have substantive content
and others clearly call for injection with value choices. Even
the procedural provisions of the constitution have to be based on
value choices in their ,application if they are to be applied to
produce a result consistent with the purpose for which they were
drafted. Aixng the constitutional catuitments which are substant-
ive in character are the First amendment's guarantee of religious
liberty and the prohibition of the establishrrent of religion, the
protection of private property in several ways, and the abolition
of slavery: all of these principles are evident fran several
provisions of the constitution
In fact most of the constitution addresses matters of
procedure. These procedural provisions have purposes beyond their
procedural content. The procedural cainitments in the constitu-
tion are either adjudicative (procedure due to individuals who
beccme defendants in legal action) or representative (procedure
which governs the election of representative persons or bodies).
To understand the purpose of the procedural prescription of
the constitution, substantive values must be involved. In order
to determine whether the process involved is adjudicative or
representative, we must look at the values and rights these
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procedural provisions are meant to protect. In the application of
these procedural provisions, the court has to look at the values
these provisions are meant to protect and their relationship to
the person or group involved and consider whether a person or
group is denied a right or suffers the imposition of a duty that
the application of the constitutional provisions will correct.
In Londoner v. City of Denver (11), the Supreme Court decided
that a hearing Is required before assessment for the cost of
street improvement is made of a property owner to satisfy the due
process of law guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution in the 14th
Amendment. tJnder the process-based theory, there is no need for
such a hearing because the officials who are responsible for the
assessment of costs are elected, and therefore subject to the
elective process, obviating the need to subject them to the
adjudicative process which is intended for non-elected judiciary.
Trying to explain this rule by a process-based analysis will lead
nowhere unless the right protected by the process is borne in
mind, and its protection is emphasised. The protection of
private property is a substantive right and is central to
explaining the rule established in this case.
In Griswold v. ConnectIcut (12), the Supreme Court held that
the statute involved was invalid as an unconstitutional invasion
of the right of privacy of married persons. The Court cited
several cases to prove, that the Fourth Amendment implies the
right to privacy (13)• certainly the Fourth Amendment protects
rights other than privacy, but proving this fact does not lead to
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the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment is concerned with
procedure as a purpose for protection (14),
Successive decisions have proved that there is a need to
invoke rights of substance, such as the right to privacy,
individual dignity and the protection of privacy, in deciding
whether some superficially procedural provisions of the
constitution warrant its intervention (15),
We cane now to one of the functions Ely has announced to be
among the duties of the judiciary in order to perfect the
governmental process, which is the protection of minorities. Fran
the analysis of the judicial duty to protect minorities, it is
obvious that value choices are inevitable. The most important
question in the protection of minorities is whan to protect. How
can we determine which minorities deserve protection?
The process perfecting theory suggests the use of
imutability, discreteness arid insularity (16), There are several
characteristics and factors by which groups of people are identi-
fied: colour, religion, nationality, gender, sexual orientation,
legitimacy and wealth. But the question is how th determine which
minorities deserve protection? Or should people belonging to, or
identified with, such groups, be denied substantive rights
because of certain feelings and attitudes towards them? Are the
determining factors those distinguishing characteristics. The
determining factor in the identification of a group deserving
protection should not be based on a suspect categorisation, which
assumes that there is a flaw in the process, but rather the
determination that it is unjust that the group is denied the
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opportunity fully to realise their humanity, and practise their
fundamental rights (17)• To identify minorities which deserve
judicial protection, a search for fundamental values must be
invoked to discover whether or not certain groups of people are
unjustly denied some rights, or have imposed on them unwarranted
duties. The search for the minorities deserving judicial protect-
ion will involve an application of attitudes to fundamental
values that the process perfecting theory tries to avoid (18)•
nother function that Ely has announced to be anng the
proper duties of the judiciary in the constitutional field is
"clearing the political channels", through speech and voting
(19), The First imendment protections of freedoms of speech,
press and the right of assembly are aiong such rights that will
if protected, keep the channels open for political change and
evaluation (20), In analysing this point, we begin by asking why
politics should be open to equal participation by all.
Clearing political channels is obviously not sufficient as
an aim in itself, 1it should be considered a means of achieving
sane benefit to society. The importance of clearing political
channels and guaranteeing the right to vote stem from a
substantive view of human rights. The determination of whether
the elective procedure warrants the interference of the court in
a particular case involves the determination of whether or not
the rights protected have been denied. This will involve the
judiciary in the kind of fundamental value determination which
the process perfecting theorists want to avoid (21)
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'L jixitciary ar tI arrectiori of malfunction in tk political
pss
The whole idea of giving the determination of proper
procedural functioning to the judiciary is contrary to the
history of the Pmerican constitution. Ely contends that:
"Obviously our elected representatives are the last persons
we should trust with identification of legislative
malfunction". (22)
Ely justifies giving the judiciary the role of correcting
malfunction in the political process using the idea that an
outsider, the judiciary, should determine the abuses and not
leave it to the political branches themselves (23)• mis is
contrary to the whole structure of the merican constitution,
which is based on involving many separate and independent parties
in making decisions and executing them. The involvement of
different parties and levels of government in the political
process is intended to correct its malfunctions and prevent
dcntination by any one party which produces the checking effect
famous in the U.S. Constitutional system. There are many
incidents in political history which show that the political
process can successfully correct sane of its malfunctions (24)•
There are no convincing reasons in Ely's arguments to give the
judiciary the role of correcting malfunctions in the political
process.
There are provisions in the constitution which specifically
give power to correct the political process to the political
branches. The carinerce clause, for example, gives to Congress the
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power to regulate interstate commerce in order, among other
things, to protect the voteless out-of-state traders. There are
sane procedural provisions which cannot be affected by any of the
government's branches, including the judiciary: one example is
the duration of office of members of Congress.
There is one other defect in Ely's theory: he supposes,
correctly, that the political branches may overstep the limits of
power prescribed by the constitution and may try to prevent
others fran entering the decision making process • This is correct
in that the political branches are human institutions susceptible
to mistakes, b..it what about judicial mistakes in determining the
limits of constitutional procedure? Ely does not address the
judicial role of process-perfection to correct malfunction in it.
The process-perfecting theory of John Hart Ely is one
important example of a host of theories which have one thing in
ccrrrron in that they try to avoid dealing with the substantive
content of judicial review in different ways (25)
All of these theories fail to achieve a reasonable objective
even if judged by their own staudards. As we have seen in the
case of Ely, these theories do not provide beneficial dialogue
for the developnent of the content of constitutional law. The
best approach to judicial review of the constitutionality of
legislation is to recognise the substantive choices that the
courts have to make in their review and fran that point, to argue
for the best choices that are consistent with the constitution
and are good for the nation. The participation of constitutional
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scholars with judges, trial lawyers and other concerned parties
will no doubt benefit the developitent of constitutional law. The
fact is that there are several provisions in the constitution
which are open-ended. In applying the open-ended constitutional
provisions the court has to inject meanings and choices of
substantive values. The argument which does take place is about
the proper source of the choice of the values to apply the
constitution. Certainly the legislature does apply the
constitution and its provisions to practical situations and in
doing this it gives 'certain meanings to some open-ended
constitutional provisions. The executive does give meanings to
sane open-ended constitutional provisions. The legislature and
executive sc*netimes give meanings and interpret the constitution
without expressly announcing that they are doing so. The
judiciary, being in charge of dealing with the law, and
constitutional law is part of the law of the land, does interpret
the constitution. The Supreme Court was especially created by the
constitution and given certain powers by the constitution itself.
The Supreme Court acts fran a strong position because of the
express constitutional source of power it enjoys. The Supreme
Court has the power to apply the constitution, and it is accepted
that it has the power to review the acts of the legislature and
the executive. With its independence and autonany, it acts as a
check on the other branches of the government and it deals with
matters which sanetimes appear, on the face of it, to be procedu-
ral and sanetimes with rrre obviously substantive provisions. All
of these provisions have substantive meanings and aims. The
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Supreme Court does, quite properly, deal with substantive value
choices. The argument which insists on proclaiming the judicial
role in the constitutional field to be about perfecting the
process, avoids dealing with the substantive choices made by the
Supreme Court, and deflects attention from an actual and
necessary part of judicial review, regardless of the stated role
of the court.
The result of this will be to encourage the judiciary and
especially the Supreme CourE to make substantive choices in the
name of perfecting procedure, knowing that commentators and
critics will focus on this part of the court's work without
questioning its substantive choices.
A proper constitutional analysis, in ray view, is one which
considers reality and the real extent of judicial review,
acknowledges that in judicial review the courts deal with
substantive choices about constitutional provisions, and tries to
question the appropriateness of these choices and their
canpatibility with constitutional provisions and values. The
constitution does contain value choices and there are values in
the constitution which are not stated in rds but understood
fran the constitution. The judiciary has the power to review the
canpatibility of the legislative as well as the executive acts
against the provisions and values of the constitution. Discussion
of judicial review which admits value choices and questions them
is a healthy analysis which can participate in the developiient
and correction of constitutional law.
chapter 4
	
- 122 -
Intergo'erziiita]. acticris arri furviamental values
In actions between the state (political branches) and the
individual, the court should take into consideration the
substantive values and ends that the constitutional provisions
appear to protect.
Between national government and the states, the court must
look at the basic ca'aponent of the nation, the individual, and
what he is meant to gain fran the system. tes the encroachment
of one level of the government upon the other disturb the balance
put forward in the constitution in order to prevent one level of
government from domination? One purpose of federalism is to
protect the individual by a division of powers, and this, coupled
with the separation of powers, is meant to distribute
governmental powers artong several parts and layers of government,
which in the end serve to provide a balanced government in which
decisions are debated and pass through different parts of
government in. order to allow correction and protection of
individuals and groups of citizens. The basic issue in
federalism cases is whether challenged action by one government,
state or federal, exceeds the scope of its constitutional
authority and thereby invades the authority of the other. One
kind of constitutional case in which the court frequently strikes
down state actions on grounds of federalism, is carinerce clause
cases (26)
The basis on which striking down state legislation occurs
nostly concerns the interests of the nation, and the material
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well-being of the country. The constitutional provisions are
indeterminate and the original intentions of its framers are hard
to establish and controversial to invoke (27) Federalism
involves imposition of limits on individual states as well as on
the federation. The ultimate effect of such limits is to have a
checking and limiting effect on the powers of both levels of
government. The courts, especially the Supreme Court, have wide
discretion in the declaration of the limits of powers. The
Supreme Court is bound by constitutional provisions which give it
a wide range of choice in its decisions in cases involving issues
of federalism (28)
The doctrine of enumerated power that Congress has
"all legislative powers herein granted",
and the doctrine of implied power (29) that
"Congress shall have power ... to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution of the
foregoing powers, and all other powers rested by this
constitution in the Government of the United States, or any
Department or Office thereof" (30)
make the Federal Government a government of limited powers. The
limits of the legislative power of the Federal Government are not
precisely defined and are subject to variation and developing
interpretation. The overall attitude of the court's decisions in
the cainerce clause cases has been towards strengthening unity,
encouraging integration and suppressing the forces of localism
(31), but this does not indicate that the restraining effects of
the states in the operation of the National Government and the
Federal system has diminished (32)• Federal legislation under the
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commerce clause may be subject to close judicial scrutiny.
Legislation passed under authorisation from the carinerce clause,
must be consistent with the Bill of Rights and other restrictions
which protect not only individual interests but State interests
as well
Using the process perfection theories may serve to justify
active judicial involvement in several areas including
fundamental rights by. labelling the courts intervention as
Process-Perfecting or Clearing-Political channels, or other terms
that are used, but this theory does not lead to restraining the
judiciary (34)•
There are substantive meanings and objectives of
constitutional provisions, even those dealing with processes.
Judicial interpretation of constitutional provisions involves
choices and results in checking other branches and levels of
government. Studying the Courts' choices and discretion is better
than ignoring them or avoiding dealing with them under any label
or approach.
The courts, especially the Supreme Court, deal with various
areas of the Constitution, and therefore have discretion to
affect various rights and relationships. The application and
interpretation of the Constitution involves rights of individuals
tc .iards government arid rights of government authorities towards
other governmental levels and branches.
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AP1R FIVE
ThE NrIvE XE c ThE aismuric crxr IN W'1' (W2ff
Unlike the United States Constitution, the Basic Law of West
Germany (the constitution) gave the Constitutional Court the
power to determine the constitutionality of federal and Laender
(state) legislation in clear and explicit provisions (1)•
The Constitutional Court has the power (inter alia) to
decide:
in case of differences of opinion or doubt on the ...
caripatibility of federal or land law with this Basic Law
at the request of the Federal Government, of a Land
government, or of one third of the Bundestag members. (2)
on canplaints of unconstitutionality, which may be entered
by any person who claims that one of his basic rights
has been violated by public authority (3)
in the case of difference of opinion on the rights and
duties of the Federation and the Laender... (4)
and
on other disputes involving public law, between the
Federation and the Laender, between different Laender.... (5)
As a result of this clear constitutional stipulation, it is
universally accepted that the Constitutional Court has the power
to review the constitutionality of federal and Land legislation.
There is, however, no uniform opinion about the rules or scope of
constitutional interpretation.
Fran the early days of the Court opinions were divided as to
whether or not the political effects of the Court's decisions
should be considered. In one of its early cases the second senate
of the Constitutional Court declared:
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• The decisions of the Constitutional Court relate to
political realities, and the Court must on no account
disregard the political environment in which its decisions
take effect. (6)
In another of the Court's early decisions the second senate
observed:
The political consequences which may arise from the
rejection of the applications as inadmissible cannot be
allowed to influence the Federal Constitutional Court. It
must decide according to the law alone. (7)
Nevertheless political and social considerations were always
present and can be traced in different cases considered by the
Court.
One way of taking political considerations into account was
to use the passing of time, leaving the case pending either until
it was resolved by other factors or until it became more
appropriate for the court to take action. In the Carrnunist Party
case, (8) the Court waited for five years until East-West
relations changed and other political factors took effect, ar1
then declared the Cczrrnunist Party to be unconstitutional (.
?nother way in which the Court took account of the political
implications of its decisions was by recognising that the
justification for these decisions lay in the spirit of the
Constitution rather than falling within its written provisions.
Reliance on the spirit of the Constitution scinetimes implied the
violation of written constitutional provisions. In confirming the
constitutionality of the act ratifying the Saar Agreanent of
October 1954 the Court did not deny that the act violated sauie
constitutional provisions, but argued that the outcane of the
treaty was the best result politically attainable and that the
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Constitution must not prevent the bad fran giving way to the
better just because the best was unattainable (10)
1 special nature of the West German legal and federal syst
and their relaticxiship with tl Qxistituticrial Ccurt
The West German legal system is a civil law system. Under
this system the state is at the centre of law-making. Tradi-
tional German jurisprudence is a positivist jurisprudence based
on the idea that there is only one "right" decision and that the
task of the court is to "discover" it by a process of logical
deduction (11)
In the twentieth century the positivist view has been
declining. Even in the heyday of positivism there was no
agreement as to whether the criterion of judgement was the
"objective" meaning of a statute or the "subjective" will of the
legislator. The Constitutional Court has declared its preference
for the objective statutory construction (12)
Even when j udgement is based on the objective meaning of
statutes and constitutional norms, it is possible to consider
either what the words meant at the time when the law was framed
or what they mean at the time when it is being applied. The
present trend is to interpret laws on the basis of their meaning
at the time they are applied; this is another way of taking
social, political and economic developments into account in
applying the law.
Judges in West Germany and other civil law systems do not
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view their decisions as binding on them in later cases or as
binding on other judges. The interpretations of the
Constitutional Court are binding on all other courts and
government authorities. Even the Court itself cannot easily avoid
following its previous precedents because of the way this will
affect its relationship with other branches of government. The
Court itself takes the view that self-restraint is a guard
against any crisis in relations with other branches of government
which might result in reduction in or restriction of the role of
the Constitutional Court.
Basic law declares West Germany to be a "derocratic and
social federal state". Basic law established a party denocracy,
and the West German federal system is a centralised federal
system in terms of both its constitutional arrangements and its
practical operation.
The federation is divided into ten Laender each of which has
its own constitution. Most of the Laender were in no sense
historical entities, bit rather, fortuitous creations of the
western powers within their zones of occupation, and were partly
intended to prevent a strong, unified West German government fran
repeating the experience of Hitler (13)•
The legislative powers allocated to the Laender are meagre,
because Basic Law allocates nost of the important legislative
powers to the federal government. The Laender are canpensated for
their limited power of • legislation in two ways. Firstly, the
second chamber of the Bundestag is canposed of members of the
state governments. The members for each Land cast their votes (en
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bloc). This institutionalises the influence of the governments of
the Laender on national government. Secondly, the way federal
legislation is executed balances the distribution of powers
between the Laender and the federal government. The federal
government does not have an administrative substructure in most
fields of its legislative powers, so it has to depend on the
Laender administration to execute its legislation. This
inevitably gives the Laender a considerable degree of latitude in
interpreting legislation (14)•
The fact that the West German federal system is a
centralised one and that most of the Laender were only organised
canparatively recently has caused the work of the Constitutional
Court to favour the Laender and to guard the federal system, as
was demonstrated in the South West case (15), In tius case the
Constitutional Court announced that there are certain fundamental
principles which can be deduced fran Basic Law and to which all
other constitutional provisions are subordinated; one such
principle is federalism.
insUthti1 3epx of tt	 ist1bxt1cxa1 Cairt
In the Constitutional Court Act of 1951 the court is defined
as "an autonaicus court of the federation independent of all
other constitutional organs" (16) Initially the Court was under
the administrative supervision of the Ministry of Justice, a fact
which annoyed the justices because it placed the independence of
the Court at risk,
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The justices of the Constitutional Court realised the
importance of preserving the independence of the court and
started a move to correct the position of the Court fran the very
first month of its existence. One of their most important demands
was that the Court be accorded a status equal to other
governmental institutions and authorities such as the presidency,
the Council of Ministers and the tv houses of the legislature.
The justices argued that the position of the Court at that time
was contrary to Basic Law, which established the Court as a
supreme constitutional organ and its justices as supreme
guardians of Basic taw (17)• The justices recarrnended that the
Constitutional Court should be given budgetary autonany and that
it should be freed from any financial dependence upon the
Ministry of Justice; that the Court should be given total control
over all internal administrative matters; and that the Court's
justices should be exempted fran all disciplinary regulations
applicable to other judges.
The justices achieved all their objectives for the
independence of the Court • The Court n 'i has its own budget,
which is independent of that of the Ministry of Justice. The
justices of the Court have the same status as the highest state
officials. The president of the court holds the same rank as the
President of the Republic, the chancellor and the presidents of
the t legislative houses (18)•
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Selecticzi of Jiñges and Internal Organisaticxi of tI
Ostitutial Qrt.
Recognition of the political importance of Constitutional
Courts is a decisive factor in determining the manner in which
these courts are staffed. Where the significance of the role of
these Constitutional Courts is valued, manners of appointing
members are designed to give political groupings and legislative
bodies a part in the appointing process (19)
Following the inerican example, and perhaps stressing to a
greater degree the ro1 of the legislature and of the Laender,
the West German system of appointing members of the
Constitutional Court is a significant factor for the
consideration of the Court's importance.
The Basic law provided that the Judges of the Constitutional
Court shall be elected by the two houses of the Federal
legislature (20) One half of the members of the court are
elected by the Federal lower house (Bundestag), which is a
poilarly elected body, and the other half are elected by the
upper house of the Federal legislature (Bundesrat), whose members
are appointed by the governments of the Laender (21)
The Constitutional Court is composed of two separate
chambers (Senates). Justices are specifically elected to either
the first or the second Senate, and may not sit on the other
panel. The first Senate is presided over by the President of the
Court and the second Senate is presided over by the Vice-
President of the Court. Both Criief Justices are independent as
far as judicial and administrative matters of their Senates are
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concerned. Under the Constitutional Court Statute of 1951, the
Bundestag elects its quota of judges through a specially
organised ccrrmittee representing a reflection of the strength of
the different political parties in the lower legislative house
(22)• The Bundesrat elects its quota of judges directly.
The effect of giving the two legislative houses the rights
to elect members of the two Senates of the court, and dividing in
half the seats they elect in the two houses, serves several
purposes. The first is to prevent damination of the court by any
one party. The second purpose is to provide a formula by which
the court represents the influence of the strengths of the
different parties in both Federal and Laender levels. The third
purpose of the design of the system of staffing the court is to
represent the interests of the Federal Government and the
governments of the Laerider, due to the courts' role in umpiring
the Federal system and its power of Constitutional review.
Another possible consequence of the system of staffing the
Constitutional Court is to reduce the objections to the courts'
substantive choices and moral judgements, on the basis of
denocratic principles, due to the close connection between the
court and the legislative houses, arid the care taken to provide
it with a system that reflects the voting powers at both the
Federal and Laender levels (23)•
Each of the two Senates has the same number of judges. The
Senates started with twelve judges each, which meant that in 1951
the Constitutional Court canprised of twenty-four judges. Now
chapter 5
	
- 136 -
the Constitutional Court is caitprised of only sixteen judges,
eight judges in each Senate (24) Functionally the
Constitutional Court operates as two separate courts. Each
Senate has its n distinct jurisdiction.
In staffing the Constitutional Court, there are
qualifications determined by the courts' Statute emphasising the
need for a variety of experience and backgrounds. To qualify to
be elected to the Constitutional Coirt the minimum age of the
persons is forty years, and they have to be eligible for election
to the Bundestag and possess the qualifications for judicial
office. In addition there is a special requirement that three
seats out of the eight seats in each Senate are reserved for
judges who are already members of the highest Federal courts
(25)• The other judges elected to the Constitutional Court
canprise a mixture of people with experience in government career
service, professional legal practice, academic life and direct
political activity (26)•
The mixture of past experiences and the design of the system
of electing the rnnbers of the Constitutional Court recognises
the need for diversity of knciledge and experience besides the
need for wider representation. All of these diversities equip
the court for handling subjects that affect various aspects of
the lives of individuals and the operation of the Constitutional
system, in addition to the important advantage of providing wider
confidence in the ability of the judges and legitimacy of their
substantive choices in deciding constitutional cases.
According to the Constitutional Court Statute, as amended in
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1971, Judges are elected for a non-renewable term of twelve years
with a mandatory retirement age of sixty-eight years (27)•
The independence of the Constitutional Court allows it to
check the other branches of government without fear of
intervention or pressure from the Ministry of Justice. This
independence is in accordance with Basic Law, which gave the
Court the power to construe Basic Law in a way which is binding
on the federal government as well as the Laender. The decisions
made by the Court have denonstrated that it is acting fran a
strong and independent position, especially in dealing with the
federal government.
Qristituticxial CCErt arKi tbe interpretati(X1 of Basic law
1 SithWest se
This case caine very early in the life of the Constitutional
Court; the Court 's statute was enacted in 1951 and this case
dates fran the sane year. The Court decided that it uld be
beneficial to use this case to introduce itself to other branches
of government and to renve any ambiguities about the place of
the Court in the constitutional system.
This case involves the federal government's attempt to
redress the artificial division of the traditional territories
of Baden and Wurtenberg into three new states by the Allies. The
issue raised by this case was whether the federal government had
the authority under Basic Law to suspend elections and extend the
term of a state legislature pending the outcane of a popular
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referendum on the merger of the state in question with another
state (28)• under Basic Law the federal government has the power
of territorial reorganisation of the Laender, (29) but the Court
denied it the power to extend the life of the state parliament as
long as the Land exists and its legislation does not violate the
requirements of Basic Law. The court said that if the federal
government interfered with such matters as when and how an
elected Land parliament was dissolved, it would be violating the
principle of federalism guaranteed by Basic Law.
The Constitutional Court announced several important
propositions in this case:
(1) The federal Constitutional Court is absolutely supreme in
the interpretation of Basic Law.
(2) The Court's function is to examine the legality or validity,
not the wisdom, of public policy; the extent of the
legislature's power is a constitutional question on which
the Constitutional Court reserves finality.
(3) Constitutional provisions are to be interpreted not as
independent rules standing alone bet within the context of
Basic Law as a whole. No constitutional right, duty or power
is absolute, bet is to be measured by ccrnpeting rights and
responsibilities under Basic Law.
(4) There are certain fundamental principles such as darccracy,
federalism and the rule of law which can be deduced frau
Basic Law as a whole and to which all other constitutional
provisions are subordinate.
(5) Certain higher law principles constitute standards against
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which POsitive law and the actions of public officials are
to be reviewed (30)
In expounding on the principle of "federal ccxnity" announced
by the Court in this case, the Court said that as members of the
federation the Laender are states with their own supreme state
power, which although limited in its field of application is not
derived from the federal government but rather recognised by it
(31)• In setting out the limits of the federation's power to
organise new states, the Court signified clearly its intention to
guard the autonany of the Laender.
'[ !rth-Rhine Salaries (se (1954)
This case was brought by the federal government against
legislation by the Land of North-Rhine Westphalia, on the grounds
that it violated the legislative framework of the federal
government, which, under article 75 of Basic Law, has the power
to enact framework legislation.
Basic Law gave the federal government the power to enact
framework legislation in certain fields; the purpose of this
power is to ensure a certain degree of uniformity throughout the
Federal Republic. The Basic Law did not define the meaning of the
term "framework", so it was a question for the Court to answer.
One area in which the federal government has the right to
enact framework legislation is the "legal status of persons in
the public service of the Laender, Carinunes or other corporate
bodies under public law" (32) In 1951 the federal government
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enacted legislation which prohibited the Laender fran fixing the
salaries of their officials riore favourably than those of the
corresponding federal officials.
The Land government denied the constitutionality of this
legislation, arguing that it did not leave free scope to the
Laender but went into detail such as could only be justified by
exclusive legislative authority. This, the Land argued, was
contrary to the purpose of the framework legislation, which is
meant to allow the Laender the discretion to adapt their
legislation to the special circumstances of their areas.
The Court struck down the federal legislation as unconstitu-
tional, and said that the definition of framework power was a
legal question to be decided by the Court. The Court differentia-
ted between framework legislation and concurrent legislation,
saying that framework legislation must not be of the same
intensity as concurrent legislation. The main distinction is that
the federal government is given the right to occupy the area of
legislation; until this time and to this extent Land legislation
is void, while framework legislation presupposes Lath legislation
in the same area. Framework legislation should thus leave suf f -
icient scope for Lath legislation. In finding invalid the federal
framework regulations on civil servants' salaries, the Court
stressed that, due to the principle of federal cartity, Laether
are not absolutely free to determine the salaries of their
officials This principle stems from the spirit of the
federal constitution and means that whenever the effects of a
Land's legislation extend beyond the area under that Land's
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jurisdiction, the Land must take account the interests of the
federal government and of other Laender. In determining the
salaries of their officials the Laender should bear in mind that
the Federal Republic has a single overall financial structure.
The Laender should take into consideration the general salary
situation in the federal government arid in the other Laerider, so
that the general financial structure is not shaken. Large
variations in public sector salaries between different Laerider
and between Laender arid federation may cause dissatisfaction
within the civil service.
The Court ruled that a Land law can only be invalidated on
the basis of violation of federal canity in cases of obvious
misuse of legislative discretion. In this case the Court found no
obvious misuse of legislative discretion by North-Rhine
Westphalia (34)•
1I televlsicxi cse of 1961
This case brought the Constitutional Court into direct
conflict with the federal government on a matter of policy which
the federal government considered vital The federal
government had decided in 1951 to create a second television
channel in addition to the existing channel which was run in
collaboration between the Laerider and sane private associations.
The Laerider argued that the federal government did not have the
right to interfere in the regulation of television matters
because these matters fell within their recognised cartpetence
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over cultural matters. Four Laender challenged the federal
government's action before the Constitutional Court on the
grounds of infringement of the guarantee of "freedan of reporting
by broadcasting" contained in Article 5 of the Basic Law, of the
residual powers of the Laender under Article 30 and of the duty
of federal ccinity (36)
The federal government's case rested on generic interpret-
ation of sane traditional areas of federal authority under Basic
Law, because there was no explicit allocation of authority over
television. Among the' federal powers invoked to support the
federal government's argument was its power over post and
telegraphs The Court ruled that while this power might
extend to the regulation of arrangements for the technical
aspects of television transmission, it could not cover the
organisation and making of prograitunes. The content of television
broadcasting, the Court decided, fell within the cultural
sovereignty of the Laender • The Court' s decision made use of the
principle of federal canity at several points. It provided an
example of the use of the doctrine of federal canity to rrdify
the existing freedan of discretion, particularly in establishing
limits for both the federal government and the Laender in the
exercise of their powers.
The Court was concerned to prevent the federal government' s
power over broadcasting fran being so far-reaching in its effects
as to prejudice the organisation of broadcasting by the Laender.
If existing broadcasting stations were prevented f ran controlling
their own transmissions, the court argued, this would be a
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violation of the principle of federal caiiity.
The Court was criticised for its highly political arguments
and the severity of its criticism of the federal government in a
matter which was incidental to a fairly clear-cut question of
legislative and administrative powers under Basic Law (38)•
There were many complaints that the Court had obscured the
boundary between constitutional judgement and political
criticism, especially in its detailed discussion of the manner in
which the federal government had dealt with the whole issue of
the new channel
The extent to which the doctrine of federal comity was
developed by the Constitutional Court in several cases,
especially the Television Case, made it susceptible to alinst
unlimited extension to every aspect of political relations
between the federal government and the Laender. But in a later
case the Constitutional Court restrained its use of the doctrine
of federal ccznity, especially for the protection of the rights of
the Laender, announcing that the principle constitutes or limits
rights or duties within an existing relationship between the
federal government and the Laender but does not independently
establish a legal relationship between thea (40)•
Qxistibitional ccirt and fm1anøita1 rights in CSt1bIt1Xa1
interpretaticxi.
The Constitutional Court announced that human dignity is the
"highest legal value" and the Basic Law in Article 1, which
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proclaims the inviolability of human dignity, is beyond
parliament's powers of amendment. The Constitutional Court
announced that fundamental rights are pre-existent and binding
upon both the founders of the Constitution and the legislature.
The Constitutional Court further announced that even though Basic
Law authorises the legislature to derogate from fundamental
rights in sane subjects, it is unacceptable to interpret the
constitution in ways which would give the legislature a free hand
to tamper with fundamental rights, even in those subjects in
which Basic Law explicitly gives the legislature the right to
derogate fran these rights (41)
Federalism was one area in which stricter scrutiny is
applied to political acts because of decentralisation and the
limits it imposes in particular on the acts of federal political
branches. In West Germany the federal system was created to
protect against repetition of the Nazi experience. New states
were created artificially by dividing the areas under Allied
occupation.
The Constitutional Court has formulated certain unwritten
constitutional principles on the basis that these principles have
their source in the guiding ideas which inspired the founding
fathers and informed the deliberations of the parliamentary
council, but were not expressly set out in any specific constitu-
tional provision. These principles include federal cxtnity, the
social state, and the principle of proportionality, which is the
equivalent of due process. The important principle of human
dignity, which is based on Article 1, can be included with these
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unwritten principles to form higher constitutional principles to
which constitutional amendrrnts should conform (42)•
The use of unwritten constitutional principles and the
primacy of individual dignity, all of which relate either
directly or indirectly to the protection of the individual, have
given individual rights a prime position in constitutional
interpretation. These constitutional principles have affected
constitutional interpretation in another respect: because they
are general arid nost of then are not written, they allcM the
Court ample roan to manoeuvre arid develop its decisions.
'fl active role of the Qxist1tuticza1 CQ.irt in cxxistituticxial
Ijxlicaticai
From its early days the Court signalled to the other
branches of government that it wanted to be independent and
active in performing its duty. In the first year the justices
sought arid eventually received independence fran the Ministry of
Justice in the Court's non-judicial affairs. The reason behind
the justices' seeking the independence of the Court in
administrative and financial matters was that they considered
that these matters could jeopardise the independence of the
Court, which is important if it is to play its role effectively.
In its first major case the Constitutional Court announced
that it was absolutely supren in the interpretation of Basic Law
and that it was prepared to carry its responsibility
independently.
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The Court took a positive attitude and played an active role
within the latitude it possessed, using the pcer available to it
in the context of the legal system to develop and balance the
constitutional structure of the Federal Republic. One example of
the role of the Court in balancing the constitutional structure
and preserving the federal system is its protection of the
Laender and the small area of legislation they control cctupared
to the federal government.
In guarding the federal system the Court did not confine
itself to the letter .of Basic Law, but rather admitted the
existence of basic unwritten principles such as federal cgpity
and considered all other provisions of Basic Law to be
subordinate to these principles.
In its interpretation of Basic Law the Constitutional Court
takes different factors into consideration by adopting the
meanings of the constitutional provisions current at the time
when the provisions are applied.
The active role of the Court was obvious not only fran what
it chose to do but also frau what it chose not to do. The Court
used to leave sare cases pending for a long time, so that the
problems could be solved in different ways or the positions in
the case could develop and becctne clearer.
The Court is an independent judicial institution and a
pcMerful actor in the West German constitutional structure. The
legal system and the nature of the constitutional structure in
West Germany have not prevented the Constitutional Court fran
carrying out its duty. The Court has practised its constitutional
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adjudication while taking into consideration the different
circumstances of the individual cases and their parties.
The jurisdiction provided by the Basic Law and the manner of
staffing the court provided it with a wide discretion and a rroral
justification to becane involved in nore than the application of
positive legal rules.
The Constitutional Court is the supreme guardian of the
Constitution, with the authority of providing interpretations of
the Constitution which are binding on all (43)• The
Constitutional Court has a political significance due to its
jurisdiction to interpret and resolve disputes about the contents
of a political document, namely, the Constitution (Basic Law).
Therefore the Constitutional Court is, by its design and
canpetence, an important institution affecting the political and
constitutional developments of the country.
The Constitutional Court is involved in issues of a
controversial nature, (as in the case of the Suprne Court of the
U.S.), like the right to abortion and the right to life of unborn
babies (44) The Constitutional Court is not without rxral and
legitimate rights when involved in deciding such issues.
In deciding such cases, the Court's judgement will not satisfy
the positions of all people. The Court can reduce the criticism
and any popular or political resentment by pointing to the
Constitutional provisions of the Basic Law and shcing the coher-
ence of its interpretation of them, as well as adopting restraint
in the disposition of sane of the issues before it
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The Constitutional Court is accorded a major responsibility
to ensure protection of rights given to governments and
individuals by the Basic Law, and to ensure the supremacy of that
Basic Law. The court's discretion in disposing of matters within
its capetence is wide. The success of the Constitutional Court
in the past and its role as protector of individual rights and of
Federal balance depended on mixed measures of self-restraint and
decisive involvement in appropriate cases. The success of the
Constitutional. Court is reflected in the grc.iing confidence in it
and in the increased constitutional responsibilities accorded to
it by sucèessive enactments
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APR SIX
JtJDICIAL REVIEW CF ThE 144E	 FR CF (XNS MD ITS IMPPCI'
ci ThE FEAL SYS'14 IN LE U.S.
Introduction
The Judiciary has an important role in deciding the limits
of the legislative powers of the national government and of the
states in the U.S. federal system.
The general pattern in the develoçznent of the U.S. federal
system has been towards increasing the National government's
share of legislative power. The courts have played two different
roles regarding the distribution of legislative power: they have
played a vital and maj or role in the prctnotion and preservation
of federalism by curbing state action incompatible with the
integration of the nation, and allowing for the expansion of
federal legislative authority. The importance of both of these
roles cannot be played down. The courts' role regarding curbing
state actions incanpatible with the integration of the national
econany has been a central one. Regarding protection of the
expansion of the national powers, the role of the judiciary has
been secondary. To say that in the performance of the second
task the role of the judiciary is secondary does not discount the
importance of such a role in the continuing integration of the
national econany (1)
In the face of the expansive power of Congress arises the
necessity of putting certain limits to this power in order to
preserve the federal system. The constitution is premised on the
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existence of the states as independent entities.
What is the branch of government most suitable to pranote
and support the integration of the nation and at the same time
ensuring the true existence of the individual states within the
parameters provided by the constitution? There are calls to
entrust the Congress with this task. I shall argue that the best
guardian of the federal system is the Judiciary.
My aim is to prove the positive role of the judiciary in
prclmDting the growth of national pcMer, while preserving the
federal system.
I (Ymrce Power
The power of Congress "to regulate Carrnerce ... among the
several states" (2) has been one of the areas which witnessed a
great expansion over the years.
The camerce power has been used throughout the history of
the U.S. federal system to strengthen the powers of the National
gov'ernment in many different fields. Federal Labour statutes,
even the Civil Rights statutes, and countless others rest on
cailnerce power. The underlying construction of the scope of the
Ccinnerce clause has been that Congress has the power to regulate
the activities which it can show to be burdening, obstructing or
affecting inter-state carrnerce
Originally the resolution of ccirtnercial rivalries between
states was among the reasons behind calling the 1787 Convention.
Under the rticles of Confederation there were different forms of
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cctrrnercial rivalries among the states, the enactment of tariff
laws against other states being just one example of the trade
restrictions on interstate carmerce. The elimination of these
rivalries and the abolition of restrictive trade practices was
one of the primary tasks of the convention
The sparse language of the Cciiinerce clause was presumed by
the framers to be adequate to allow the resolution of cawnercial
rivalries between the states. Nevertheless, it soon became
apparent that the clause had left several questions unanswered,
so it was the duty of the judiciary to address these questions
and to resolve them, to serve the purposes of the constitution to
unify the states and abolish harmful trade practices.
The need for integraticn of t1 nrket and the role of tI
pr Court
The constitutional regulation, in the constitutional text of
1787, has not been amended since caning into force . This
fact itself shows the importance of the role of the judiciary in
the interpretation of the limits of both state and national
powers regarding carmerce, which has had the effect of allowing
the integration the national economy to an extent quite
unforeseen in 1787. The role of the judiciary in providing for
and protecting the expansion of the national economy has become
necessary for several reasons, primarily the desirability of
national economic integration brought about by the develoçnent of
the country's economy from being rural and decentralised towards
greater integration and sophistication. Since the adoption of the
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constitution, the industrial revolution took place and congress
needed to provide legislation to cope with this, and to help
expand it and distribute its benefits in the interests of the
wiiole	 (6)•
The first opportunity for the Supreme Court to deal with the
questions left unanswered by the Camierce clause was in 1824, in
Gibbons v. ogden
Gibbons v. Ogden involved the validity of a New York statute
that conferred a rronopoly to navigate the waters of the state by
steamboat. The challenge to the statute rested, in part, upon the
grounds that it conflicted with a federal statute licensing such
interstate caunerce, and was therefore an unauthorised state
legislation. Chief Justice Marshall, who wrote the Court's
decision, held that the New York's statute was void and took the
opportunity to interpret federal power expansively.
Marshall rejected the claim which restricted carinerce to
purchase and sale of goods. He asserted that "Caiinerce" is a
general term which describes the camiercial intercourse in all
its branches.
Marshall did not end his discussion of the scope of federal
powers at this point, although it was sufficient for the holding
of the Court to establish that navigation was affecting ccnnerce
airong the states sufficiently, in this case, to hold the New York
statute void. Marshall went on to establish that under the
Canmerce clause Congress could legislate with respect to "all
cunnerce which concerns nre states than one" (8) This means
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that any activity which "concerns" or affects interstate cciirnerce
would be within the power of Congress to legislate. This also
means that the power of Congress to legislate on interstate
commerce would be absolute, plenary and subject only to the
Constitution's affirmitive prohibitions on the exercise of
federal authority (9). According to Marshall, in his opinion
Gibbons v. Ogden was to be understood as conforming to the
general design of the Constitution. The design is that
Congressional power should extend to the nation generally, but
not to disputes which are canpietely within a particular state,
which do not affect other states and with which it is not
necessary to interfere for the purpose of executing sane general
power of the National government.
Although Gibbons v. Oqden respected the theory of enumerated
powers, it denstrated that this theory was cciapatible with a
very broad view of Congressional authority. Gibbons v. Ogden
represents a landmark in the develoent of the Constitutional
law of the U.S., and gives a clear example of Marshall's view of
Congressional power. Not until Congress used its legislative
power with respect to Cannerce in the Inter-state Catirierce Act of
1887 etc., did the national legislature take up the power it had
under the Constitution. Before then the cases which reached the
Suprane Court were largely concerned with the canpatibility of
State legislation with the still dormant power of Congress under
the Carrnerce Clause.
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1 Pre-New Deal Decisictis (fran 1887 to 1937)
During this period the Supreme Court was repeatedly required
to define the limits of Congressional power. The Supreme Court
departed from the empirical test for determining Congress's
authority, which was suggested by Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden,
and replaced it with a formal classification of economic
activity. This test was restrictive of Congress's power and
resulted in the invalidation of a number of Congressional acts.
It distinguished "Cartierce" fran "mining" and "manufacturing",
and the result of this.classification was to deny Congress the
power to regulate the latter activities even if the products of
these activities would subsequently enter the realm of inter-
state caiinerce (10),
In U • S • v. E. C. Knight Co. (11) the Supreme Court held that
an acquisition of four sugar refineries which brought 98% of the
U.S. refinery capacity under ccxtuon control did not violate the
Sherman Act. This decision was based on a narrow conception of
Congress's power under the Camrce clause. The court maintained
that carinerce did not include manufacturing, agriculture or other
production activities. The court in its distinction between
manufacture and commerce was trying to preserve the state's
police power in order to protect the autonany of states. The
court did not succeed in establishing principles that were
adequate to confine federal power. The interactions between the
different economic activities and the wider effects of the
develotinents in states upon interstate carinerce was becaning
apparent with the passage of time. So, in Swift and Co. v. U.S.
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(12) the Supreme Court recognised the interconnectedness of
marketS among the states. In this case the Supreire Court held
that price fixing in livestock markets could be prohibited under
the Sherman Act since the markets, although themselves each
located in a single state, were part of interstate cctnnerce.
The trend towards widening the reach of interstate carmerce
continued and resulted in the ratification of important
congressional exercises of the Carmerce power.
In the Shreveport Rate Case (13) the Supreme Court sustained
Congress's power to act to regulate rates of intrastate railroads
in canpetition with interstate railroads. The court did not
explain why it approved Congressional authority to regulate
intrastate railroads which affected interstate ccirinerce while at
the same time denying Congress power to regulate production
activities which eventually affect interstate caiinerce. Justice
Hughes, who wrote for the Court in this case, gave reasons which
could be applied to other activities relating to interstate
ccmtierce: in his words, " ... all matters having such a close and
substantial relation to interstate traffic ... " would justify
extending Congress's authority to them as a fair extention to
ensure "... the efficiency of interstate traffic". Why then could
this not be applied to other activities affecting interstate
carmerce? The answer to this question was not provided by the
court in this case.
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¶L New Deal arx Interstate CaTlierce
The Supreme Court in the pre-New Deal era was reluctant to
approve the expansion of Congress's camnerce power. In sane cases
the court approved the power of Congress to regulate and prohibit
the interstate transportation of goods considered to be harmful
in certain ways. So, the transportation of lottery tickets in
interstate cannerce was held to be within Congress's power under
the Catinerce clause, in the Lottery Case in 1903 (14)• in i±is
case the court refused to accept the argument that "to regulate
does not include to prohibit". The court confirmed that
Congress's power over interstate commerce is plenary and is
subject to no limitations except such as may be found in the
Constitution. nng the subjects held to be within Congress's
power to prohibit f ran being transported in interstate carinerce
were adulterated food and wanen for iniroral purposes (15) .it
the court refused to sustain the Federal Child Labour Law of
1916, which prohibited the shiuent in interstate carinerce of
products of enterprises employing under-age labour, in Hairrner v.
Degeni-jart (16)• The court insisted that the power to prohibit
the shipoent of goods across state lines was limited to goods
that were harmful in themselves.
The insistence of the court on preserving the states t police
power and the formal classification of econanic activity were to
be major obstacles to the acceptance of several New Deal
programmes which were introduced to improve the economic
development of the nation and to remove the obstacles which
contributed to the problems of that period.
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In the years of the Great Depression the courts were
considered by many as an obstacle to national solutions to the
econanic problems. The court in several cases denonstrated its
insistence on using the formal classification and the
"direct/indirect" test to econanic activities and so excluded
many from Congress's power by labelling them as having an
"indirect" effect on interstate catiierce.
In Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co (17) the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute that established a
caripulsory retirement and pension for all carriers subject to the
Interstate Cctrinerce Act. The Court held that the scheme had no
relation to the hisiness of interstate transportation, and. that
it was essentially related solely to the Social Welfare of the
workers, therefore it was not in purpose or effect a regulation
of caanerce within the meaning of the Constitution. In another
case, Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (18), the Supreme
Court invalidated parts of the National Industrial Recovery Act
partly because the regulation of wages and hours in the Act had
only an "indirect" effect upon commerce and was, therefore,
beyond the authority of Congress.
In Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (19), the Supreme Court
invalidated the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 in part
because the Act regulated incidents of "production", and
"production", the Court ruled, was a purely local activity beyond
the pcers of Congress to regulate under the Carurierce clause.
The Supreme Court invalidated several New Deal prograns by
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the use of its restrictive tests and thereby precipitated a
political crisis. The Court was considered to be an obstacle to
the needed national solutions to the econanic problems. The
Court's insistence on excluding a wide range of economic
activities and labour regulation frc*n the p .zer of Congress and
reserving them to the states was considered to be a failure of
the Court to understand the eoonanic realities. The states were
impotent to deal with the problems of the economy and their
regulation was useless because it usually resulted in caiipetition
axtng the states for local advantage rather than the solution of
the wider problems. The effect of the Court's decisions resulted
in public disfavour for it, partly because it was considered by
many observers and ccxrmentators that the Court's limits on the
power of Congress were not required by the Constitution but were
merely of the court's own opinion (20)• it was argued that bad
the Court used doctrines dating back to Gibbons v. Ogden it might
have sustained Congressional authority in the New Deal
legislation.
In the face of the Supreme Court' s refusal to sustain the
New Deal prograrrrne President Roosevelt iwved against the Court
shortly after his second election in 1937. Roosevelt urged
Congress to enact legislation which would permit the increase of
the justices of the Court, with the ultimate aim of allowing for
the appointment of new justices who would conform to the
Constitutional views of the President and Congress. The "Court
packing" was a serious challenge to the independence of the
Court. Eventually the Congress refused to adopt the suggested
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legislation in the face of bitter and widespread debate. But
before the defeat of the Court-packing legislation the Court
retreated from its position and acceeded to political pressure in
its famous decision in National Labour Relations Board v. Jones
and Laughlin steel Corp. (21)•
'fl Scope of tbs Caiiirce er as Established by Jcxs &
Lauqhlin aml subsequent cases:
In Jones & Laughlin the Court sustained Congress's power to
regulate labour relations at a manufacturing plant operated by an
integrated steel company. The Court held that labour relations
in the company was within Congress's power to regulate because
any work stoppage at its plants "would have a iwst serious effect
on interstate ccfrinerce" (22)
The Court used language the effect of which was to broaden
the reach of Congressional authority and signified the abandon-
rnent of the classification tests which were used at sane earlier
cases. The Court announced the shift in its emphasis from the
consideration of each econcinic activity separately in view of its
nature and "direct" or "indirect" relation to interstate
commerce, to one in which the attention was paid to the
cumulative effect on interstate carinerce. The Court announced in
Jones & Laughlin that "the power to regulate caiinerce is the
power to enact all appropriate legislation for its protection and
advancement". The Court further announced that " ... Although
activities may be intrastate in character when separately
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considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to
interstate cawierce that their control is essential or it is
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and
obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise
tiiat control" (23)
This decision marks the recognition by the courts that the
earlier test it used was irrelevant and signified the return to
Chief Justice Marshall's earlier view of Congressional power over
interstate cawnerce. This case marks the start of a new era in
which Congress's power was sustained on a wide range of
activities and different fields, so long as it can prove they
have an effect on the flow of interstate carinerce.
In Wickard v. Fi1brn (24), the Court sustained Congress's
power to regulate activities which are not in themselves involved
in interstate carinerce at all, but where the aggregate effect of
the class of those activities was understood to influence
interstate cairerce. In Wickard the Court held that Congress
could control farmers' production of wheat for hane consumption
because the cumulative effect of hare consumption of wheat by
farmers might reasonably be thought to alter the supply-and-
demand relationships of the interstate caruodity market (25)•
The st-1 937 decisicrs arki the Protective Principle
In addition to extending Congress's power to regulate
activities affecting interstate carinerce, the post-i 937 Supreme
Court approved the imposition by Congress of protective
conditions on the privilege of engaging in an activity that
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affects interstate canmerce. It is now established that Congress
may impose any conditions on the use of canrnerce privileges as
long as the conditions do not violate independent constitutional
prohibitions (26)• The limits which were imposed by the decision
in Haniner V. Dagenhart (27) on Congressional power have been
renved. One of the examples of the protective conditions was the
exclusion fran interstate catinerce of goods produced in plants
whose employees' wages and hours did not meet federal standards.
Such conditions were included in the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Darby (28), Congress, the Court said, could follow its own
conception of public policy in imposing restrictions to exclude
frcrn interstate catinerce articles the use of which is considered
by Congress to be injurious to public health, morals or welfare.
The power to exclude goads and activities from interstate
commerce enabled Congress to expand its powers to achieve
objectives which by their nature are not econanic.
In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (29) the Supreme
Court unanimously sustained the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
prohibited racial discrimination in any "Inn, Hotel, Wtel or any
other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests".
Congress had ample evidence, the Court said, that racial
discrimination in these establishments impeded interstate travel
by blacks.
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1 C iierce Power ar1 the Limits Required by t1 Federal Systan
The expansion of the Cainerce power since 1937, and the
inclusion of even non-econcxnic activities and the achievement of
non-econc*nic objectives through the Cctiurce power, gives rise to
the question of whether or not there are limits to this power.
The use of the "protective principle" and the "necessary and
proper" clause (30) resulted in the extension of Congress's power
to activities which are so peculiarly "local" that even their
repeated performances cannot have substantial effect on the
econany of re than one state (31)•
The Supreme Court has indicated that there are limits on the
Cctunerce power resulting fran the federal system of government.
These intimations are reinforced by the effort the Court makes,
when sustaining legislation, to denonstrate that the conduct
regulated has sane connection with interstate camerce. There
would be no need to prove the existence of connections between
the conduct regulated and interstate commerce were there no
limits to Congress's power over these kinds of activities. Ir
yet it is easy to prove the existence of connections between
eoonanic activities and interstate canmerce, the result is a
plenary Congressional power over the national econany. Congress
needs only to indicate its express intention to include certain
kinds of econanic activities in its regulation for the Court to
sustain their inclusion under Congress's authority. Only in the
absence of express language to include econanic activities under
Congress 's regulation will the Supreme Court construe a Congress-
ional Act not to include such activities if they are intrastate
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activities. In United States v. Five Gambling Devices (32), the
Supreme Court ruled that the Congressional statute should not be
construed to govern wholly intrastate activity when it is not
expressly included, because of the premised respect to the
federal system (33).
Congress's authority over econixnic activities in the United
States is effectively a plenary authority insofar aS its
intention to include such activity is obvious and that it can
prove the relevance of that activity to interstate camierce.
There is, though, the question of whether the sovereignty of
states forms a limit to the power of Congress to regulate
interstate cctiinerce.
State Sovereignty as a Limit i Qxjressiczia1 PtMer
Does the independence of the states as sovereign entities
have a limiting effect on the national carnierce pcer? nd who
should declare the limits? These and other relevant points will
be the subject for our investigation in this section.
The Constitution, clearly, presupposes the existence of the
	 I
states as entities independent of the national government. The
Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides
that "the powers not delegated to the United States by
constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to
the states respectively, or to the people" (34) was treated by
early Judicial decisions to be a defence against federal
overreactiing 	 After 1937 the Supreme Court rejected the
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earlier construction of the Tenth Amendment and instead
recognised it to be a truism, that the states retain powers not
given to the federal government (36)•
The protection of state sovereignty should depend now on the
presumed independence of the states under the federal system
created by the Constitution. Congressional action which treats
the states in a manner contrary to their constitutional status
should be void. In order to preserve Constitutionally created
federalism, what matters is mainly the preservation of states as
sovereign entities which can practice their governmental
authorities in their proper fields.
In Maryland v. Writz (7) the Supreme Court, as a result of
the post-i 937 interpretation of the Tenth Amendment and of the
federalism restraint in general, held to be a constitutionally
authorised practice the application of the minimum wage and
overtime pay requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FtSA)
(38) to sane employees of states and municipalities. Eight years
later in 1976 the Supreme Court, in National League of Cities v.
Usery (39), the Court overruled by a 5-4 vote Writz and struck
down as unconstitutional a 1974 Congressional amendment to the
FLSA which extended Federal minimum wage and maximum hour
provisions to a]st all state and municipal employees. Nine
years later the Supreme Court overruled National League of Cities
in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (40) by a
5-4 vote.
The interesting thing about National League of Cities was
that it was the first decision in which the Court struck down
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Congressional legislation under the caimerce clause on federalism
grounds since Carter v. Carter Coal Canpany, four decades earlier
(41) National League of Cities established a three-part test to
determine whether a Congressional act infringed state
sovereignty. The first part is that the challenged law should be
established to aim to regulate the "states as states". The
second part is that the challenged law should address matters
which are "attributes of state sovereignty". The third part is
that the challenged law should directly impair the ability of
states "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions" (42)•
This three part test was designed to protect the sovereignty
of states fran federal encroachment. As the Supreme Court said in
National League of Cities, the challenged statute was well within
the area of authorised Congressional power under the caimerce
clause, except for the fact that it disregards the limits of
federalism. The decision in National League of Cities was not
based on the Tenth Amendment argument, but was rather based on
the idea that there exist under the constitutional structure
judicially enforceable limits on the federal power to protect the
existence of states as sovereign entities with meaningful powers
to provide for the purposes of their independent existence. It is
questionnable, though, whether the role of states as employers
and providers of services is an essential role for their exist-
ence as independent sovereign entities in the federal system.
There is no satisfactory evidence to prove that the role of the
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states to provide services is basic to their independence, as was
the decision in National League of Cities meant to protect.
There are better areas to offer the states protection on the
grounds of federalism, arrong which are the ability of the states
to structure their sulxlivisions, and their role as legislators
(43).
The three part test announced by the Court in National
League of Cities proved to be a problematic one, as demonstrated
by later decisions • The meaning of "traditional tt functions is
ambiguous; does it mean "custaiary" in a certain period? What
are the traditional functions which are beyond the reach of
Congress? This and other parts of the test presented the Court
with difficult choices on several occasions (44)• several cases
in which the applicability of National League of Cities was a
central issue, during the nine years until Garcia, were decided
(45)• In none of these cases did the Court eventually find an
irmiunity frcxn federal regulation.
In Federal Energy Regulatory Caruiisslon (FERCJ V. Missippi
(46), for example, the Supreme Court upheld the application of
certain provisions of the Public Unity Regulatory Policies Act
(PURPA) of 1978 to the states • FERC involved a claim by the State
of Missippi that certain provisions of PURPA encroached upon its
sovereignty. The Court in its 5-4 vote upheld the statute, but
noticeably did not depend for its decision on the three part
test. The Court in FERC considered the ability of a state
administrative body to make decisions and set policies
independently of federal control as an important condition for
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the state to be able to promulgate regulations of its own in the
federal system The Court, however, upheld the federal law
depending on the finding that it did not compel the states to
adopt its proposals, therefore it did not impair their
independent sovereignty. The unhappiness of the Supreme Court
with the three part test was made obvious in FERC by the fact
that the Court avoided using it, and in other cases by using the
test and somehow finding the statute to be constitutional (48)•
In Garcia the Supreme Court announced that the granting of
inraunity to "traditional governmental functions" of states and
municipalities was unworkable and inconsistent with the
"established principles of federalism" (49)• Due to the
problematic nature of the three part test of National Leaque of
Cities, especially of its third part, and to the lack of
sufficient support in the Supreme Court, it was inevitable that
it would be abandoned or changed. Indeed, the conversion of
Justice Blackmun, who concurred in National Leaque of Cities to
join the dissenters of the National League of Cities, suggests
the moment at which the judicial struggle with the test of the
National League of Cities ended. What was not totalily
predictable, however, was how far the court would go in its
reversing of the National League of Cities • What happened was
that the Supreme Court disengaged itself from the substantive
judicial review of federalism. The Court, in Garcia, went too far
in abandoning the test of the National Leaque of Cities. The
Supreme Court adopted in Garcia the political process theory of
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judicial review of federalism. Justice Blackmun, in his opinion,
said
"we are convinced that the fundamental limitation that the
constitutional scheme imposes on the commerce clause to
protect the 'states as states' is merely one of process..."
(50).
Justice Blackmun went on to declare that it is for Congress, not
the Court, to measure the scope of the caffnerce power and the
countervailing weight of the Tenth 2mendment. The interests of
states, the Court announced, are protected by the structure of
the government as a whole.
Other than the fundamental defects in the "political
process" theory of judicial review in general which we dealt with
in Chapter Four, there are inherent defects in the argument
contained in the decision of Garcia about the sufficiency of the
political process to protect the rights of the states in the
federal system. The fact that Congress is composed of
individuals does not guarantee that it could be trusted to
protect individual rights. Likewise, the fact that Congress is
canposed of representatives of states does not guarantee that it
could be trusted to protect the rights of states (51)
The process of legislation is one of compromise, to
accarmodate several interests in order to guarantee the passage
of the proposed legislation. The interests of states have very
little effect on the legislative process in Congress. The states
have lost several of the original means by which the original
design of the constitution sought to ensure sufficient state
representation. mong these lost state protections was the
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composition of the Senate, which has been changed by the
Seventeenth Amendment. There are several other lost state
protection measures in the original constitution design (52)
Because of the deficiencies in the protection provided by
political process of the states' rights, it is in the power of
the judiciary to interpret and apply the constitution, and
because of its independence it can be trusted to announce the
limits to the power of Congress under the camrce power and to
protect states' sovereignty. The test established by the Supreme
Court in National Leagie of Cities was an unfortunate one and
tried to establish the limits of commerce power.by using
inappropriate areas of state power. But the decision in Garcia
is wrong in its total judicial disengagement frau the substantive
judicial review of federalism's limits on Congressional power.
Qxi.nerce clause T.imi ts xt State Regulat1i and the ctrir of
the Jrnnt mirce clause
Other than the strong influence of the judicial
interpretation of congressional acts enacted under its carinerce
power strengthening the Federal system and increasing the power
of the national government, the Commerce Clause has been
interpreted by the judiciary to be a limit on state regulation of
carinerce even where there is no Congressional action under what
came to be known as the "dormant camnerce power" doctrine.
One of the earliest cases establishing the dormant carirterce
power doctrine is Gibbons v. Ogden 	 in this case ief
Justice Marshall said, about the argument of dormant carinerce
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clause, that it had "great forcet' (54) Within the basis of the
dormant catinerce is that one of the principle aims in calling for
the Constitutional Convention was the abolition of the
restrictive trade practices among the states.
The importance of the dormant catinerce power doctrine is
that it affects the whole structure of the federal system, the
relations between the federal government and the states, and
among the states.
In the early stages of the developnent of the doctrine of
the dormant commerce clause there was an opposing doctrine
supported by Chief Justice ney, Marshall's successor. The
opposing doctrine was that the cariirce clause left states free
to regulate as they wished as long as their actions did not
conflict with validly enacted federal legislation . iater,
Taney retreated and joined the majority in supporting the
doctrine of the dormant cai:inerce clause.
pn important develonent of the doctrine of dormant carinerce
clause was the decision in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port
of Philadelphia (56) In his opinion, Justice Curtis attempted to
reconcile all preceding opinions. In Cooley, the Supreme Court
upheld the power of Pennsylvania to require ships in interstate
and foreign carinerce to engage local pilots when entering or
leaving the port of Philadelphia. The doctrine developed in
Cooley was that states are free to regulate those aspects of
interstate and foreign commerce so local in character as to
demand diverse treatment, while Congress can regulate those
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apects that are so national that they demand a single, uniform
rule (57). The remaining impression on later caiunerce clause
jurisprudence left by Cooley- is the recognition of the need, in
sane cases, to permit local legislation while understanding the
need for uniformity in those instances that are necessary for the
unimpeded flow of interstate caTrnerce. Following Cooley, the
test of whether to allow state regulation which is burdening
interstate commerce was to classify the burdens either as
"direct" or "indirect", allowing those that have an indirect
effect arid invalidating state regulations which have a "direct"
effect on interstate camerce (58)
The Qi1teflorary I ve1opxit of Driint C iurce Clause Ictrine
The contemporary doctrine used by the Supreme Court is that
the constitution established a national interstate and foreign
commerce free from excessive state interference. The Court
sought to clarify the process by which it determines whether
state regulation is unconstitutionally burdening interstate
cairnerce. The test used by the Suprene Court is known as the
"balancing test", and is associated with the decision in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc . According to the balancing test, state
regulation of interstate commerce will be upheld if the
regulation is rationally related th legitimate state interest arid
that the burden it imposes on interstate carinerce is outweighed
by the state interest in enforcing that regulation.
According to the advocates of the political process theory
of judicial review, state laws burdening interstate carinerce or
chapter 6	 - 175 -
disadvantaging non-residents should be invalidated only to
reinforce accountability. And this happens when the courts make
void state laws which predaminantly burden non-residents who are
unable to vote in the state elections. There is an inference in
the commerce clause that state and local law makers are
especially susceptible to pressures which may lead them to
disadvantage those who are not constituents of their political
sulxlivis ions. There is a limited value in the dependence on
political process as a justification for the doctrine of the
dormant camiterce clause. The political process theory makes the
majoritarian denocracy by noting the predaminant constitutional
value in every situation. Whilst the majority of the cases are
raised by private parties to defend their interests, the main
issue under the caiinerce clause is the allocation of power in the
federal system between states and the national government (60)•
Another alternative to the balancing test used by the
Supreme Court in determining the limits to state regulation of
interstate commerce is the "protectionist intent" test of
Professor Donald Regan (61) Regan argues that for the noveinent
of goods cases, the correct rule which the court uses, even
without expressly saying so, is the test to find purposeful
protectionism. If the protectionist intent is found to be of
substantial effect for enacting the law, then the state
regulation of interstate commerce is unconstitutional. The
notivation test is borrowed frau the Fourteenth Amendment. The
rrotivation test, if applied, would result in the invalidation of
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more state regulation than the current test used by the court.
The protectionist motive test would apply to partial
discrimination in import-export and movement of gocds cases,
which are rarely struck down under the balancing test. Contrary
to the allegation by Pegan, the Court sustained state regulation
of interstate catinerce in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.
(62), and Excon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland (63), despite lower
courts finding the existence of protectionist motivations. The
Court does not and need not rely on the motivation for state
regulation of interstate commerce, because what matters is
whether there is a protectionist effect and whether interstate
carrnerce is excessively burdened, not whether that protectionism
was deliberate or not (64)• There are limitations to the
balancing test, one of which is the existence of sufficient
representation in the regulating state of the interests affected
by the regulation. In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Cc. (65)
the Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota statute banning the sale of
milk products in plastic, non-returnable containers. The statute
was obviously for the benefit of the ilp-wood industry, whose
products would fill the void left by the ban on plastic
containers, the pulp-wood industry being an important state
industry. The Supreme Court's decision rested on several
findings, one of which was that the burden imposed on the
interstate movement of goods was relatively minor. The Supreme
Court also found that the ban on plastic containers served a
substantial state interest, which is the conservation of
resources and the reduction of solid waste. The Supreme Court
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also found, in this case, that the interests of out-of-state
manufacturers of plastic containers was adequately represented by
the few Minnesota firms that were adversely affected by the ban.
Those overlapping interests and the existence of sufficient
representation of the interests affected in the state provided,
in the view of the Court, a powerful safeguard against
legislative abuse (66)•
'I adttevnts of ji.1Lcial review regarding the oimr
From very early in the life of the federal system, the
interpretation by the courts of the commerce clause and the
commercial power of the national government took a clear
direction tcMards supporting the integration of the national
econciny, and against allowing strict and narrow interpretations.
Doctrines, such as the dormant cauinerce power developed by the
judiciary have helped to curb state powers even where there was
no clear federal legislation in the specific matter. These powers
have helped to strengthen the Union and to support an econcinic
system capable of coping with development and overcoming
impediments to its progress. A clear example of the stricter
interpretations of the commerce power can be seen in
understanding the implications of cases decided since 1887, and
in particular during the period of econanic depression prior to
1937 (67)• The clear role of judicial review in the support of a
stronger Union and rrore integrated econany is evident fran cases
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decided after 1937 (68)
National Leaque of Cities was an exceptional case in which
the court turned back to pre-New Deal ideas. It was an
unfortunate decision which was bound to be struck down. However,
the way in which Garcia over-ruled National League of Cities and
announced the disengagement of judicial review fran determining
the limits of power in the federal system was a decision with
mixed fortunes. Whilst it was a welcaie decision in over-ruling
National League of Cities and its three part test, which proved
unworkable in later cases, it went to extremes by announcing the
adoption of the process-based idea of limitation to Congressional
power. Surely the judiciary has, since early in the life of the
federal system, played its part in supporting the federal system,
and helping a positive, productive and beneficial integration of
the econany. Th announce that determination of the limits of the
power of Congress was to be left to the political branches, was
neither a beneficial statement, nor was it supported by the
history or design of the constitution. The role of the judiciary
in its use of its power of judicial review was a helpful and
significant factor in shaping the existing federal system, and
helping that system throughout its various stages of develotrnt.
The Court has both shaped and followed the develoznent of
the national market, its judgements scmetimes creating econanic
opportunities, sometimes confirming independent economic
achievements. In the American experience of federalism, the
reservation of econanic independence to the States has not been
considered to be a value of sufficient importance to obstruct the
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integratiQn of the national market. It has not been regarded as
an essential ingredient of the identity of states as discrete
political units.
thapter Six Footrxtes
1 SandalcM, T. "The Expansion of Federal Legislative
Authority" in Saridalow, T. and Stein, E. (eds.) Courts and
Free Markets: Perspective fran the United States and Europe
Vol. I, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1982, p50.
2 U.S. Constitution Article 1 Section 8, Clause 3.
3 Epstein, B. The Proper Scope of the Camiierce Power 73
Va.L.Rev., (1987) p1387
4 Sandalow, op. cit., p62.
5 Linde, H. "Transportation and State Laws under the United
States Constitution: The Evaluation of Judicial Doctrine"
in: Sandelow, T. and Stein, E. (eds.), op. cit., p140.
6 Sandalow, op. Cit., p49.
	
7	 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1894).
8 Ibid. at 194.
9 Tribe, L.H. American Constitutional Law (2nd ed.) Mineola,
New York: The Foundation Press, 1988, p306.
10 Tribe, op. cit., p308 and Sandalow, op. cit., p65.
	
11	 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
	
12	 196 U.S. 357 (1905).
13 Iuston E. and W. Texas Ry. Co. v. U.S., 234, U.S. 342 (1914).
14 Qampion v. Ames 188, U.S. 321 (1903).
15 See Hipplite Egg Co. v. United States 220 U.S. 45 (1911), in
which the Court upheld the power of the federal government
to seize adulterated food that was no longer in interstate
camierce.
See also Hoke v. tkiited States 227 U.S. 308 (1913) in which
the Suprene Court upheld the power of Congress to prohibit
the transportation of snnen for iirrroral purposes.
The Suprne Court also upheld the federal statute which
imposed retail labelling requiranents on goods that had
rroved in interstate cctr(nerce, in McDermott v. Wisconsin 228
U.S. 115 (1913).
16	 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
17	 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
chapter 6 Footnotes	 - 181 -
18	 295 U.s. 495 (1935).
19	 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
20 See Sarida1o, op. cit., p64; Tribe, op. cit., p308; and
Johnston, R. The Effect of Judicial Review on Federal-State
Relations in Australia, Canada and the United States Baton
Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1969, p225.
21
	
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
22 Ibid. at 41.
23 Ibid. at 37.
24	 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
25 Ibid. at 128.
26 Tribe, op. cit., p312.
27 247 U.S. 251 (1918). In this case the court held that
Congress could not prohibit the use of child labour by
preventing inclusion of products by institutions using child
labour in their activites.
28	 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
29	 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
30 US. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 18.
31	 Tribe, op. cit., p313.
32	 346 U.S. 441 (1953).
33 See Sandalc,w, op. cit., p77.
34 U.S. Constitution, Amerxrnent X.
35 Redish, M. and Drizin, K. Constitutional Federalism and
Judicial Review: The Role of Textual Analysis 62
N.Y.U.L.ReV., 1987, plO.
36	 See e.g. U.S. v. t'arby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
37	 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
38 29 U.S.C. sections 201-219 (1982).
39
	
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
40	 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
chapter 6 Footnotes	 - 182 -
41 Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 298 U.s. 238 (1936). See Van
Alestein, W. The Second Death of Federalism 83 Mi .L.Rev.,
1985, pl713.
42 The three part test was clearly stated in Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining and Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. at 288
(1981).
43 See Tribe, op. cit., pp396-397.
44 See e.g. United Transportations Union v. Long Island R.R.
Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
45 See E.E.O.C. v. Wya'ning 460 U.S. 226 (1983);
F.E.R.C. v. Missippi 456 U.s. 742 (1981),
United Transport Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678
(1982);
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assn., 451
U.S. 264 (1981); and
Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
46	 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
47 Ibid. at 761.
48 See e.g. E.E.O.C. v. Wyaming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), where the
Court applied the three part test to the Age Discrimination
Act extension to, and found it to be constitutional.
49	 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
50 ]oC. cit.
51 Tribe, op. cit., p388.
52 Airong them: the poll tax and the malapportioned election
districts. See Tribe, op. cit., p315.
53	 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
54 Ibid. at 209.
55 See The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How) 504 (1847).
56	 53 U.S. (12 }k,) 299 (1851).
57 See Tribe, op. cit., p407.
58 Ibid., p408.
59	 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
chapter 6 Footnotes	 - 183 -
60 See nore detailed argument against the (process-based)
theory and dormant caimerce clause in Collins, R. Econamic
Union as a Constitutional Value 63 N.Y.U.Rev., 1988, pplll-
116.
61 Regan, D. The Supreie Court and State Protectionism: Making
Sense of the Dormant Carinerce Clause 84 Mich. L. Rev. p1091
(1986).
62	 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
63	 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
64 See Collins, op. cit., p118.
65	 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
66 Ibid., p473.
67 Examples of which are:
Railroad Retirnent Board v. Alton R.R. Ca, 295 U.S. 330
(1935);
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935); arxl
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.s. 238 (1936).
68 Examples of which are:
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937);
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942);
and United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative Inc., 307 U.S.
533 (1939).
PARE '11R
QPR SE
'fliE U.A.E. tTISIAL cXrIT(yPIaJ, ThE FAL SYS"14
ND ThE SEPARTIc cF	 S
The governments of the Emirates agreed to establish the new
Federal Government as a union of their respective Emirates. In
July 1971 they declared their intention and announced their
Constitution. The new Constitution, which was to cane into force
on 2nd of December 1971, was originally drafted for nine
Emirates, but eventually axnnded to suit the new federation. The
number of the original Emirates was six, namely: Abu-Dhabi,
Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, tJm-Al-Qaywayn and Fujairah. On 10th
February 1972, seventh Emirate (Ras-al-Khaimah) joined the
Federation.
The new Constitution was entitled "Provisional Constitution"
and by its provisions it was intended to last for five years,
during this period a new permanent Constitution was to be
drafted.
The provisional Constitution ("the Constitution")
represented the result of a ccinprcinise between the opposing
forces of localism and the need and desire for unity. The powers
which were surrendered fran the Emirates to the Federal
Government were considered to be the minimum possible. Even these
were agreed only under the pressure of tine and the proximity of
the date of the British witlilrawal. There were clear signs that,
for the Federation to survive and prosper, further powers uld
have to be surrendered to the Central Government, but this was
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deferred to the drafting of the permanent Constitution
The Constitution defined the new Central Government it
created as • .an independent, sovereign, Federal State •••" (2)•
Among the Federal characteristics of the Constitution is the
distribution of the legislative powers which is contained in Part
7 of the Constitution. Article 120 listed the areas in which the
Central Government has exclusive legislative, as well as
executive, powers. Among the most important areas of power
reserved for the Central Government are foreign affairs, defence
arid nationality. Article 121 contains the areas in which the
Central Government has legislative power while the Eknirates have
executive power. Article 122 declared that the residuary powers
are left to the Emirates.
Frau the area of powers given to the Federal Government we
can see clearly that it was envisaged as an entity representing
the Emirates at the international level; providing most of the
major services such as health and education; unifying the
Emirates at the local level; and showing the basic, driving
forces which led to the formation of the Federal Government. The
areas which are left for the Emirates show the existence of the
localising forces, among which are the local econamic interests,
leaving the important areas of mineral resources and custcxns
regulation for the individual Emirates. The fact that in the
supreme body of the Federal Government, the rulers themselves,
represent their Emirates, shows the strong arid prevailing power
of the heads of the Emirates, even at the Central level.
The Central Government cauprises five authorities listed in
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Article 45, namely: The Supreme Council of the Union, The
President of the Union and his deputy, The Council of Ministers
of the Union, The National Assembly of the Union, and the
Judiciary of the Union.
The Supreme Council is the highest authority in the country
because of its canposition and powers. The members of the
Supreme Council are the rulers of the Enirates. It is vested
with executive as well as legislative powers. Each flnirate has
one vote, the special majority required for passing substantive
matters has to include Abu-Dhabi and Dubai (i.e. these two
flnirates have veto powers in these matters) while in procedural
matters, simple majority is enough to pass a decision (3),
The Supreme Council ratifies laws and decrees of the Union.
Article 110 enables the Supreme Council to ratify a law which has
been rejected or amended by the National Assembly. The Supreme
Council appoints the Prime Minister and sets the main policies
for the country
The main powers vested in the Supreme Council are not
utilised to the fullest extent because of the relatively few
occasions on which the Council meets (i). mis is for several
reasons, anng which is the lack of provision in the Constitution
itself for the frequency of the Council's meetings (6)
The President of the Union has wide ranging powers, both
legislative and executive. The President and his deputy are
elected fran anong the seven rulers of the Enirates.
Theoretically any one of the seven rulers could be elected as the
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President or the Vice-President, but in practice these two
positions are certain to go to Abu-Dhabi and Dubai because of
their importance and of their having veth power in the Suprie
Council of the Union. The terms of office for the President and
Vice-President are five years with no restriction on their re-
election, The President of the Union is the President of the
Supreme Council and represents the unity of the Enirates on
local as well as international levels.
The powers and position of the President are defined in
Articles 51 to 54 of the Constitution. Among the important
powers of the President is his role as the Supreme Carinander of
the Armed Forces and Head of the Supreme Council for Defence
The President nominates the Prime Minister and appoints
ministers, ambassadors and other senior officials of the Federal
Government with the exception of the President and members of the
Supreme ji (8), The President signs Union laws, decrees and
decisions which the Supreme Council has sanctioned and has the
duty of supervising their implementation by the different
ministries and divisions of the Federal Government (s). The
President signs and pranulgates treaties after their passage by
the Supreme Council (10),
The Council of Ministers is a part of the executive
authority of the Union under the supervision of the Supreme
Council and the President (11), The main policies of the Federal
Government are set by the Supreme Council and entrusted to the
Council of Ministers to be implemented under the supervision of
the President, who has the authority to question the cabinet as a
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whole or individual ministers a:bout their duties and
jurisdictions (12)
The Prime Minister has been frati Dubai ever since the
establishment of the Federal Government. For several years, the
Deputy ruler of Dubai was the Prime Minister, then the ruler of
Dubai, who is the Vice-President of the Union, took the position
of Prime Minister (13)• The Prime Minister has two deputies, one
fran Dubai, the second frcin Abu-Dhabi. The seats in the Cabinet
are distributed anong the Enirates. P3b.i-Dhabi and Dubai have
reserved key ministries for themselves ever since the first
Cabinet, whilst the other seats are given to the other Enirates
in relation to their size and importance (14)•
The National Assembly represents the legislative authority
in the Constitution, but the analysis of its power reveals that
this is limited to a large degree. The National Assembly, by its
powers in the Constitution, is mainly a consultative body in
legislative matters (15)
The National Assembly is currently canposed of 40 members
apportioned to the Enirates according to their size and
importance (16),
The Constitution gives the flnirates the right to determine
the systems by which their representatives are selected for the
National Council (17)• Currently all the flnirates appoint their
representatives in the Council by decisions fran the rulers. This
does not mean that the representatives always voice the opinions
of their respective rulers (18), The Constitution states that the
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members in the Council represent the whole of the population of
the Union (1 )• The stage of developnent, especially on the
educational level and the tribal base of the society, made it, to
sane degree, difficult to adopt popular election especially in
the first few years of the Federation (20)• The develoinent of
the society during the time since independence, makes the causes
for delaying the popular election of representatives no longer
valid, bat it is yet to be seen how cannitted the flnirates and
their rulers are to the dencratic representation of their people
(21)
The National Council plays a genuine, though limited, role
in checking and balancing the other bodies of Government. The
fact that there are representatives fran the Eknirates,
symbolising the concerns of the public, cannot be played dawn,
and, canpared to the ininediate neighbours of the U.A.E., is a
step in the right direction (22)•
The National Assembly's role in the legislative process is
that it discusses the proposed bills and accepts them as they
stand, rejects them totally, or amends them (23)• The bills
originate in the Council of Ministers, and after passing through
the National Assembly' s discussions are referred to the Supreme
Council which has the right either to accept the opinions of the
National Assembly and pranulgates them with the amendments added
or, in the case that the Supreme Council disagrees with the
opinions of the National Assembly, return the bills to the
Assembly to review them for a second time. The bill then returns
to the Supreme Council which has the power this time to disregard
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amendments made by the National Assembly (24) The powers of the
National Assembly, then, are more of a consultative nature than
real legislative power, but it has a persuasive discussion and
can delay proposed laws for sane considerable time, so that the
Supreme Council is tempted not to disagree with the Assembly' s
opinion if it feels the need for a certain law to be prctnulgated
(25)• Increased awareness by the people and the supposed repres-
entation by the Assembly of public opinion place a moral oblig-
ation on the Supreme Council, either to accept the Assembly' s
opinions or to disregard them with proper explanation (26)•
The National Assembly has the power to question the policies
of the Government in the different fields by addressing questions
to the Prbe Minister or the Ministers concerned (27)• The Prime
Minister and the Ministers have a Constitutional obligation to
answer the questions addressed to them frau the National
Assembly. The Assembly's power is limited to discussion of the
Government's policies and to the issuing of recarmendations
regarding these policies (28)• This power strengthens the
National Assembly's powers, and though not binding, enables the
Assembly to exert moral pressure by checking the other branches
of government. The National Assembly's checking power is
directed mostly at the Council of Ministers, but it also applies
to the Supreme Council because it is the Supr legislative as
well as executive branch of the Government and is responsible for
sorting and supervising the Government's policies in the
different fields.
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It is evident that there is no division of legislative and
executive powers, and that the separate headings for these powers
in the Constitution do not have sufficient content either
theoretically or practically. The Supreme Council is the supreme
executive as well as legislative body of the Government. Bills
originate in the Council of Ministers and the legislative
jurisdiction of the National Assembly is merely of a consultative
nature. The fact that the members of the Supreme Council are the
rulers of their respective fluirates, where they have the final
say in nearly all the legislative and executive powers, leads to
underlining the fact that the maj or legislative and executive
powers are concentrated with the seven rulers on the local and
central levels of Government.
Continuing our analysis of the concentration of powers in
the Federal Government, we can understand that the main executive
and legislative powers in the Federal Government are further
concentrated into the hands of the two major flnirates, namely
Abu-Dhabi and Dubai. These two Eknirates control the resources on
which the Federation survives, and they have the power of veto
over substantive matters in the Supreme Council. Major decisions
in the Federal Government are left to the discretion of the two
main Enirates to a large extent. The attitudes of the two main
Eknirates concerning Federal matters depends on the relationship
between these two Enirates and whether or not the interests of
their flnirates are involved. This was evident in the discussion,
decisions and application of several major decisions concerning
the deve1oinent of the Federal Government. One of the areas in
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which there was a disagreement which has hampered the developnent
of the Federal Government, is the contributions of the flnirates
in financing the Federal Budget (29)•	 Another area which
represents the importance and effect of the relationship between
the two main flnirates for the Federal Government is the
Unification of the Armed Forces 	 The framing and pranulgation
of the permanent Constitution is another area which dtonstrated
the real effect the two main flnirates can play in the developnent
of the Federal Government (31)•
Knowing all of these facts and understanding the influences
under which the Federal Government operates and develops, leads
us to feel the need for an independent and effective Judiciary to
check and supervise the application of the Constitution and the
proper develoinent of the country according to the desires and
aspirations of the writers of the Constitution and of the people.
The Judiciary of the Union is dealt with in Chapter 5 of the
Constitution. The mere dedication of a separate chapter of the
Constitution for the Judiciary reveals the existence of the
feeling of the importance of the Judiciary and the necessity of
its independence frau the early stages of the Union.
The Constitution provides for the establishment of a Union
Supreme Court and Union Courts of first instance. Articles frau
96 to 101 inclusive, deal with the jurisdiction and the
canposition of the Supreme Court, which is given great importance
mainly because of its Constitutional Jurisdiction and its being
the umpire of the Federal System.
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The Constitution gives the Emirates the option of
transferring the jurisdiction of their local courts to the
Federal Government. Four Emirates, thus far, have chosen to
transfer the jurisdiction of their courts to the Federal
authorities, namely: Abu-Dhabi, Sharjah, Ajman and Fujairah,
whereas the other three Emirates retain their own local courts.
The provision of allowing the Emirates to join their courts and
transfer their jurisdiction to the Federal Judiciary was mainly
because of the temxrary nature of the Constitution when it was
drafted and ratified. It would be better now, after past
experience, to unify the court system in order to avoid the
confusion which is created by the current situation and because
of the success of the experience of those Emirates which have
transferred their judicial jurisdiction to the Federal
Judiciary, especially after the passage of two major pieces of
legislation on Civil Transactions and the Criminal liaw (32),
Saying that the inclusion of the judiciaries of some Emirates in
the Federal Judiciary Is a successful experience does not mean
that it did not experience any problems. Indeed the sudden
transfer of the judiciaries of some Emirates created some
conflicts between the rulers and the Federally-controlled
Judiciary. However, the experience has generally been a
successful one. More co-operation is needed, especially between
the Federal and Local Authorities, in order to convince the
remaining Emirates to follow the same route. What is happening
is that there is official and un-official co-operation to solve
the problems that arise in the operation of the judiciaries of
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those Emirates that have transferred their courts to the
Federation. One area of co-operation is consultation between the
Ministry of Justice and the rulers on the appointment to key
positions in the judicial departments in those Emirates which
have Federal lcer courts. Overall the experience of the Lc'ier
Federal Courts is like that of most other services which were
transferred to Federal control after a long time of local
control, b.it the passage of time and the clearer regulations and
more defined and understood Constitutional limitations are arrong
the solutions for these problems (33).
The Judiciary in the U.A.E. is ccinposed of Civil and Sharia
Courts. The jurisdiction of the Sharia Courts varies fran one
Emirate to another. Generally the Sharia Courts have
jurisdiction in family law (Laws of Personal Status) such as
proof of marriage, divorce and inheritance for Muslims, and in a
majority of the Emirates, jurisdiction in matters concerning sar
criminal of fences such as theft, adultery and alcohol intake.
Civil Courts have jurisdiction in major areas like criminal law
generally, civil and ccirinercial transactions, banking, insurance
and traffic matters • In those Emirates which have Federal LcMer
Courts, Sharia Courts have two stages, and the Cassation is for
the Supreme Court. The area of dividing jurisdiction between
Civil and Sharia Courts is a confusing one and needs better
regulation.
Judges of Sharia courts axe required to, or preferred to
have a degree in Law and Sharia (34)
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The Federal Courts are of three stages, Courts of first
instance, Appeal Courts, and Cassation which was given to the
Supreme Court by a special law in 1978. The Federal Courts have
general jurisdiction, because there are no specialised courts, so
the Federal judiciary has jurisdiction in administrative arid
catinercial matters, in addition to the other areas in which it
has jurisdiction, such as labour, traffic, criminal and civil
matters.
The legal system in the U.A.E. is substantially affected by
the Egyptian legal system, which is, in turn, based on the French
legal system. The legal system in the U.A.E., then, is rxidelled
on the Civil Law System with its characteristics opposed to those
of the Catmzn Law System. The principle of Res Judicata does not
apply in the U.A.E., other than in exceptional cases where a
judicial opinion is binding, when it is applied by special legal
stifxilations (35)• In studying the legal system in the U.A.E.
then, more attention should be given to the text of the
Constitution and the Codes. The CarmDn Law System did have sane
effect in sane Eknirates, for example Dubai and Sharjah, bet its
effect is declining and the trend is for the Civil Law System.
This is the case in the whole area around the U.A.E. as well.
The majority of those who participated in drafting the
Constitution arid the Codes in the U.A.E. were Egyptians (36) The
majority of the judiciary is of Egyptian nationality.
The Emirates still have legislation on a variety of
different matters. Whilst sane legislation has n been over-
ruled by new Federal legislation, in areas which have been
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transferred to the Central Government, others are still
applicable (37), The flnirates do not have written Constitutions.
The Constitution was passed to serve as a basis for the formation
of the Union and to have a duration of five years, according to
Article 144. The whole idea was to agree on a Union which
although not up to the aspirations of ccznplete unity (which was
and still is the dream of many people in the area) was
nevertheless enough to present the newly emerging country as one
state to the outside world, and to provide services which were
greatly needed by the population. The argument at the time of
the formation of the Union, was that the passage of time would
help in welding the people of the Eknirates and their Governments,
to strengthen their unity (38),
The Provisional Constitution was meant to be an instrument
for unity and for a closer relationship, but what was not obvious
at that time was that this instrument itself would have a life of
its n, would standardise relationships and create a balance of
rights and duties which would itself need sai force of need or
urgency to change. It was easy to argue, at the time of the
formation of the Union, that in future the atmosphere for a
stronger Union would occur in the five-year duration of the
Constitution. Experience has proved otherwise. Indeed it is not
peculiar for the Federal Systaa of the U.A.E. to prove bard to
change, and not unique for the Constitution of the U.A.E. to
axjuire a life of its own. That is also the experience of Federal
Systems elsewhere, as well as for Federal Constitutions to change
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from being instruments of accaimdation for varying interests,
into a barrier for stronger unity (39),
According to Article 144 of the Constitution, six months
before the expiry of the five-year term of this Constitution, the
Supreme Council should present a draft permanent Constitution to
be discussed by the National Assembly. What happened was that the
Supreme Council formed a carinittee of twenty-eight members with a
Constitutional expert to draft the permanent Constitution. After
several meetings, the draft permanent Constitution was presented
to the Supreme Council.- The general feature of this draft was
that it moved clearly towards more participation by the people in
the legislative process, clear solutions for the participation
fran the flnirates in the Federal Budget, unification of the Armed
Forces and most importantly, the strengthening of the Federal
institutions and Federal President. The Supreme Council failed
to agree on this draft, for several reasons, airong these being
the persisting ccinpetition between the two larger Eknirates and
the view taken by Dubai that this draft favoured Ai-Dhabi, and
the resistance of several Ehirates to surrendering more powers to
the Federal Government and to the people generally (40),
Instead of presenting the dizaft Permanent Constitution to
the National AsserrdDly, the Supreme Council presented an amendment
of Article 144 of the Constitution to extend the duration of the
Constitution for a further five years. This draft amendment
faced strong objections f ran members of the National Assembly and
caused confrontations and discanfort f ran several members, but
after all of this, and due to the understanding of the
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distribution of power in the country arid to the division of the
members of the National Council, especially those frc*it Abu-Dhabi
arid Dubai, on Enirate lines, the Amendment was passed on 12th
October, 1976. The whole process of extending the duration of
the Constitution was the first real constitutional crisis in the
TJ.A.E., arid its results showed the difficulty of changing the
Constitution and the difficulty of reffoving the suspicions of the
Emirates towards each other. There were many lessons to be
learned from the experience of attempting to draft the new
Constitution and the debacle around its fall. There was a build
up towards the end of the first term of the Constitution, which
involved certain steps taken by those Eknirates which have more
enthusiasm for a strong Union. For example Sharjah surrendered
its army, broadcasting authority arid judicial authority to the
Union and abolished its flag. Other steps were taken by Abu-
Dhabi, which involved joining its judiciary with the Union.
Fujairah also took sane steps towards stronger Union. Dubai, and
to a lesser extent, Ras-Al-Khaimah, proved to be be harder to
convince in joining these efforts (41),
The second term of the Constitution began with a feeling of
suspicion arrong the Emirates and a of uneasiness anong
those who were cartnitted to stronger Union and airong the
population generally (42)
The build-up tcAqards the end of the second term of the
Constitution witnessed strong moves designed to strengthen the
Union by means Of persuasion and pressure fran different
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quarters. A joint meeting was held by the Council of Ministers
and the National Council, which resulted in the issuing of a
lengthy memorandun calling for, inter alia, a Permanent
Constitution, dcracy and a stronger union (43)• There was an
opposing menrandurn presented by Dubai, and a second crisis which
warranted the intervention of the Foreign Minister of Kuwait to
bring the opposing factions closer and preserve the Federation
(44)• The Council of Ministers was changed, and those who were
leading the tide for stronger Union were removed. More
importantly, the ruler of Dubai became the new Prime Minister,
and it was apparent that what prevailed after this crisis were
the demands of Dubai. All of this led to the extension of the
Constitution for a further period of five years, fran December
1981 to December 1986. It was renewed again in 1986 until
December 1991 • It is n apparent fran the experience that the
renewal of the Constitution has beccme a usual occurrence, with
hardly any official opposition, arid it is expected to stay like
this for a considerable period in the future
So the Constitution which was labelled "Provisional" and was
given five years to survive, has proved to be difficult, if not
impossible, to replace, and has becane effectively a permanent
Constitution and should be treated as a permanent one. The fact
that this Constitution was designed and agreed to be a
provisional one, an experimental Constitution in a sense, means
that by their design its provisions require maj or changes in
order to serve as a basis for steady and organised grcMth and
develorrnent for the future of the country (46)• Partial changes
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and amendments have to be made and sane of these have already
been made, especially to unify the Armed Forces. Other changes
have to be made by the custan of implementing the Constitutional
terms and carrying on the organisation of the Federal System and
the Governmental organisation in practice.
All of this cathined, will not be enough for the adaptation
of the Constitution to the development of the country. Some
changes may create their own problems and may generate challenges
(47) All of this leads to the understanding and appreciation of
the role which can be played by that institution which is given
the responsibility to interpret the Constitution and determine
the validity of Local and Federal Laws under its terms • This
institution is the Supreme Court of the union (48)
Constitutional amendments originate in the Supreme Council
and are presented to the National Council to be debated, with a
higher than usual majority being required to pass its decisions.
Then the matter goes back to the Supreme Council to be passed.
The opinions of the National Council are not binding on the
Suprane Council, so even if the National Council insisted on its
opinions a second time, the Supreme Council can still disregard
them	 Therefore, the borden of responsibility for amending
the Constitution lies mainly with the Supreme Council, and with
both Abu-Dhabi and Dubai having a veto power over this decision,
it has proved to be very difficult to pass the amendments
It is apparent that the Federal System is suitable for the
flnirates as the Union of these flnirates has survived several
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internal crises and disputes. Moreover, the Union has proved to
be a step forward in the solution of old problems and for
furtherance of future ambitions. There were several problems for
which the Federation offered successful solutions. irong these
problems were the border disputes, nost of which have been solved
n q with the remainder being in the process of being solved (51)
The Federation has been the medium for solution of other
problems, including coups in the Enirates, of which Sharjah has
suffered two unsuccessful ones since 1971. The first
unsuccessful coup in Sharj ah happened in January 1972, six weeks
after the birth of the Federation. In this attempt the previous
ruler, a member of the ruling family, with an armed group forced
his way into the palace of the ruler demanding to be recognized
as the sole legitimate ruler. In a joint action the armed forces
of the federal government and of Abu-Dhabi managed to bring the
situation under control. The coup failed and the attackers were
held prisoners. Although as a result of the confrontation the
ruler of Sbarjah, Sheik Khalid Al-ssimi, was killed, the effect
of the federal government's role in suppressing the attack and
preventing change of ruler by force gave the Federation strength
and prctninence in all the j1y (52)
The second attempt to seize pcer in Sharj ah by force
happened in June 1987, when the Camander of the &iiiri Guard and
brother of the ruler, Shaikh Ax3.ul Aziz, used his position in the
Guard to seize control of the emiri palace and government head
quarters and demanded to be recognized as the legitimate ruler.
Again the federal government played an important role in
clapter 7
	 - 203 -
resolving the dispute and preventing forcible change of ruler.
The federal government, its Supreme Council in particular, used
peaceful negotiations to put the attempted coup to an end (53).
Through the period of trouble the Supreme Council remained in
session and did not end its meetings until the problem was over.
The Supreme Council refused to bow to the pressure arid insisted
on its position not to recognize use of force as a legitiiiate way
of transferring power. Those who were occupying the palace and
government offices were forced to negotiate arid accept the return
of the ruler Sheilch Sultan Al-.ssimi to the emirate.
The Federal System has proved through time that it is
destined to stay but, contrary to the aspirations of many, it has
proved to be too difficult to change it into a canpiete Unitary
System.
nong the characteristics of the Federal System which are
clearly observable in the U.A.E. Constitution are the following:
1 • The Constitution is clearly a written one, stating the
division of powers between the floirates arid the Central
Government.
2. The Constitution is a rigid one, meaning that it requires
special procedures to amend it, which are rrore difficult
than those needed to pass ordinary laws.
3. The Constitution includes division of powers between the
flnirates and the Central Governments, especially the
legislative powers.
4. Both the Eknirates and the Central Government have direct
powers over the citizens.
5. The Constitution cannot be amended by the Federal
Authorities alone, instead the Emirates have a vital role to
play in these procedures.
6. Foreign affairs are mainly the province of the Central
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Government,
7. There is an authority which has a sufficient amount of
independence which is entrusted with solving the
Constitutional problems between the flnirates and the Central
Government, which also has the power of the binding
interpretation of the Constitution.
8 • There are provisions in the Constitution ensuring the
supremacy of the Constitution and the Federal Laws issued
accordingly, over those of the Ekttirates (54).
9 • The rrmber Eknirates do not have the right to secede fran the
Union.
Generally, a major weakness of the Federal System in the
U.A.E. is that the Central Government does not have sufficient
independent financial resources and it has to depend on the
contribution fran the Enirates, especially Ab.i-Dhabi and Dubai,
for its needs (55). The Eknirates control the t major sources
of incane which are mineral resources (especially oil) and
custans.
The second major weakness in the Federal System of the
U.A.E. is one of design. The Supreme Council which is the main
body of the Central Government having control over all main
subjects and policies is caosed of the rulers of the Eknirates.
The Suprane Council by its design has major contradictions. It
is supposed to be the guardian of the Federation, the heart of
the Central Government. Yet at the same time the members of this
Council are the rulers of the Emirates protecting and praroting
the interests of their respective Emirates. Experience has
proved that the bias towards the individual Emirates is strong
and the Supreme Council functions better or worse according to
whether the relationship between .bu-Dhabi and Dubai is good or
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bad, and to whether or riot there are clashes of interest between
these two Emirates. Moreover, there is no provision in the
Constitution to regulate the frequency of meetings of the Supreme
Council, so months and even years pass without any meeting of the
Supreme Council taking place, which means delay in discussing
important issues. Consequently, great harm can befall the
developiient of the Federation.
Federalism is not a static formal design of Government but,
rather, a continuing process (56)• The development of the
Federal System depends on the application of the Federal
Constitution, on the co-operation between the Central Government
on one hand, and the member States on the other, and on the
relationships between the member States. As far as the
realisation of the need for the Federation, that is quite clear
in the TJ.A.E. on both formal and poçxilar levels. It is left to
the member flnirates to co-operate with the Federal Government, to
provide all the help they can and to respect the decisions of the
Federal institutions when they are issued according to the
Constitution and laws which are all products of agreements arrong
the E).mirates.
It is obvious that a lot more good faith and co-operation
are required fran the flnirates in the future to strengthen the
Federal experience, especially when co-operation is spoken of and
done not on the local level but on the regional level ni after
establishment of the Gulf Co-operation Council
The Constitution of the U.A.E. is the first written
Constitution for the Enirates. The individual Eknirates were, and
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still are, governed by traditional regimes based on tribal
alliances. Pidherence to the letter of the Constitution requires
time and patience for the individual Emirates and their
respective Governments to get used to it. The rulers of the
Ehirates used to enjoy an absolute power in their Emirates, so
for them to get used to the limits which the Federal System
introduced is a difficult and a gradual process. The
institutions responsible for enforcing aid supervising functions
of the Federal System are faced with all of the problems produced
by the environment in which the Federal System aid its
institutions are to work.
Umpiring the Federal System, interpreting the Federal
Constitution, and resolving the disputes which arise fran its
application, are tasks belonging to the Federal Supreme Court.
Understanding the nature of the Federal System in the U.A.E. aid
the environment in which it is working, makes us appreciate the
difficult and important task entrusted to this court.
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The importance of the Supreme Court stems fran its power of
reviewing the constitutionality of laws, giving binding
interpretation of the constitution and its position as an umpire
of the federal system.
The ncdern principle of constitutional judicial review, that
is the subordination of ordinary laws to the higher law, was
first effectively enunciated in the United States by John
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison (1), one of the main reasons
given as justifications for empowering the judiciary to review
the constitutionality of laws is that the Constitution is a
higher law and that the courts have the duty of applying laws, so
if an inferior law violates a higher one, the courts have to
apply the higher one. The institution of judicial review serves
to limit the power of the legislature and preserve and supervise
the adherence to the Constitution. Judicial review of the
constitutionality of laws has spread throughout the world (2)•
One of the countries that has adopted the institution of judicial
review of the constitutionality of laws is the United Arab
EmLrates.
Federal government has two tiers of authority, central and
state. Both are governed by the same constitution. The two levels
of government in the federal system are supposed to be co-
ordinated and independent in their respective spheres. The
chapter 8
	 - 215 -
federal constitution is the basis on which the division of power
is governed in the federal system. Differences of opinion and
occasional disputes between central and state governments are
bound to occur as a result of the application of the federal
constitution. These differences of opinion and disputes are to be
resolved and decided by an independent authority which is capable
of rendering decisions on an unbiased basis. The preservation of
the federal balance and the protection of the rights of the two
levels of government in the federal system has led the majority
of federations to entrust the function of deciding federalism-
based disputes and differences of opinion to the judiciary (3).
The constitution of the United Arab Enirates gave the task
of interpreting the Constitution and resolving federalism-based
disputes to the Supreme Court of the union (4)•
In this chapter we shall discuss the establishment,
canposition and jurisdiction of the Court, and the guarantees
provided by the Constitution and the laws to protect the
independence of the Court. We shall analyse the powers of the
Court and the significance of its jurisdiction for the
constitutional order and federal system of the United Arab
Eknirates. The canparative study shows us the importance of the
constitutional courts and the systems which are employed to give
these courts the best chances of doing properly the job which is
entrusted to them. The canparative study also shows that there is
much debate and controversy surrounding the constitutional courts
in their attempts to invalidate legislation, accusations of
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judicial legislation and of illegitimate judicial activism. All
of the accusations of activism directed to the constitutional
courts stem fran the allegation that these courts encroach on
other departments' powers and by that undermine the same
constitutional system they were meant to protect and guard (5).
In the United Arab Enirates we have seen the way in which
the Constitution functions, where power is concentrated and what
kind of federal system operates in the country (6)• In this
chapter we shall try to understand and find out what are the
possibilities that are .presented to the Supreme Court, how the
Court can carry out its responsibilities in the constitutional
system without creating a crisis or causing permanent damage to
the Court itself in relation to the other important government
authorities either federal or local. Traditional theory
concerning the judicial function, which prevailed until the turn
of this century, held that the Courts only apply the law but do
not participate in making legal rules • It was held that law
making was the exclusive province of legislatures, whereas Courts
have a duty to implement the law as they find it (7). mis theory
is what legal realists call "The Basic Myth" (8)• In the context
of Constitutional Law, the traditional view holds that the
framers are the only source of Constitutional Law, and that the
Courts only apply this law. In the early years of this century,
a great debate took place aimed at dispelling the basic mytli
It is now generally accepted that the traditional theory is a
myth, not a reality, and few today believe in such a theory (1 O)•
To defend the traditional theory in the ordinary law is a
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difficult if not impossible task. In the field of Constitutional
law the task is even harder. Constitutions usually contain
general rules and are meant to last for long periods. The
Constitutional rules and provisions form a basis for ordinary
legislation. Constitutional Courts interpret Constitutional
provisions in the course of the different tasks entrusted to
them. Anong these tasks is the exaid.,nation of the conforming of
regular laws to a Constitution (h1)•
In the case of the U .i.E., the nature of the Provisional
Constitution makes adherence to traditional theory unworkable.
There are several reasons for this, among which are the
provisional, temporary nature of the Constitution, and that its
intended purpose is to be an instrument leading to stronger unity
(12)
Another reason, especially in the first few years of the
federation, was the existence of a vast legislative volume which
left a large number of Constitutional provisions without details
and without statutory regulation. The consequence of this has
been the generation of applications to the Court for
interpretation, and in sane cases the resolution of disputes
about the rights of different authorities. These eventually
arrive at the Court for settlement (13)•
The Supreme Court is entrusted with the task of interpreting
the Constitution either as a direct interpretation, or else in a
decision in a judicial review case (14), The Court has declared
its role in the interpretation of the Constitution to be passive,
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which would accord with one of the ideas fran traditional theory:
of simply removing ambiguities fran the text and applying the law's
provision without any judicial :Law-making (15)• The facts and the
actual interpretations provided by the Court do not support this
claim. The Supreme Court establishes Constitutional Principles
and in reality makes Constitutional law, and this law which is
made by the Court is binding on all (16)
The duty entrusted to the Supreme Court is an essential and
important one and its task is delicate. The Court needs to
understand the importarce of its task arid the results which are
attainable fran its attitudes. It needs to live up to the
aspirations of the people arid those who established the federal
government and drafted the Constitution. It needs to keep in mind
that the United Arab Enirates is a progressive country on the
road of developnent, which is one unit in the face of the whole
world, yet is still being introduced to the world. It is
important that these aspirations and expectations are realised.
The different governmental departments and authorities bear their
share of the burden of promoting developments and removing
obstacles to the country's progress. The Court bears its share,
which makes an important contrib..ition to the whole developient
process. The Supreme Court deals with the Constitution, which
prescribes the limits of power and distrib.ites responsibilities.
Whilst the Supreme Court is needed to play a positive role in the
progress and develoinent of the constitutional system, at the
same time those who can disrupt the functions of the Court, arid
even question its existence, should be assured of their powers
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and not provoked. Keeping the balance required of the Supreme
Court is a difficult task. We want to study the Court arid its
power to see whether all of these enable the Court to keep the
balance and to be a forward-looking Court.
The Constitution deals with the Supreme Court in seven
articles of the fifth chapter, which is devoted to the judiciary.
This chapter contains sixteen articles (17), It is obvious frcm
the large number of articles devoted to the Supreme Court that
the founders of the Constitution preferred a sanewhat detailed
constitutional regulation of the Supreme Court instead of leaving
this regulation to the legislature. The detailed constitutional
regulation of the Court and the substance of this regulation
reveals the supposed importance of the Supreme Court for the
constitutional order and develoxnent of the United Arab Fmirates.
Whether the practice of the Court during the past years of the
life of the Court lived up to the initial expectations is a
different matter which deserves special analysis to discover its
causes arid effects (18),
The Constitution provides for the issuance of a law to
regulate in nire detail the canposition of the Court and its
vrking procedures (19), This law was enacted in 1973 (Union law
number 10 for the year 1973). The name of this law is the law of
the Federal Supreme Court. The enactment of this law marked the
beginning of the life of the Supreme Court. This law regulated
the Supreme Court as a specialised constitutional court on the
same basic lines contained in the Constitution. The year 1978
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marked a major transformation in the life of the Supreme Court.
In this year the Supreme Court ceased to be only a specialised
constitutional court when Union Law (17/1 978) was passed under
Paragraph (9) of Article 99 of the Constitution. Paragraph (9)
of Article 99 makes the Supreme Court caupetent to embrace "Any
other jurisdiction stiu1ated in this Constitution, or which may
be assigned to it (the Supreme Court) by law". Law (17/1 978)
added to the Supreme Court cassation jurisdiction in all matters.
Provided that the parties bringing a case for cassation to the
Supreme Court follow the procedures correctly, the Court cannot
refuse to hear the case. Law (10/1973) was amended in 1985 by
law (14/1985) to accaimdate the increased volume of cases and
provide certainty and simplify sane procedures. Law (1 7/1 978)
was amended in 1985 by law (3/1985).
We shall discuss the Court's canposition, procedures and
jurisdiction under the Constitution, law (1 0/1 973) as amended by
law (14/1985), and law (17/1978) as amended by law (3/1985).
!fl aiiçositicn of the Suprei Oxirt
The Constitution provided that the Supreme Court "... shall
consist of a president and a number of judges not exceeding five
in all. , , tt (20), The law determined the number of judges of the
Court to be a president and four judges (21) There is an option
in the law to add an unlimited number of alternate judges,
provided that not more than one is sitting on the Constitutional
panel, not more than t are sitting in the five-member panels
which consider matters included in the first seven paragraphs of
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Article 33 of law (10/1973), and that none of them is allted to
preside on any panel (22),
The qualifications for the appointment of those who are
appointed to the Supreme Court stress technical experience in
judicial affairs. The nnbers of the Court should be nationals of
the United Arab nirates arid hold a University degree in Sharia
and law (23), The president and members of the Supreme Court are
appointed by decree issued by the President after approval by the
Council of Ministers and ratification by the Supreme Council
(24)
The Constitution and the law provide the president and the
members of the Court with guarantees that they will be secure in
their positions. The president and members of the Court may not
be reved except by death, resignation, expiration of term of
contract or ccrnpletion of term of secondment (for those who are
appointed for fixed terms or are on secondrnent from other
countr, reaching retirement age, permanent incapacity, or
being appointed to other jobs with their approval (25) ,	 I
The constitutional regulation of the appointments to the
Court, and the guarantees given by its provisions to the members
of the Court, reflect the conviction by those who framed arid
ratified the Constitution of the importance of the Court,
especially due to its constitutional jurisdiction and its role in
umpiring the federal system. But there are several problems
sterming from the regulation by the Constitution and the law of
the composition of the Supreme Court, all of which problems
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contribute by different degrees to hampering the Court and
depriving it of the integrity and independence which is necessary
for it to function in a proper way.
The main guarantee for the members of the Court is that they
are secure in their positions, and they cannot be removed fran
their positions except in very few exceptional cases, which do
not reduce their independence. All of this looks to be enough to
allow the Supreme Court to play its part in checking the other
branches of government. We have seen already that the Supreme
Council of the Union controls both the main executive and
legislative powers. The Supreme Court, in its checking other
departments of government, has to confront the Supreme Council,
if not irimediately, eventually. The Supreme Council has the power
to amend the Constitution, through sanewhat lengthy procedures,
but nevertheless it can insist on having amendments made (26)•
Despite the moral obligation on the Supreme Council not to harm
the Supreme Court, and the negative political consequences which
may result f ran actions which are directed against the Supreme
Court, the possibility of such actions cannot be ruled out. nd
although it is difficult for the Supreme Council to make
decisions on important issues, the Council can amend the
Constitution to limit the powers and effectiveness of the Supreme
Court (27)
The possibilities of the Supreme Council actions to limit
the powers of the Supreme Court include:
a) The removal of certain conditions of appointment, such as
the removal of the life tenure of the judges.
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b) The removal of certain judges (28),
c) The reduction of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, by
removing certain items fran the canpetence of Court.
d) The use of the Supreme Council's power to finance the Court
as a pressure device on the Court.
The existence of these possibilities can have restricting effects
on the Court's work when it considers issuing decisions which may
trigger the anger and displeasure of the members of the Supreme
Council. In a sense the Supreme Council is too powerful for the
Court to confront in the present constitutional arrangements in
the United Arab Eknirates Constitution. Although, for the Supreme
Court to play its role to the full extent, the current
constitutional arrangnts will have to be changed, the Supreme
Court can still play a useful role in providing constructive
interpretations of the Constitution. There is a need for the
positive and thoughtful interpretations by the Supreme Court to
the Constitution. The involvnt of the Supreme Court in the
developaent of Constitutional law is needed for the stable and
constructive developeent of the Constitutional system. The need
for the Court' s interpretations became apparent soon after it
began functioning (29), The need for the Court's insights and
authority in the interpretation of the Constitution is still
continuing and is bound to develop as its system, and the legal
relations in it, becane more canplicated (30),
Generally, the requirements for the appointment to
Constitutional Courts, and the procedures for such appointments,
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depend to a large extent on the degree of adherence to the basic
legal myth that judges do not make law (31)• W1-iere aerence to
the traditional theory of the judicial process prevails, the
procedures for appointment to Constitutional Courts tend to be
undertaken by the executive, without recourse to consultation
with the legislature; Canada ar India are examples of such an
attitude (32) In countries where the nature of Constitutional
Courts is recognised to include itore than the mere mechanical
application of existing law, the legislative authorities are
given decisive roles in. the appointment process; the U.S.A. and
West Germany are examples of this system (33),
In the U.A.E., the procedure for the appointment of members
of the Supreme Court proves adherence to the traditional view of
the judicial process. The Supreme Council and the President are
empcMered by the Constitution to appoint judges of the Supreme
Court (34) The National Council is given no role in the
process of appointment to the Supreme Court. This suggests a lack
of appreciation of the possible effects and role of the Court
The traditional view of the judicial process is open to
criticism, and has been shown to be misleading in its
consideration of the technical, mechanical role of the judges of
a merely discovering the law without participation in its shaping
(36), In the appointment to the Supreme Court of the U .A.E.,
bearing in mind its political importance, attention should be
paid to the political knowledge of the judges, in addition to the
emphasis on their legal knowledge and technical experience
Limiting the attention paid to qualifications other than the
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technical knowledge and experience neglects the need for judges
to be sufficiently politically aware that confidence in them can
be maintained. The consequence of this neglect has a negative
effect on the operation of the Court, limiting its checking
effect, and curtailing its role in developing the constitutional
law in the United Arab nirates (38)•
Although, generally, the members of the Supreme Court are
appointed for life, there are exceptions to this rule which
overshadow life tenure and, in reality, empty the guarantee of
judicial independence that life tenure carries with it. Article
96 paragraph (2) of the Constitution mentions anong the causes to
end the tenures of the judges of the Court, ". . .Expiration of
term of contract for those who are appointed by fixed term
contract or canpletion of term of secondment", Article 5 of the
Supreme Court law (10/1973) gives as an exception to the
requirements of appointment to the Court the option of appointing
saneone fran ". . .anong the citizens of the Arab countries to the
Court for a limited, renewable period". In fact this exception
has been, and still is, the general rule for the appointment to
the Court since its establishment. It is obvious that those
judges who are appointed to the Court for limited renewable
periods will not be free fran pressure of wanting the renewal of
their contracts, and the authorities which have the power to
renew the judges' contracts are the same authorities which the
judges are supposed to check and supervise. For the Court to be
independent, this option of allowing the appointment of judges
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for limited periods of time has to be discontinued. The excuses
given for making exceptions to the life tenure to the Supreme
Court and for appointing citizens of other countries to the
Supreme Court was that the United Arab Fznirates was in its early
stages of develorinent and that this exception was to continue
until there were artong the citizens of the country people well
qualified to be appointed to the Court. If this reason had merit
in 1973, it has surely ni lost all justification The way
in which the Supreme Court is arid has been staffed, since its
establishment explains .to a large extent why it has not been
effective in reviewing the legislative as well as executive acts
and has not been useful to check their adherence to the
Constitution.
The independence of the Supreme Court as an institution in
relation to the other branches of government has to be closely
reviewed and evaluated. The current arrangements by which the
Supreme Court is included under the Ministry of Justice is
inccirtpatible with its general and constitutional powers. The
Supr Court has to be arrong the independent government branches
which deal with other branches and departments on equal terms.
This Court is meant to check the adherence to the Constitution by
the executive as well as the legislative branches. The Court is,
rroreover, empowered to render constitutional interpretations
which are binding on all concerned. In other words, the
interpretations given by the Court to the Constitution have the
same effect that the constitutional provisions have. The Supreme
Court also is entrusted to umpire the federal system, which means
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that it has to resolve problems between the emirates and the
central government, as well as problems anrig the emirates. This
Court has to be independent fran the Council of Ministers, yet in
its current situation, depending for its budget on the Council of
Ministers and under the supervision of the Minister of Justice,
it is restricted by this relationship.
This same arrangement was originally made for the West
German Constitutional Court but, after strong pressure fran the
Court, it finally won its independence fran the Federal Ministry
of Justice, and other objectives, by 1960 (40),
The Supreme Court in the United Arab Eknirates, in order to
be in a better position to carry out its responsibilities of
judicial review and constitutional interpretation, has to be
distanced fraii the Ministry of Justice and has to be provided
with its own budget and insulated against any possible
restriction from the executive as well as from legislative
departments.
The founders of the United Arab flnirates Constitution chose
to mention the number of the members of the Supreme Court in the
constitutional text (41), This, by implication, means that the
legislature is excluded fran interference in this matter except
to add more details to the constitutional regulations. The
constitutional delegation for a law to prescribe detailed
regulation for the Supreme Court did not include changing the
number of judges on the Court. All of this casts doubt on the
constitutional legitimacy of the option of appointing alternative
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judges to the Supreme Court which is included in law (10/1973)
(42)• The appointment of alternative judges to the Supreme Court
means that even if there are members of the Court who have life
tenure (therefore with a sufficient degree of independence and
insulated fran reprisals by the other branches of government) the
appointment of alternative judges who are appointed for limited
periods of time and are subject to nore pressure can have a
negative effect on the work of the Court and can limit its
independence.
The Supreme Court,. according to its statute, is organised
into at least three chambers one chamber for constitutional
matters, one for criminal matters, and one or more for other
matters
The formation of the different chambers is the duty of the
plenum of the court (45)• Decisions on matters of Constitutional
importance are handed by a five-member chamber (46)•	 e
alternate judge can be a member of such a panel (47)• The
inclusion of alternate judges in the work of the Supreme Court,
and participating in decisions on constitutional interpretations,
judicial review and the different kinds of disputes between the
federal government and the emirates could have significant
consequences • In Supreme Courts o which judges are appointed
with life tenure, as in the U.S. Supreme Court, the judges form
distinct groups, in matters of constitutional consequence, so
that any change in the formation of the Court is bound to have
sane effect on the decisions taken by the Court (48)• At present,
and in the absence of life tenured appointee to the Court, the
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significance of alternate judges is not highlighted. However, it
is not only alternate judges who are vulnerable to pressure
resulting fran the lack of security in their jobs; all the judges
of the Court share the same lack of security. Through the passage
of time, and with the appointment of life tenured judges to the
Court, the negative effects of the existence of alternate judges
could beccine apparent.
Qçete of ti &ipraie Cirt
The jurisdiction of the Suprne Court of the United Arab
Emirates is fashioned along the same lines as the jurisdiction of
the Constitutional Court of West Germany (49)• The jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court is especially close to the original,
unamended enumeration of powers of the West German Constitutional
Court, save, of course, the matters which are non-existent in
United Arab Enirates, such as party political matters (50)•
The Constitution gives the Supr Court its major powers in
its enumerations of jurisdiction in Article 99 and in other parts
of the Constitution (51)• The main powers of the Court are its
constitutional and federalism-based jurisdictions. The
constitutional jurisdiction of the Court includes advisory
opinions as well as reference to it in actual cases fran other
courts in the country. Federalism-based jurisdiction involves
disputes between emirates and also between the emirates and the
federal government. The federalism-based jurisdiction involves
issues of supremacy of the Federal Constitution and laws issued
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by delegations from its provisions. The federalism-based
jurisdiction involves settling differences about laws and
treaties between central and regional governments.
The Supreme Court has powers other than those which concern
the constitutional review and supremacy and the federal system,
but these powers do not concern us in this study (52)•
A: '] Qnstituticrial Jurisdicticxk of t1 Supr
	 art
This jurisdiction includes both advisory opinions and
concrete case/controversy.
1) Requests for Qristitutimal Interpretaticxi:
(Mvisory Opinis)
The original style of judicial review, which is attributed
to the Pmerican experience, limits the way in which the issues of
cctnpatibility of legislative and judicial action with the
Constitution can be brought, that is only through a real case!
controversy. The American experience of judicial review depends
on the notion that the proper role for the Courts is to decide
cases, and through this process they apply the Constitution as a
higher law. Constitutional questions, according to the American
experience, have to be connected with a factual situation to
warrant judicial decisions. The Court can then give its decision
in full appreciation of the factual background and the need for a
resolution of the presented case (54) There are exceptions to
the role of requiring concrete case/controversy in order to
approach the Supreme/Constitutional Courts for decisions on
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constitutional matters. These exceptions include Canada and the
original West German system under the Constitutional Court Act of
(1951) (55). The West German Constitutional Court, as a result of
the controversy arising fran the European Defence Carrnunity case,
has been deprived of the power of rendering advisory opinions by
the Court Reform of 1956 (56)•
The power of rendering interpretative opinions by
constitutional courts, by its nature, can be used for political
reasons and can be employed by the political branches of the
government in applying pressures on other departments or for
achievement of certain desired ends. All of these possibilities
can create problems for the courts or result in mistrust in their
work, or, as has been the experience in West Germany, depriving
them of sane of their powers. The Constitution of the United Arab
Ehirates gives the Supreme Court the power of rendering
interpretation to the Constitution upon application fran certain
authorities • The right to apply for advisory opinions fran the
Court is given to all federal authorities and the governments of
the emirates. The federal authorities include: the President, the
Council of Ministers, and the National Council. On the local
level the governments of the emirates, which are represented in
the rulers, have the right to apply for interpretation of the
Constitution to the Supreme Court.
The Constitution provided that the interpretations provided
by the Court in its opinions upon the request for such
interpretations are binding on all, which makes its opinions
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practically on equal terms with the provisions of the
Constitution. The only ways in which the opinion of the Court can
be changed are either by constitutional amendment or by the
Court's own change of decision in later opinions (57).
This jurisdiction of the Court has proved to be a useful
tool for engaging the Court in clarifying airüiguities in the
Constitution and in providing informative opinion for the newly
established federal authorities in their dealing with the written
Constitution, especially in the early years of the Federation
(58) This power can be utilised by the Court and by the author-
ities applying for the opinions to serve several purposes. The
Court can use this power to provide opinions suitable for the
purposes of the Constitution and for the need of the country at
the time when the opinion is given. The Court can use this power
to help the develoimnt of application of the Constitution to
help strengthen the federal authorities and, at the same time,
protect the nirates fran any intrusions on their powers. Parties
have the right to apply to the Court to obtain an authoritative
opinion which clarifies the powers and limitations of each party,
or else to prevent the occurrence of undesirable actions by other
parties (59)• The party applying for an opinion fran the Court
can use this way of obtaining information to stabilise their
position and protect their actions against later attacks or
allegations of illegitimacy. Hence this right of the authorities
can be used to gain kcMledge and to provide confirmation of
their actions, and also as a protective device for future
developuent. Because of their failure to agree to a Permanent
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Constitution the emirates have repeatedly opted to extend the
duration of the provisional constitution (60), The repeated
extension of duration of the Provisional Constitution means that,
in practice, the Provisional Constitution is functioning as a
permanent one. The fact that this Provisional Constitution was
originally drawn up to operate for only a limited period of time
makes it by necessity unable to provide long term solutions for
new problems as they arise. This gives the Court opportunities to
participate in adjusting its opinions to the developnent of the
country. The actual use the Court makes of its power of rendering
interpretations to the Constitution depends to sane extent on the
Court's understanding of its opportunity and the importance of
its opinions hat also to sane extent on its appreciation of the
political risks involved if it chooses to render opinions unfav-
ourable to the political branches of the federal or local
government. The Court's role depends also on the willingness of
authorities who have the right to apply to the Court to have
resort to the Court and their choice of issues to present to the
Court,
2) Fralin-base1 Açlicatim of Review
(Abstract ?brm Qxitro].) (61)
The Constitution and the law give the two levels of
government the right to challenge the consistency of the other
level's laws within the agreed distribution of powers. This
involves differences of opinions or doubts about the formal or
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material compatibility of federal or regional law with the
Constitution, or the cctnpatibility of regional laws with federal
laws. This process is initiated either by the authorities of the
central government or by the emirates. No adversary proceedings
are necessary. This is similar to the abstract normal control
power given to the Constitutional court in West Germany (62)•
This item of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is meant to be
a guarantee for the two levels of government to protect their
spheres of power without having to wait for individuals or
legal persons to bring cases to the Court to decide whether the
offending legislation should be declared null. In this. power of
the Court there is another departure from the traditional
judicial role of deciding cases or controversies - another
manifestation by the Constitution of the special nature of the
Court and its significance in the political system of the
country. The parties in these proceedings are either central
government authorities or governments of the emirates. No private
person is involved. The Court in these proceedings acts as an
umpire on legislative matters between the two levels of
government. The institution which is pit in this position of
having to resolve differences on such important, political
matters should have, by its design and structure, assurances of
independence and integrity in order to have the respect and
confidence of the opposing parties.
The Court's decisions in these proceedings are, as in other
cases, binding on all. Where the Court decides that the law under
consideration is inconsistent with the Constitution or federal
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law, the Constitution instructs the concerned authority to "take
the necessary measures to rtove or rectify the constitutional
inconsistency" (63)• The Constitution opts for the instruction of
active renval of laws deemed improper, rather than the effective
removal of these laws by inapplicability. Anyway, the final
result is the same in this case because the decision of the Court
is binding on all and the words of the Constitution require the
quick retoval of doatted laws.
3) ¶I Referx,e of Cases frciu LcMer Ccxirts for
Caistituticrga]. Review (Qxcrete rm Qxitrol) (64)
This is the only way open for individuals and other private
persons to challenge an unconstitutional law. If, while hearing a
case, a lier court considers unconstitutional any statute the
validity of which is relevant to its decision, then it must stay
the proceedings and give the concerned party a limited period to
take his petition of unconstitutionality to the Supreme Court
(65)• consideration of the unconstitutionality of laws by 1c,er
courts can be either by a challenge fran one of the parties or by
the Court's own initiative. If the lcMer court considers the
challenge of unconstitutionality unfounded, then it has to give
the reason for its finding in the decision (66) There is no spe-
cial remedy for the party whose challenge of unconstitutionality
of laws has been refused. The only remedy for those parties whose
challenge on the constitutionality of laws has been refused is
the normal appellate procedures (67)•
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If the consideration of the unconstitutionality of the law
was by the lower court's own initiative, then it has to refer the
concerned provisions to the Supreme Court with details of the
reasons for its decisions (68)•
Article 99 (6) of the Constitution holds that the Supreme
Court shall have jurisdiction in:
"Examination of the constitutionality of laws, legislation
and regulations in general, if such a request is referred to
it by any Court in the country during a pending case before
• 1-	 l1_.
All Courts in the country can bring questions of review of the
constitutionality of legislation to the Supreme Court. Both
Federal courts and local Courts can bring constitutional review
applications to the Supreme Courts. Primary, appellate, final
and Sharia Courts can bring questions of review of
constitutionality to the Supreme Court. Questions of
constitutionality of legislation can be referred to the
constitutional chamber fran other chambers in the Supreme Court,
especially after the enactment of the law of cassation (Law
17/1978) (69)
The laws that can be referred to the Supreme Court through
this jurisdiction can be either federal or emirate laws, they
include statutes, bye-laws, and any form of legislation and
regulation (70)• The Constitution gives the power of deciding on
the constitutionality of laws to the Supreme Court bit this does
not exclude the role of inferior courts in the process of
reviewing the conformity of laws with the Constitution. Indeed,
the role of inferior courts in the decision on the
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constitutionality of laws is a vital one. rticle 58 of the
Supreme Court' s statute (Law 10/1973) includes regulation of the
procedure of referring questions concerning Constitutional review
of legislation to the Supreme Court fran other Courts. This
article gives the Court the right to initiate questions of
Constitutionality, thereby referring them to the Supreme Court.
The Courts in the country have the perver to decide on the merits
of questions of constitutionality of legislation initiated by
parties to cases before them. The inferior courts have the right
to question the conformity of any law with the Constitution as
long as the decision on this matter affects the ultimate decision
of that court on the case before it. To initiate proceedings of
reviewing the conformity of laws with the Constitution, the
inferior courts have a wide discretion which means that they
should be willing to refer laws to the Supreme Court arid, at the
same time, they should be confident of the procedural and
material ability of the Supreme Court to guard arid enforce the
supremacy of the Constitution. Even when the question of the
constitutionality of laws is presented by parties in cases before
inferior courts, the discretion of these courts is still wide.
The inferior courts have to decide on the matter of
constitutionality of laws. If a constitutional question is raised
by the parties, then, these courts either stay the proceedings
before them arid allcM the party concerned to take his request to
the Supreme Court or proceed with the decision on the case,
having explained the reason for not granting the right to
approach the Supreme Court. Paragraph (6) of Article 99 of the
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Constitution allcs the inferior courts to refer laws to the
Supreme Court even if they have only a slight doubt regarding
their constitutionality and, at the same time, when the reference
is requested by a party before them, there may be a strong
possibility of contradiction of the questioned law with the
Constitution but the question will not be referred to the Supreme
Court if the opinion of the court is wholly on the other side of
the argument. The absence of special procedures of appeal for
parties whose applications for referral to the Supreme Court
have been denied by lower Courts strengthens the power of the
inferior judges on the referral of constitutional objections to
the Supreme Court. Currently only ordinary appeals procedures
are possible for those who have been denied referral to the
Supreme Court for constitutional review. These procedures are not
sufficient in all cases because there are special requirements
for ordinary appeals which may be absent fran the case in which
the constitutionality of laws was raised. Therefore the concerned
party may have no way to appeal against the refusal to grant him
the right to approach the Supreme court (71)•
The Supreme Court's jurisdiction to decide on the
constitutionality of laws referred to it by inferior courts
resulting from cases or controversies before them makes the
Supreme Court an important guarantor of constitutional rights of
individuals against violation by legislation. There is an
inherent defect in the kind of procedure chosen in the United
Arab Eknirates. The constitutional court receives an application
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to review the ccmpatibility with the Constitution of a piece of
legislation. The legislation is referred to without the facts of
the case, and the decision of the Court will be binding on all,
not simply to the particular case in which the question of
constitutionality arose. The emphasis of the Supreme Court
becanes concentrated not on the individual and the breach of his
constitutional right but rather on the piece of legislation
referred to. The separation of the constitutional questions fran
the specific fact situation deprives the Supreme Court of the
flexibility enjoyed by such courts as the merican Supreme Court.
For, if the Supreme Court receives all of the case (both its
facts and the question of constitutionality) it may consider it
proper to postpone deciding the question of constitutionality or
to interpret the Constitution in a way to restore and protect the
rights of the concerned party and others in a similar situation
to a greater extent (72) The Supreme Court's understanding of
its primary duty regarding laws referred to it by lower courts,
that is, of not having to decide a particular case b.it having to
give a formal declaration of the canpatibility of a law with the
Constitution, caild have adverse effects on those parties who
willingly or unwillingly caused the statute to be referred to the
Supreme Court.
The procedures prescribed by the law for referring laws for
constitutional scrutiny by the Supreme Court may not be adequate
to protect all constitutional rights that are violated by the
legislature. The element of time may be a cause for the
insufficiency of the procedure to protect individual rights by
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referring laws to the Supreme Court, for example a person whose
right to obtain a passport to travel has been violated by a law
or administrative regulation. If he brings a case to ordinary
court, the court either grants or refuses to grant him the right
to approach the Supreme Court. If the lower court decides to
allow the person to approach the Supreme Court, the court's
protracted procedure takes a long time, after which the decision
must still return to the lower court which decides the case
accordingly. If the lower court decides not to grant the
concerned person the right to take his case to the Supreme Court,
then this person has to appeal to the Appellate Court which may
or may not reverse the lower court' s decision. Then the only
remaining course for this person is by way of cassation to the
Supreme Court. Each of these procedures may result in a denial of
a person's fundamental rights. Even if the Supreme Court's
decision ultimately favours the person who initiated the
procedures, it may be too late for him to benefit fran it.
Another disadvantage resulting fran the lengthy procedures
and the special requirements in the court's statute is the high
financial cost of bringing applications of constitutional review
by individuals to the Supreme Court, which may result in
discouraging people from requesting these procedures or
abandoning them after they are permitted to approach the Supreme
Court
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4) ¶fl Reso].uticn of Dispites Between tI
	
nber Fn1 rates
aid Betw	 'itin aid tbe Federal Gov'eraint (74)
General disputes can e presented to the Supreme Court
through this jurisdiction. The emirates and the federal
government can bring these disputes to the Court. These disputes
can be between the emirates and the federal government or between
the emirates. The subjects of these disputes can vary widely. The
dispute presented to the Court through this jurisdiction can be
about territorial border differences, financial carnitments, the
application by the emirates of the federal laws, or many other
subjects. The parties to these disputes are political bodies, so
dealing in a dispute between them is politically sensitive. Die
to the position of the Court there are no appeals fran its
decisions. These facts place the Supreme Court in a position
which is both powerful and could be delicate. The position of
the Court - to be able to decide disputes between the emirates
and the federal government - demands that the court is without
bias aid thus deserving the trust aid confidence of all parties.
5) ccnstltutixia]. stiis Qining to t1 cbirt Thrcugh its
Role as the Qurt of Cassati(x1
The Supreme Court was given the role of a cassation court to
hear final appeals on matters concerning errors of law by lower
courts	 Sane constitutional questions may reach the Supreme
Court on the basis of the error of application of laws or
constitutional provisions.
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'fl Role of the Suprei Ccurt in the Federal Balazxe
In the United Arab fliiirates federalism has different
meanings to different categories of people. To the people of the
country, the term itself has a kind of attractiveness and holds
promise. The principle of unity between the emirates and the
ending of a period during which the area was under British
influence, prctted a sense of national pride and nationalistic
emotion. The independence of the country came during a period in
which the total structure of the society and its economic,
cultural, educational and other aspects were undergoing fast
development. The development of education connected the
inhabitants of the country with the people of the Arab world and
brought to the fore several historic facts, all of which
strengthened the call for unity. The economic situation was
changing fast, oil money was seen as a cause and promise of a
better life. Unity between the emirates meant better services to
the population, especially to those in emirates unable to provide
these services. To the rulers the federation meant security and
stability, and a source of financial support to the non-oil
producers (76)
Article 1 of the Constitution presented the country as a
"Federation". The preamble emphasised the desirability of unity,
and the need to enhance the quality of life and strengthen the
bonds between the emirates • But what does "Unity" or "Federation"
mean? There is no explanation of these terms in the Constitution
other than the prescription for the division of powers between
the emirates and the central government. The distribotion of
U
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powers in the Constitution between the emirates and the central
government is set out in a series of fairly detailed lists of
powers to the federal government, with the residuary given to the
emirates. The kind of distribation of powers is closer to the
system of West Germany and Canada than that of the U.S. which
stresses the creating of a strong central government
Owing to the immediate history of the emirates, their
existing system of government, and their tribal character, the
emirates are likely to be strong and reluctant to suJinit totally
to the authority of the federal government or help it to grow and
prosper (78)
The Supreme Court is the final reference to interpret the
Constitution and is given the jurisdiction to decide on the
allegations of unconstitutionality of either federal or emirate
laws if challenged either directly by the other level of
government or indirectly by individuals and parties to cases
before inferior courts. By their nature constitutional cases are,
in a sense, political, especially if the dispute is between the
t levels of government. The laws prnu1gated by both levels of
government could affect various subjects and there are bound to
be questions and disputes of whether or not each level of
government did in fact adhere to the province of power it is
allowed by the Constitution. Not all of the areas of legislation
by the two levels of government will be clearly coherent with the
constitutional distribotion of power The position of the
Supreme Court as an umpire of the federal system, and the lack of
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precise definition of the term "federal" or "federal government"
put on the Court the responsibility of affecting and maintaining
the federal balance in areas which are not regulated in detail.
The judgement of the Court is not only to abide according to
"positive" constitutional law but also to include substantive
judgement of creative quality. The Supreme Court cannot remain
passive. Its decisions are bound to include more than just
remz,val of ambiguity fran constitutional provisions (80) • n
question which should be asked then is not whether the Supr
Court will make constitutional law but rather according to what
guidelines will and should it make such law? (81)
In the area of constitutional distribution of power between
the two levels of government and in maintaining the federal
system, there are several principles which should be considered
by the Court in its decisions. These principles stem from the
constitutional text and history, fran the nature of the society
and other relevant factors. Maintaining the federal system is the
best way to ensure better protection for the individuals. The
federal system is better than small, completely independent,
emirates and, at the same time, it is better than one large
unitary state. The origin of the federal system, the modern
version of which is attributed to the U.S. system of government,
was designed to afford the best protection for individuals by
distributing the powers of the government aztong many institutions
through separation of powers and the federal system. The result
is a system of many quarters of power, each sharing part of the
power and all participating in guaranteeing protection of the
chapter 8	 - 245 -
people through the system of checks and balances (82) In West
Germany the current federal system was organised to prevent the
repetition of the Nazi experience and any other tyranny. Indeed
in West Germany new states were artificially created in order to
divide the power and to assure protection of the individuals
(83)• The United Arab flnirates' federal system may help in the
protection of individuals. For a very long time before the
federation the rulers in the emirates used to enjoy canpiete
power over individuals and over domestic matters in their
respective emirates. The federal system helped to break the
cauplete daninance of the rulers over individuals by dividing
powers between the t levels of government. The creation of the
federal system, in producing a new institutional infrastructure,
offered the people a wider choice of employment and a better
quality of services. Wealth in the United Arab Emirates is
associated with the government which distributes the benefits of
oil to the people through various different channels: employment,
services, projects for building the infrastructure and other
government schemes • All of the opportunities and choices are
increased by the federal system which, ultimately, results in
increasing the choices and benefits accruing to the citizens. The
protection of the individual and the prevention of tyranny are
ends associated with judicial review. The Supreme Court is a
court empowered to practice judicial review of the
constitutionality of laws, the ultimate purpose of which is to
afford better protection for individuals. The Supreme Court has
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to support and maintain the federal system according to its
original powers in the constitution (84)• In supporting the
federal system arid maintaining the federal balance, the Supreme
Court will be participating in protecting the individual arid
serving the same end that is linked with the judicial review
(85)•
In order for the Supreme Court to support and maintain the
federal system, attention must be paid to providing measured
support for the central government, at least in the current
period, and for the .foreseeable future. However, current
circumstances surrounding the federal system tend to favour the
emirates against central government, which results in weak
central government. The continued weakness of central government
hampers the developnent of the country, particularly in that the
central government is given the duty to provide vital services.
The weakness of central government leaves the whole federal
system out of balance. This imbalance not only prevents the full
protection of the people, but also denies than access to a better
life with nore ctioice (86)
The weakness of the central government is the result of
different factors, all of which play sane role in weakening its
po.iers or preventing it fran the proper exercise of them. We
shall discuss sane of these factors and their effects.
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1) The previous existence of the efuirates as independent
entities
The emirates were governed by their rulers for a long
period. Originally the rulers held all the power in their
emirates, sane of which they relinquished to the British through
treaties. Mainly, the rulers had the final say in all matters of
government. The tribal nature of the people helped to direct
power and loyalty to the person of the ruler and the ruling
family. The later flow of oil and the increased financial
strength of the rulers served to enhance their position over the
people (87), The powers of the rulers were established for a very
long time in their respective emirates. By comparison, the
federal government is new. In the early stages of its life,
therefore, the federal government needed support to establish its
power and to be recognised by the people and by the rulers. The
transference of popular loyalty fran the emirates to the federal
government needed time to occur.
2) 'fl arraxits in tl Qxistituticxi favciring tbe nirates
Due to the nature of the process of devising the current
Constitution, which was initiated, supervised and approved by the
rulers, the arrangements in the Constitution concentrate power in
the rulers and stress the rights of the emirates.
The supreme body which has the principal executive and
legislative powers is canposed of the rulers of the emirates. The
emirates reserved large and important areas of power (88) Urer
the original arrangements the emirates have the power over:
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(i) Oil production and other minerals, and their revenue.
(ii) Customs regulations and duty collection.
(iii) djudication of matters not allocated to the federation
(which is the majority of civil and criminal matters
and matters of public laws which arise in the emirates).
(iv) Raising armies and security forces which include all
arrangements and different military forces.
(v) Police matters.
and several other important areas of power, the use of all of
these powers resulting in the existence of strong emirates and
weak central government..
3) 1	 f1naxial deperr3xe of citral goverrilEnt cx' tbe
enirates
Canpared to the federal government the emirates have the
means and the capabilities to be independent in their financing.
The central government, on the contrary, has to depend on the
contributions fran the individual emirates. There are no means to
force the emirates to pay their respective shares. The only means
of pressure on the emirates is a noral one. The emirates pay
their shares because of their felt need to maintain the central
government. The payment of their shares by the emirates can be
used as a means of pressure to achieve certain ends. The emirates
can, and do sometimes, delay payment of their shares as a protest
against the political decisions of central government (89)•
The Supreme Court is a judicial body and its decisions are
relatively irmiune from the pressures that face the political
department of central government. Its decisions may, therefore,
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support central government to an extent unavailable to the
political departments.
These are only sane of the factors that contribute to
weakening central government and thereby contributing to the
imbalance of the federal system.
It was clear that the arrangements provided in the
Constitution and the powers given to central government were not
totally satisfactory and that is why the Constitution was
labelled "provisional" and given a duration of five years during
which t:ime a permanent constitution of a rrore pcMerful union was
to be prepared and approved. The new Constitution was not
approved and, therefore, the arrangements for the stronger union
were not achieved. The current constitution is a document which
its authors and framers wanted to be revised and improved to
provide for a strong central government (90) Were the Supreme
Court to interpret the Constitution in a manner favouring central
government, it would not contradict the Constitution. Rather it
would achieve the results desired by those who framed it. In
addition to living up to the desires of those who founded the
Constitution, the Supreme Court, in supporting central
government, would be protecting the individual and maintaining
the strength of the federal system.
The Supreme Court can, through the interpretation of the
Constitution, achieve what the reformers of the Constitution
failed to achieve. Those who attempted to reform the Constitution
were confronted by political differences and pressures. The
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Supreme Court can, through authoritative decisions, achieve the
same desired ends with fewer obstacles (91)•
There is a possibility that negative reactions and
unwelcaning responses, or even objections, fran the emirates
would follow a decision of the Court to support central
government. Such reactions could be reduced or avoided by the
Court adopting the gradual approach and by persuasive arguments.
In the U.S. and West Germany, the courts were scrnetimes accused
of being anti-deocratic if they confronted the legislatures, and
their acts were made void. This objection cannot exist in the
United Arab Enirates because of the absence of denocracy. What
can be upheld is the accusation of politicising the judiciary and
the accusation to the Court of trespassing in the provinces of
other departments of government. All of these objections can be
answered logically and could be avoided by the Court using a
cautious approach. Judges must be assured of immunity from
reprisals as a necessary protection for the Court to carry its
responsibilities and play its proper role in the develotinent of
the federal system of the United Arab Eknirates. The minimum role
played by the Court must be to support the centre as a viable
government and so preserve a federal system rather than allowing
local power to reduce the arrangennt effectively to a confederal
one.
fl csaticx Jurlsdicticxi arñ its Effect cxi the Court
The year 1978 marked a rraj or turn in the operation and
jurisdiction of the Supren Court. This turning point was the
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move of the Court fran being mainly a constitutional , court to
being a court of more general canpetence. Law (17/1978) added to
the Supreme Court the cassation jurisdiction.
Cassation is an appeal to a high court to review and
discover errors in the application of law by lower courts.
Cassation originated in France after the revolution. It was a
means by which a non-judicial organ, strictly connected to the
legislative power, ensured that the courts applied only the
letter of the law and did not interfere in the legislative sphere
(92) The creation of the "Tribunal de Cassation" in 1790 was ithe
result of the French Revolutionary distrust in the • judiciary
Comparing the original institutions of cassation and
judicial review we can discover profound theoretical differences.
Cassation assumes the supreme will of the legislature, whilst
judicial review requires the subjection of ordinary laws to a
supreme judicial body sufficiently immune from political
decisions. Cassation presupposes profound mistrust of the
judiciary, whilst judicial review presumes a great confidence in
it. The development of cassation in France transformed the
institution carrying it into a judicial body and the "Cour de
Cassation" became the supreme court for the judicial
interpretation of the law. This development of cassation
effectively removed the contradiction between it and judicial
review. Hence, whilst judicial review is the institution for the
control of constitutiOnality, cassation is the institution for
the control of legality (94).
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The jurisdiction of cassation in its modern form and
according to Article 4 of Law (17/1978) does not contradict
judicial review. What cassation effectively does is considerably
widen the field of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by adding to
its original control of constitutionality the jurisdiction of
controlling legality. Generally, in civil law countries where
cassation has been received, as in France, there are specialised
higher courts. For example, in West Germany there are no fewer
than six higher courts In the United Arab Eknirates there
are no such specialised courts which means that the ultimate
court of appeal for all cases is the Supreme Court. In cannon
law countries where there is no such specialisation in Supreme
Courts of Appeal, there are usually devices by which the Supreme
Courts can choose cases or refuse to decide in others. For
example, in the U.S. the Supreme Court has the discretion to
refuse jurisdiction through certiorari (96) The Supreme Court of
the United Arab Enirates lacks such a device so it has the duty
to hear all cases brought before it. The result of the inability
of the Supreme Court to avoid jurisdiction will inevitably lead
to the Court being suhnerged beneath a deluge of cassation cases,
thus draining the Court of time and energy which it was, by its
original jurisdiction, supposed to give to interpreting and
supervising the developnent of the Constitution. An ordinary
civil law high court is unsuitable to be given, in addition to
cassation jurisdiction, the pcer of a constitutional court, nor
is a specially created constitutional court suitable to be given
the general jurisdiction of cassation.
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Because of the special nature of the cassation jurisdiction,
it needs technically-minded and experienced judges which makes it
unsuitable to be given to the Supreme Court in the United Arab
Eknirates. The Court's State (Law 10/1973) expressed the desire to
appoint local judges to the Supreme Court, the addition of
cassation jurisdiction makes it difficult to do this. Because of
the relatively recent deve1opTnt of the United Arab Enirates and
the scarcity of experienced judges, the cassation jurisdiction
makes it difficult, if not impossible, to fulfil the desire of
the legislature to appoint local judges to the Court at the
present time or in the near future.
The cassation jurisdiction was included under Paragraph (9)
of Article 99 of the Constitution which permits the addition to
the Court's jurisdiction of other matters. But, to use this
permission to take up more than 90% of the Court's time is
incompatible with the constitutional purpose, although,
literally, this can be justified. The incanpatibility of the
addition of cassation to the Court is evident:
1) The Constitution has a relatively large part devoted to the
Supreme Court. This can be justified by the importance of
the constitutional jurisdiction of the Court b.it is quite
unjustified for a court whose occupation is to supervise the
proper interpretation and application of ordinary laws.
2) The appointment procedure and the tenure of the judges are
especially formulated because of the political nature and
constitutional importance of the Court. The participation
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of the Supreme Council and the President in the appointment
of the judges arid President of the Supreme Court is not
necessary for a Court which is mainly a court of cassation.
The inclusion of the cassation jurisdiction was mainly
because the Court was underworked before 1978. The inclusion of
cassation within the jurisdiction of the Court did not solve the
problem of the Court but rather increased it. The real problem
was that there were constitutional issues affecting the federal
system, and the constitution in general required decisions. The
Supreme Court, by the application of Law (10/1 973) especially
concerning staffing and tenure, was unable to provide effective
solutions for them. There was a lack of confidence in the Court.
There was also a lack of experience, and all of these factors
contributed to the ineffectiveness of the Court as a
constitutional court • These problems require special solutions.
The approach used in the United rab Enirates was to use the
Court as a cassation court, which adversely affected the
constitutional jurisdiction.
This approach did not address the real problem. It simply
solved a superficial problem. It Iray have appeared desirable for
the Cabinet or the Supreme Council to avoid this judicial body
which deals with constitutional matters by occupying it with
cassation cases. But, in reality, this means the increased
ineffectiveness of this body in constitutional cases which will
leave a gap in the constitutional structure, the effect of which
is to harm the developrent of the country and to hamper the
constitutional system.
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characteristics of Qxistituticna]. Review aud Interpretaticri by
the Suprie Qirt in the United Arab flnlrates.
There are several characteristics of the method chosen by
the Constitution and legislation for constitutional review and
interpretation. These characteristics entail certain effects and
result in advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the
Supreme Court.
1) cntraflsed Review
The only institution empowered to provide binding
constitutional interpretations and declare federal and local
legislation unconstitutional is the Supreme court (97)• All other
courts have to refer legislation to the Supreme Court for
declaration on Its compatibility with the Constitution. The
choice of the centralised form of review is carrron in countries
with mainly civil law systems (98) The rationale for adopting
the centralised form of judicial review is that it is coherent
with the civil law system. Firstly, civil law countries adhere to
the supremacy of statutory law. Judicial review is recognised to
have political character, therefore it is not the function of
ordinary judges to engage In practising it. Ordinary judges
should presume the validity of legislation and adhere to it in
their decisions. Should any doubt arise in the validity or
conformity of legislation with the Constitution, judges should
Stay their proceedings and refer the matter to a specialised
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court empowered specifically by the Constitution to decide in the
conformity of legislation with the Constitution. Special care is
given to the appointment of members of constitutional courts
because of their political significance.
The special political significance of the Supreme Court in
the United Prab Eknirates is enhanced by the other areas of its
canpetence, such as providing constitutional interpretation on
request. Whilst the final decisions and binding constitutional
interpretations are the province of the Supreme Court, lower
courts are not caripletely excluded fran engaging in actual
judicial review. Indeed, lower courts play a vital, role in
bringing legislation for constitutional review to the Supreme
Court. L,er courts, either federal or local, can, by their own
initiative and according to their own opinions, refer legislation
affecting decisions on cases before them to the Supreme Court if
they consider, or even suspect, incompatibility of this
legislation with the federal constitution. If a party to a case
before a lower court raises the question of unconstitutionality,
the lower court has to decide whether there is merit in the
attack or not. If it decides that it is not founded, the only
requirement for the court to refuse reference to the Supreme
court is to give reasons (99. There are no special remedies or
appellate procedure for constitutional issues raised by parties
to cases in lower courts to review the decisions of refusal to
refer them to the Supreme Court. The result is that the system,
which was designed by the Constitution to be a centralised system
of review, is in practice distorted by Law (10/1973) into a
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decentralised system. The practice of judicial review depends to
a large extent on the will and enthusiasm of judges in ler
courts to activate constitutional review and encourage its
practice.
2) Urispecialised Qxrt.
The Supreme Court, which is the Court empowered to practice
judicial review in the United Arab Eiiirates, is an unspecialised
constitutional court, especially after the addition of cassation
jurisdiction to its competence (100)• Elsewhere, in other
countries, the trend has been to give judicial review to a
specialised court created for this jurisdiction or else the
courts, through their practice, becaning practically specialised
constitutional courts (1 01) Coupled with the inability of the
Supreme Court to refuse or avoid jurisdiction on cases brought to
it, the lack of specialisation has an adverse effect on the
constitutional role of the Court. Constitutional courts need a
wide range of political judgements and emphasis on the different
effects of their decisions on present and future develont of
their respective societies, whereas general courts need more
technical legal experience, with only a linited emphasis on the
effects of their decisions (102)
3) S Retroactive General Birdinj Effect of 1isicxs
The decisions of the Supreme Court concerning constitution-
ality of laws are not only binding on the parties to the case in
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which the decision was given, but also on all others in similar
situations in the future. The decisions of the Court are binding
on all, and although the unconstitutional laws are not removed
fran the books, they are pronounced null and void for the future
(1 03) The Constitution instructs the concerned government to
remove the unconstitutional law as soon as possible (104)•
The express constitutional provisions emperering the Supreme
Court to pronounce legislation null and void towards all and for
the future, have effectively saved the Court fran the kind of
arguments which surrour4 the practice of judicial review in the
U.S. and the allegations of judicial legislation which confronted
the American Supreme Court for a long time. What remains for the
Supreme Court is the wise use of its given powers. The degree to
which the Court uses its constitutional power, and the wide sweep
of its general conclusions, can cause confrontation with the
legislatures and other political departments of the country. The
fact of unconstitutionality of a law is a ground for absolute
nullity and therefore ineffectiveness of that law even before the
actual unconstitutionality has been declared. The Court discovers
the nullity of the unconstitutional law (105)•
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Article 93 of the Basic law of West Germany under the title
"Federal Constitutional Court, Canpetency" includes the
following:
(1) The Federal Constitutional Court shall decide:
1- on the interpretation of this Basic Law in the event of
disputes concerning the extent of the rights and duties
of a highest federal organ or of other parties
concerned who have been vested with rights of their
own by this Basic Law or by rules of procedure of a
highest federal organ;
2- in case of differences of opinion or doubts on the
formal and material canpatibility of federal law or
Land Law with this Basic Law, or on the canpatibility
of Land Law with other law, at the request of the
Federal Government, of a Land Government, or of one
third of the Bundestag member;
in case of differences of opinion on the rights and
duties of the Federation and the Laender, particularly
in the execution of federal law by the Laender and in
the exercise of federal supervision;
4- on other disputes involving public law between the
Federation and the Laender, between different Laender
or within a Land, unless recourse to another Court
exists.
Article 100 Provides under the title Canpatibility of
Statutory Law with Basic Law:
1- If a Court considers unconstitutional a law the
validity of which is relevant to its decision, the
proceedings shall be stayed, and a decision shall be
obtained from the Land Court competent for
constitutional disputes if the Constitution of a Land
is held to be violated, or from the Federal
Constitutional Court if this Basic Law is held to be
violated. This shall also apply if this Basic Law is
held to be violated by Land Law or if a Land Law is
held to be incanpatible with a Federal Law.
2- If, in the course of litigation, doubt exists whether a
rule of public international law in an integral part of
federal..., the Court shall obtain a decision fran the
Federal Constitutional Court.
50. In the original jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, it
had the power to provide advisory opinions on the meaning of
constitutional provisions, which is a part of the canpetence
of the Supreme Court of the U.A.E. The original jurisdiction
of the Constitutional Court did not include hearing
constitutional canplaints by individuals, which is not
included in the powers of the Supreme Court of the U.A.E.
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51. Articles 123, 124 and 151 in addition to the main
jurisdiction of the Court contained in Article 99.
Article 99 states that the Supreme Court: "...shall have
jurisdiction in the following matters:
1- Various disputes between member E'nirates in the union,
or between any one Emirate or nre and the Union
Government, whenever such disputes are sulxnitted to the
Court on the request of any of the interested parties.
2- Examination of the constitutionality of Union Laws, if
they are challenged by one or nore of the Emirates on
the grounds of violating the Constitution of the Union.
Examination of the constitutionality of
legislations prcinulgated by one of the Emirates, if
they are challanged by one of the Union authorities on
the grounds o violation of the Constitution of the
Union or of Union Laws.
3- Examination of the constitutionality of laws,
legislations and regulations in general, if such
request is referred to it by any Court in the country
during a pending case before it. The aforesaid Court
shall be bound to accept the ruling of the Union
Supreme Court rendered in this connection.
4- Interpretation of the Provisions of the Constitution,
when so requested by any Union authority or by the
Government of any Emirate. Any such interpretation
shall be binding on all.
5- Trial of Ministers and Senior officials of the Union
appointed by decree regarding their actions in carrying
out their official duties on the demand of the Supreme
Council and in accordance with the relevant law."
Other matters included in this article are conflict of
jurisdiction between federal and local courts and between
the emirates. The Constitution allowed addition of "Other
Jurisdiction" by the Constitution or by law to the Court.
Law 10/1973 in Article 33 added the interpretation of
treaties and international agreements to the Court.
Law 17/1978 added the cassation jurisdiction in all matters
to the Supreme Court.
Articles 123 and 124 of the Constitution give the Suprre
Court the power of resolving disputes between the emirates
and the federal government about their rights to enter into
treaties and international agreements, in case of objection
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Constitution expired on 1 December 1976 (U.A.E. Pra y. Const.
Article 144 (1)). Before the expiration of the initial
period of operation of the Constitution, a draft was
prepared for a Permanent Constitution. Due to the failure of
the emirates to agree on the new Constitution, they opted to
extend the duration of the Provisional Constitution. The
Provisional Constitution has been extended three times, the
last of which was in 1986 and it will expire in 1991. The
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APR NINE
ThE FARLY E*NES FtR ThE &J4E (tXJI?r'S as'rrnJ1'IctAL
Decjsjcxs of t1 Suprei Qirt Delivered fran 1973 to 1978.
The Constitution called for the enactment of a law to
regulate details of structure and procedure for the Suprte Court
(1)• Law 10/1973 (the Supreme Court Statute) was enacted in 1973
and published in ugust of the sane year (2),
The first case to cane before the Court, was registered on
24 October 1973, about two months after establishment of the
Court, and the decision was given on 29 November of the same year
(3). The Court's business during the period from 1973 to 1 978
was dominated by applications for Constitutional interpretation
Each application may contain more than one request .
The Court's decisions in these applications, therefore, may
establish more than one principle. In its reply to the
applications before it, the Court may need to establish
principles which are not necessarily answers to the questions put
before it (6)	 There was a need for authoritative
interpretations frau the Court for several reasons • The Court' s
interpretations were needed to remove ambiguities from the
Constitutional text (v),
 and to settle differences between
competing Federal Institutions (8), The Court' s interpretations
were, moreover, needed to aid the new Federal Institutions to
pass through the critical first few years of their formation.
The Court's decisions during this period had a special
chapter 9	
- 271 -
importance, namely by providing interpretation which supported
the Federal system and Institutions, thus producing a stabilising
effect on the whole country and its chosen Constitutional struc-
ture. The new country, as organised by the Federal Constitution,
needed to be enlightened as to the proper functioning of the
Constitution, and objections to this functioning needed to be
disarmed. All of these needs were satisfied by the Court's
decisions.
A. 'ft Federal Distrthftim of Pcers in t First 1%
Alicatims to the axirt.
The distribution of legislative and executive pcer between
the centre and the constituent units is one of the main
characteristics of Federal systns 	 . Federalism Is one of the
rxst important features introduced to the fliiirates by the new
Constitution (1 O)• The idea and practice of Federal Government
was new to the area. The Constitution distributed the legislative
and executive powers between the Emirates and the Federal
Government (h1) The language used, inevitably, led to
interpretational differences of opinion. The factors which led
to the formation of the specifically Federal Government (in
contrast with either the canplete political separation of the
Emirates, or else a unitary Government) could, within the
possible interpretations to the Constitution, continue to exert
their influence in the emergence of either a strong Federation,
or else a restricted one. The stronger Federation is preferred by
the newly organised Federal Authorities, whilst the restricted
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Federation is preferred by those Emirates which are still
suspicious of the Federation and its authorities (12) There are
sane provisions in the Constitution which can produce either a
strong, or a weak Federation, according to the interpretations
given to them (13)• By Constitutional design, the Supreme Court
is the arbiter in these matters, and the strength of the
Federation will depend, to a great extent, on its vision and on
the position it is willing to take.
In view of the above, it is unsurprising to find the Court
faced with questions about the distrth.ition of powers in the
first two applications sujxnitted. The opinions of the Court in
these two cases should be viewed in context and should be
understood to mean more than just providing answers to specific
authorities' questions; rather these opinions are precedents in a
subject which was still in the moulding process and the effects
of the Court's opinions in these two cases have profound and
long-lasting effects.
1 First	 1icatii:	 nigratiai law Cse
(Application for Constitutional interpretation 1/1, 29 November
1973). 15 Official Gazette (14)
This application was addressed to the Court from the
Ministry of the Interior. The Public Prosecutor urged rejection
of the application because an individual Minister does not have
the capacity to sulinit applications to the Court according to
Article 99 (4) of the Constitution, which states that only the
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Federal authorities are capable of suliiiitting applications of
interpretation to the Court, and these authorities do not
ccxnprise individual ministers (according to Article 45 of the
Constitution) (15)• The newly created Court, eager to start its
business and to present itself on the scene, rejected the call of
the Public Prosecutor and decided to proceed in the case. In the
Court's opinion, the Ministers are collectively responsible for
their works and policies (16)• Depending mainly on the collective
responsibility of Ministers in its argument, and on the known
fact of the recent creation of the Federal machinery and the lack
of the proper procedures for representing the Council of
Ministers (17), the Court accepted the case against a strong
objection frciii the Public Prosecution. In this application there
are several questions, and to each the Court supplied an answer,
interpreting Constitutional provisions and providing priorities
and general principles.
This case was effectively started because of problems in the
application of a newly drafted Federal Law. The Ministry of the
Interior is the authority responsible for the implementation of
the Eknigration and Residency Law (Law 6/1973). As a consequence
of its being faced with several difficulties in the application
of this law, the Ministry rxwed to bring this enquiry to the
Court to help resolve the problems, and provide it with
authoritative opinions and guidance. The application suthdtted
to the Supreme Court involved numerous questions concerning
interpretation of several Constitutional provisions.
This case represented the enthusiastic pursuit by a federal
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ministry for nre power. The constitution was in its early years
and the limits of power in the federal system created by it were
still vague. The questions presented were grouped and phrased in
a manner inviting an interpretation of the constitution which
favoured the federal authorities.
()iestiais invo1v1 in this case:
The Ministry of the Interior presented a list of questions
in its application to the Supr Court. This list included:
1 - Whether matters included in all Criminal Federal Legislation
are within the scope of Paragraph (6) of Article 99 of the
Constitution? (18), And whether these crimes can be
understood to violate the interests of the Federal
Government.
2 - Whether violation of Criminal Federal Legislation, including
Criminal Provisions of Federal Emigration Law (19), are
within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court according to
Paragraph (6) of Article 99 of the Constitution.
3 - What is the purpose behind separating legislation from
execution of matters included in Article 121 of the
Constitution? And what is the purpose of giving legislation
in these matters to the Federal Government yet execution to
the Emirates?
4 - What is the purpose of giving the Federal Government
legislative power in "Major Procedural Legislation"? (20)
5 - What is the meaning of "Major Procedural Legislation"?
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6 - Does the Constitution authorise the Emirates to enact
legislation which contradicts Federal legislation, in Major
Procedural matters?
7 - What is the effect of the exception contained in Article 149
of the Constitution, on the application of Article 121? .nd
what is the significance of the Federal supremacy of Article
151 on these matters? (21)
8 - Whether Federal Law regulating Judicial relationships arrong
the Emirates (Law 11/1973), which is requested by Article
11(a) of the Constitution, is a "Major Procedural
Legislation", and, accordingly, whether the Federal
supremacy and the Federal occupation of the field prevents
the Emirates fran interfering in these matters.
9 - Whether Article 121 of the Constitution abolishes the
contents of Article 119 of the same Constitution. Possibly
because the matter which is the subject of Article 119 is
included under Article 121.
10 - Whether the requirement of regulation with "utnost ease" of
Article 119, in regulation of Judicial relationships arrong
the Emirates, has a binding effect over the Federal
legislature.
As a consequence of the U.A.E., at the time of presentation
of this application, having been in a transitional period, and
because of the existence of a wide legislative vacuum, many
important questions still awaited answers • It is obvious fran the
questions in this case, that many Constitutional provisions are
open to rrore than one interpretation. This case presents several
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examples of the probability of the existence of different and
variable meanings to the Constitutional provisions, namely:
1 - What are "Major Procedural Legislations"? What is major and
what is minor? Who sets the standard by which these
legislations can be classified? It is obvious that the
Constitutional provisions cannot provide much help in
answering these questions.
2 - What are the crimes that "... directly affect the interests
of the Union ..." ?
These are only examples, certainly there exist a great many
other provisions of the Constitution which give rise to several
possibilities of interpretation and which can cane to the Court
for resolution and authoritative answers, It is obvious that
there was more than one motive for bringing this application.
One purpose of the application was to gain an authoritative
declaration fran the Court in a matter which was still in dispute
as to whether it fell under Federal or Local Authority. The way
in which the questions were organised and styled, are evidence of
this driving force behind the application. Auother cause was the
quest for guidance, especially as to whether the Judicial
authority has cartpetence in related matters.
The Ministry of the Interior, by presenting this application
wanted to achieve several results. The Ministry wanted jurisdic-
tion over all Federally crimirialised acts, including those which
result fran violation of anigration Laws, to be given to the
Federal Judiciary. The Federal Judiciary, at the time of the
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enquiry, was ccraposed of the Supreme Court alone. The Ministry
wanted this jurisdiction to be given to the Supreme Court under
Article 99 (6) as crimes against the interests of the Federation.
The benefits of giving the jurisdiction to the Supreme Court were
numerous. One benefit was that the Supreme Court is a Court of
last instance, and there are no appeals from its decisions.
Another benefit of giving the jurisdiction to the Supreme Court
was that it is geographically better for the Ministry to bring
cases to one Court situated in the same city as the headquarters
of the Ministry itself, xather than to argue the case in differ-
ent courts dispersed throughout the flnirates. A third benefit was
that the legal rules and procedures which would be applied by the
Supreme Court would be more consistent and simpler for the
Ministry, than to involve local judiciaries with their variant
details of regulations and procedures. These same benefits
explain the reasons for which the Ministry rroved to invoke the
Federal Supremacy of Article 151 and the Federal occupation of
the field of Articles 121 and 149 of the Constitution.
Pririp1es amr1 by tI birt in this case.
In this case the Supreme Court was put in a position to test
its vision of the Federal balance in the country. Was the Court
aware of the aims of the Ministry which submitted the
application? And was the Court prepared to submit to those
demands? What role did the Cairt choose for itself concerning
the Federal distribution of pcMer? Where was the Court prepared
to draw the line between the Eknirates and the Federal Government
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in matters which are not clearly stipulated in the Constitution?
The answers to these questions would depend on the stance that
the Court took in this case and on the decisions it produced.
The decision of the Court contained several principles
regarding interpretations of the Constitutional provisions and
policies.
1 - The Supreme Court has jurisdiction, according to Article 99
(6), only over crimes which represent direct intrusions on
basic interests and foundations of the Union.
2 - Not all acts criminalised by Federal legislation are within
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. For acts
criminalised by Federal legislation to be within the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, they have to be of such a
nature as to represent intrusions on basic interests arid
foundations of the Union.
Whilst the Court did not mention those crimes stenuiing fran
violations of the Emigration Law in particular, the test
announced by the Court in this case excludes these crimes fran
the jurisdiction of the Court. The motive behind the
establishment of such a test in this early case can be understood
to be the desire of the Court not to be overb.irdened with a vast
number of cases.
3 - The distrthution of legislative and executive powers, which
is included in Article 121 of the Constitution, stems fran
the Federal nature of the country. In the Federal system,
which is adopted by the Constitution, there is a central
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government which has its sovereignty and international
personality on one hand, and on the other, there are several
flriirates, each with its own sovereignty and powers, both
legislative and executive, by which it has the right to
practise its powers indeperKiently. The Enirates have powers
in areas which are not specifically given to the Federal
government.
This principle partly serves the purpose of the Ministry
because it announces clearly that areas of power, which are
reserved for the Union are forbidden to the flnirates. This
principle was needed by the Ministry to exclude the flmirates fran
legislating in "Major Procedures" which is, by Article 121,
reserved to the Union.
4 - Major legislation in civil and criminal procedures is any
legislation which deals with the general rules for
adjudication and specific requirents in civil and criminal
cases • The legislation may deal with the bringing of cases
before the Courts, the organisation of levels of the Courts,
organisation of clerks and ancillary personnel, procedures
for handling decisions, organising appeals, execution of
judgements and other related matters. Moreover these
regulations cover collection of evidence and its
presentation, interrogation, prosecution and execution of
judgnents in criminal cases.
This principle further advanced the cause of the Ministry,
though not in this particular case, because it interpreted the
Federal Governments' power in the issuance of legislation
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concerning major procedures in a fairly wide manner. In this case
the Ministry wanted to include specific legislation (22) Urer
the "Major Procedural Legislation" of Article 121, but the Court
distinguished between the two. The motive of the Ministry was to
exclude the Emirates frau interference in this matter. Whilst
the Ministry' s desire to include the specified law under "Maj or
Procedural Legislation" was not satisfied by the Courts'
decision, the principle is a fairly wide one and opens the door
for future Federal legislation in the subj ect, with the canbined
benefit of excluding the Emirates from intervention in the
matter.
5 - The Emirates have the right to issue legislation laying down
detailed procedures for the application of the general rules
contained in the Federal Major procedural legislation. The
Local legislation should observe the limits imposed by
Articles 149 and 151. These limits are: (i) Federal
occupation of the field of Articles 149 and 121 which means
the Emirates are excluded frctu matters of Article 121 when,
and to the extent that, the Federal Government occupies the
field and (ii) the supremacy of Federal legislation, which
means that Federal legislation prevails over Local
legislation, if the Federal legislation is properly enacted
in areas within the power of the Federal Government,
according to the Constitution.
The details of the principle in this case, bad a negative
effect on the aims of the Ministry, namely its insistence of
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mentioning Article 151 in addition to Articles 121 and 149, and
the inclusion of a question concerning the authority of the
fluirates in contradicting Federal legislation. Their aim was to
obtain a declaration which excluded Local legislation caiipletely
from areas in which there are Federal regulations.
6 - There are no contradictions between Articles 119 and 121 of
the Constitution, therefore both are still applicable. Each
of these articles has its own specific meaning and specific
area of application.
The aim of the ministry's enquiry in this matter was to
obtain a declaration including matters of Article 119 in the
general area of "Major Procedural Legislation" of Article 121,
therefore excluding the flnlrates from interference as far as
there is Federal legislation in the matter. The Court's decision
clearly rejected the demands of the Ministry concerning this
matter.
7 - Article 119 of the Constitution ordered the issuance of
Federal Law to regulate "...wlth utmost ease..." those
matters pertaining to the execution of requests of
commissions in judicial proceedings, the procedures of
serving judicial documents and surrender of fugitives airng
member Emirates. All of these matters, in which the
flnirates have judicial power, are those matters left by the
Constitution for the Emirates. The Constitution required
that Federal Law regulate these matters with "utnost ease",
but it did not provide any measure of guidelines for the
ease required, which puts this matter within the judgement
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of the legislature, within the supervision that is included
in the Constitution.
The supervision mentioned by the judgement is rxst probably
the supervision practised by the Court in its review of
ccnipatibility of legislation with the constitution. (23)
Other than these principles, the Supreme Court announced its
pcier regarding the Constitution and legislation. The Court
ruled that its pcMer in interpreting the Constitution was to
reirove ambiguities and clarify matters in the constitutional
provisions which were unclear, and to harnnise the application
of these provisions within the country. The pcer of the Court
is to interpret constitutional provisions and does not include
interpretation of legislative acts unless this is needed to
determine their canpatibility with the Constitution.
The need for the guidance and principled interpretations by
the Court is evident fran this case despite its announcement that
it only reves ambiguities fran constitutional provisions. The
fact is that there are open-ended constitutional provisions
requiring, not interpretation in the strict sense, but judgenent,
and the Court is required to make this judgement. The provisions
which were included in this case, are examples of the need to
inject more details and to use judgement in interpreting
constitutional provisions.
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¶L1 Seaiii Applicatixi: 'it Case of Social Seourity Law
(Application for constitutional interpretation 1/2, 14 April
1974). Not published in the Official Gazette (24)•
This case was brought to the Court by the Council of
Ministers because of a dispute it had with the National Council
about the powers of the latter with regard to the legislative
process (25) The case involved a request to define the meanings
of "legislation" and "execution" which are contained in Articles
120 and 121 of the Constitution. According to these definitions,
the spheres of power of -the two levels of Government, as well as
those within the Federal Government would be affected.
The question of the powers of the Council of Ministers and
the National Council arose in the process of enactment of the
Social Security Law (26) When the bill of this law was
presented to the National Council fran the Council of Ministers,
the former suggested amendments to the bill. The bill was
transferred to the Supr Council to be discussed and considered
for enactment. The Supreme Council approved the original
contents of the bill, without the amendments suggested by the
National Council, and the President signed it to beccine law. The
National Council objected to the enactment of this law as being
in violation of the procedures established by the
Constitution (27) The National Council insisted that the bill
was supposed to be re-submitted to them, in the event of its
amendments not being accepted by the Supreme Council, so that the
enactment procedure was as stated in the Constitution.
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Prirciples ar xirced by tI Ccurt in this case:
In this case definition was requested of the general terms
of "legislation" and "execution" within the context of Articles
120 arid 121. The Court in this case established standards by
which acts can be determined to be either legislative or
executive. In future disputes, as to the nature of any act,
whether it is legislative or executive, the Supreme Court is the
competent authority to resolve the dispute, according to its
original pcMers and along the lines of the general principles it
announced in this case. It is the Supreme Court which has the
competence to resolve disputes between, and answer questions
from, Federal and Local Authorities. It is the Supreme Court
which sets the standard for classifying acts as either
legislative or executive. It is the Supreme Court which is
competent to resolve differences about classification of acts as
legislative or executive, if subnitted to it, in the future, by
the relevant authorities. The Court pronounced several principles
in Its decision in this case:
1 - The meaning of "legislation" in Articles 120 arid 121 of the
Constitution is the general rules regulating interactions
axrong the subjects of the law. This legislation is issued
by the competent Federal Authorities In accordance with the
procedures prescribed by the Constitution. It takes the form
of a statute, a decree which has the power of law, or a
delegation by a law, and within the limits established by
that law. All matters contained in Articles 120 arid 121
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should be regulated by such legislation, not by any inferior
form of regulation which does not have the essential
characteristics of legislation. The legislation has to be
confined to the limits prescribed by the Constitution. It
has to be general in nature, not directed to specified
persons, and has to exclude unnecessary details, all of
which should be left to the executive authority.
2 - The meaning of "execution" in Articles 120 arid 121 of the
Constitution, is the administrative acts which are performed
by the canpetent authorities. These acts are those which
are required for operation of the legislation, and can take
two forms. They can be in the form of general executive
ordinances, prescribing detailed rules for the application
of the legislation, or in the form of decisions concerning
individual cases relating to matters necessary for the
operation of the legislation, such as nployment of people
who will work on, and supervise the execution of, the
legislation, or other kinds of acts, the purpose of which is
to simplify arid renve obstacles fran the execution of the
legislation. The executive acts have to be performed without
unnecessary delay, especially if the legislative provisions
are not self-executing.
3 - Whilst the Emirates have executive power over matters
contained in Article 121, the Constitution made a special
condition for the delegation of this power. They have,
according to the Constitution, to be without prejudice to
the provisions of Article 120 • This condition means that if
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there is an eminent connection between matters of Articles
120 and 121, so that the execution of both of these matters
is inseparable, then the execution of both these matters has
to be within the power of the Federal Government, in order
not to prejudice the delegation of power in Article 120.
This exception should be limited to the minimum possible
extent, in order not to hinder or abuse the distribution of
power in the Constitution.
4 - The founders of the Constitution intended to support the
Federation by providing the Federal Government with powers
sufficient for it to achieve its goals, whilst protecting
the independence of the Emirates. The distribution of
legislative and executive powers between the Eknirates and
the Federal Government stems fran the Federal nature of the
Constitution. The Constitutional limitations on the powers
of the Federal and Local Governments, have to be applied
logically and with a view to preserve the balance intended
by framers of the Constitution.
The Council of Ministers presented this case to the Supreme
Court, requesting a pronouncement on the division of powers
within the Federal Government. The Council wanted the Court to
announce in its favour, limiting the authority given to the
National Council. The Court's decision, however, favoured the
National Council by its insistence that, in the event of disap-
proval of the National Council's interventions, re-suhaission of
bills to the National Council Is part of the legislative process.
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Although this case was presented to the Court as a result of
disagreement between the Council of Ministers and the Federal
National Council, the provisions invoked and the questions it
presented, were equally important for the Federal balance as it
was for the canpetition for pov'er between the original parties to
the dispute.
The Court's interpretation of Articles 120 and 121 and its
principles, are obviously benefiting a stronger Federation
because of several attitudes and stances adopted by the Court:
1 - The Court invoked the preamble of the Constitution, and used
it to achieve the interpretation which it gave to Articles
120 and 121 in this case. This has resulted in a favourable
conclusion for the Federal Government. This was an effort
by the Court in the direction of strengthening the
Federation. So, instead of engaging in a literal
interpretation of the Articles requested, the Court rroved to
use the preamble to support the Federal Government.
2 - The use of the preamble as a binding Constitutional
Provision Is significant in itself. The consequence of the
Court' s reference to the preamble is that, in the future if
there is doubt about whether or not the Federal Government
has a certain pcMers in relation to the Enirates, this doubt
should to the extent possible, be resolved to strengthen the
Federal Government, according to the attitude and desire of
the framers of the preamble.
The Court's interpretations of the Constitution have a
binding effect (28), and can be used in the future by the
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Federal Government or other interested parties, so its use
of the preamble and the consequences of this use, all have
important significance for the future in the direction of
supporting the Federal powers. The Court in this case
renoved the possibility of the mere guiding effect of the
preamble, and stressed its binding effect, with significant
consequences for the powers and future of the Federal
Government.
3 - The combined effects of the Court's attitude, which was
favourable to the Federal Government, and of its use of the
preamble as a binding part of the Constitution is an
interpretation of the distribution of power which is clearly
supportive of the Federal Government. The interpretation of
the first paragraph of Article 121 (29) that was given by
the Court is clearly in favour of the Federal Government.
Although the Court restricted its interpretation of Article
121 (first paragraph) with certain conditions, the fact
remains that this interpretation is a significant step in
favour of the Federal Government. The principle of giving
executive power to the Federal Government in matters covered
by Article 121, if their execution is inseparable from
matters of Article 120, has been established by the Court.
The existence of the binding conditions will be in the usual
cases a relative fact which will need judgements concerning
the surrounding circumstances to prove its existence or not.
The effect of this is the possibility of increased powers
Chapter 9
	
- 289 -
for the Federal Government. The Court opened the door to
the addition of new powers. The use of this opportunity
however, will depend upon the Federal Government taking
advantage of the Court's interpretation.
'11-n Gerral Approach of the Suprei Q*irt Towards the Federal
Systan.
The Court's attitude towards the Federal system during this
period was to emphasise its importance to the Constitution, and
the priority of the interpretation which protects and strengthens
this system. The preservation of the Federal system, besides the
preservation of the independence of the Enirates, requires the
prciiotion and support of the Central Government and its powers.
The Court was not willing to suhnit to all the desires of the
Federal officials but, nevertheless used its interpretations for
the support of the Federal Government through a cautious
attitude.
B. The &lpraie Qirt and the Poiers of the Federal Natkral
Q3UrKi1.
Although the Federal National Council has only a consultat-
ive role to play in the legislative process, it can play a useful
role in checking the other Federal legislative authorities, by
disputing projected laws, amending or canpietely rejecting them
(30)• Because of the possibilities for the National Council to
participate, and the effects it can produce, the Council became
involved in several disputes about the extent and effects of its
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interventions in the legislative process.
The Supreme Court can, through its authoritative decisions,
play the role of umpire between the National Council and the
Council of Ministers. It can provide opinions alx)ut its view of
the balance in the legislative process. These views can have
important effects on future developments in the legislative
process.
The occurrence of these applications in the early period of
the Federation was evidence of the ca'npetition for power and
attempts to gain authority by the different quarters of power in
this transitional period.
se of Social Seairity law
(Application for Constitutional Interpretation 1/2, 14 April
1974)
"Concerning the effects of objections to, and amendments to
bills by the National Council"
This case denstrates the hesitation and unwillingness of
the traditional absolute power holders to st±znit to the recently
created Federal Institutions. Although the National Council is
canposed of members chosen by the Rulers themselves, the real
effect of dissent by the Council is to delay the pranulgation of
laws. The Supreme Council and its Chairman (the President) rep-
resented in this case by the Council of Ministers, insisted on an
interpretation of the Constitution which would deprive the Nat-
ional Council of the delaying effect of its dissent upon bills.
The Council of Ministers submitted a draft of Social
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Security Law to the National Council who amended the draft, and
submitted it to the Supreme Council to be considered for
prcinulgation.
The Supreme Council approved the original un-amended version
of the draft and the President promulgated it as originally
proposed by the Council of Ministers. This provoked a protest
fran the National Council, which argued that the step taken by
the Supreme Council and its president, was unconstitutional,
because it conflicted with Article 110 (3)a (31)• The Council of
Ministers argued that there was no breach of the Constitution by
the action of the Supreme Council and the President. Article 110
(3)a in fact states:
"If the Union National Assembly inserts any amendment to the
bill, and this amendment is not acceptable to the President
of the Union or the Supreme Council, or if the Union
National Assembly rejects the bill, the President of the
Union or the Supreme Council may refer it back to the
National Assembly" (Eknphasis supplied).
The National Council's opinion in the second suhuission to it
has no binding effect on the future of the bill. The National
Council's opinion is that the second suhuission of the bill to it
is not binding on the President or the Supreme Council, because
the bill can be promulgated without the amendments of the
National Council, and despite its rejection of it.
The Council of Ministers, acting as the representative of
the Government, insisted that, whatever the opinion of the
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National Council, the re-submission of the bill to that Council
was an option of the President and the Supreme Council. The bill
could be prctnulgated into law despite the opinion of the National
Council and without re-submission of the bill to that Council,
The National Council argued that if the President or the Supreme
Council wanted to override their opinions in proposed
legislation, they had a constitutional obligation to re-submit
the bills to the National Council.
The Council of Ministers after a peric of dispute with the
National Council, moved to put an end to the argument by
submitting the matter to the Supreme Court to obtain its
decision, which would be binding on all, and would remove
tensions between the two councils (32)•
Two questions were submitted to the Supr Court, namely:
1 - A request for an interpretation of Article 110 (3)a, and
whether it was cctnpulsory for the President and the Supreme
Council to re-submit bills to the National Council, if they
want to override its amex3ments and objections.
2 - A request for interpretation of Articles 120 and 121 and
clarification of the meaning of "legislation" and
"execution" in these Articles.
The secor request is discussed above in this chapter. The
first part of this application is examined here below.
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The Pririple Anrinced by tI Court as to tl First Request in
this Applicati(xi.
The question here is about the option of the President arid
the Supreme Court to re-suznit the bills to the National Council.
There are two distinct positions: one is that of the National
Council, which is that this option is between accepting the
amendments and opinions of the National Council, in which case no
re-sukxnission is necessary; the second possibility is that the
President arid the Supreme Council reject the opinions of the
National Council, in which case re-suhuission to the National
Council is necessary. The second opinion is that of the Council
of Ministers, insisting that this option is not tied to any
condition and that even if the President and the Supreme Council
want to override the National Council's opinions, re-suhnission
is optional, and abandoning it does not affect the validity of
the legislative procedures and does not affect the value of the
resulting law.
The Supreme Court stressed that re-suhnission of bills to
the National Council is an option, according to rticle 110 (3) a.
But if the President and the Supreme Council want to override
amendments and objections to bills by the National Council, re-
suhuission becanes a necessary part of the legislative process
and the promulgated law will not be valid without it. The
consultative nature of the National Council does not affect the
requirement of re-sul:znission of bills to it in this case, because
this re-suhnissjon is required by the Constitution. The President
and the Supreme Council have to wait for the opinion of the
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National Council, and then it becanes the right of the President
and the Supreme Council to promulgate the law despite the
opinions of the National Council. This opinion of the Suprne
Court is, obviously, against the wish of the Council of
Ministers, and more importantly, contrary to the desires of the
Supreme Council, and because of this it is a remarkable decision.
The Supreme Court produced a decision limiting the power of the
Supreme Council, arid the result is an effective role for the
National Council in limiting the options of the Council of
Ministers. The importance of this decision is enhanced by its
being the first case brought by the Council of Ministers,
desiring a favourable declaration fran the Supreme Court in an
issue which was in dispute between it and the National Council.
The decision of the Court was against the wishes of the Council
of Ministers, so it was a lesson to this Council and to the
Supreme Council, that the Supreme Court was not a subsidiary of
the Council of Ministers and should not be expected to suhnit to
its desires • Several consequences could be expected fran the
position of the Court in this case, including increased
confidence in it f ran institutions and individuals in their own
disputes with the Government and an unwillingness of the Council
of Ministers to sulinit issues to the Supreme Court in future.
The National Council emerged vindicated and with its pci.iers
clarified, its future role in the legislative process was
strengthened and pranoted. To the entire Constitutional system of
the U.A.E., which was in the early stages of transition, the
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decision was remarkable. Here was an institution which had the
courage and the willingness to tell the Supreme Council that, in
the case of the Social Security Law, it was in breach of the
Constitution, and that it should refrain frau doing such a thing
in the future. A pronouncement like this was a new occurrence in
the U.A.E., and should be understood in its context of its time
to be appreciated. The message of the Court's decision was that
the Constitution would be applied even against the wishes of the
Supreme Council, and that Federal institutions had constitutional
pc .zers which they were - entitled to exercise. There were new
conditions which must be faced and that the rights of the Federal
institution had real value which should be recognised.
'the Cse of Investait ar Dec,elcxiit Bank law
(Application for Constitutional Interpretation 2/4, 14 April
1976) 38 Official Gazette.
¶[ Limits to t1	 n1inq Per of tI Naticia1 Qxirg ils to
hills.
This case was brought to the Supreme Court by the National
Council in the form of an application for interpretation of
Article 89 of the Constitution. The National Council and the
Council of Ministers were involved in a dispute about the extent
of the rights of the National Council in amending bills which
were sulinitted to it frau the Council of Ministers, containing
projected amendments to applicable statutes • The cause of this
dispute was that the Council of Ministers submitted to the
National Council a bill containing proposed amendments to Law
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(1 0/1 974) the "Law of Investment and Development Banks". Upon
discussion of this bill in the National Council, it was found
that the Council of Ministers was proposing to change the name of
the bank without any other changes in the law. The National
Council decided to add other amendments to the original bill, in
addition to the proposed amendments from the Council of
Ministers. The Council of Ministers objected to the position
taken by the National Council on the grounds that the National
Council, according to Article 89, must limit its amendments to
the content of the bill sulirtitted fran the Council of Ministers,
and that its action in this case was a new bill and new
amendments, which was beyoi the powers delegated to it by the
Constitution The National Council subnitted an application
to the Supreme Court for interpretation of Article 89 of the
Constitution and clarification of the powers of the Council
towards bills suhaitted to it fran the Council of Ministers.
PrirEiples tablis1d by Supreue (irt in this Case.
The Council of Ministers sukxnitted a menorandum concerning
the power of the National Council regarding bills which are
proposals to amend existing laws. This menorandum contained the
opinion of the scholar who was responsible for ccinpleting the
final draft of the Constitution (34), and it stressed that bills
seeking to amend existing laws should be limited to the subject
of the amending bill and should not touch the other contents of
the original law unless this is necessary to the operation of
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amendments supplied by the National Council to the proposed bill.
The National Council argued that they could add, remove
parts, or change parts of bills sü}initted to it by the Council of
Ministers, whether they were new bills or merely bills proposing
amendments to existing laws, and that the Constitution contained
nothing which restricted the powers of the National Council in
the manner it chose to amend or change these bills. They argued
that, even if bills containing amendments to existing laws had a
relationship to those laws, these bills were in a sense new laws
on their own, and since the Council could add to bills of new
laws matters and provisions, the contents of which were related
to the subject of the bills, this sane power should be understood
to include the bills proposing amendments to existing laws.
The Supreme Court decided that according to Article 89 of
the Constitution, the National Council had the power to add to,
delete parts of, or amend bills sutinitted to it fran the Council
of Ministers. These alterations should be related to the general
subject that the bill was related to, and should concern the sane
legal relationships which the bill dealt with. The Supreme Court
added that if the bill was proposing to amend an existing law,
the power of the National Council was limited to that bill, and
did not exter1 to other parts of the original law which were not
included in the si±tnitted bill, unless changes to those other
provisions was made necessary by the changes desired to be made
by the National Council to the bill before it, and that those
changes in the original law should be kept to the least possible
extent.
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The bpinion of the Court in this case came according to the
wishes of the Council of Ministers, and on the same line as the
opinion obtained by that Council frcfn its consultant, the person
who was involved in drafting the final version of the current
Constitution.
There were critical carments regarding the Court's decision
in this case (35) and there were demands that the Supreme Court
was supposed to strengthen the powers of the National Council,
and that it was supposed to back its demands for more extensive
powers and wider interpretations of its authority, on the grounds
that its powers were not final, and that the Supreme Council and
the President could override the opinions of the National Council
if they did not agree with them (36)• The Court's opinion was
right in the principle it established. The final victor in this
case was the Constitution. The Court had proved that it was
prepared to stand with the Council of Ministers, and to satisfy
its desires, if the Constitution so demanded.
In the first case of disputes between the Council of
Ministers and the National Council the Court gave a
decision for the latter, whilst in the present case the decision
went against them. But in both cases, the Court's opinion was
canpatible with the Constitutional Provisions, and did not extend
them beyond reasonable limits, nor restrict them unjustifiably.
If the Constitution denied the National Council the power to
introduce new bills, then the Supreme Court was not willing to
allow that Council to achieve that power under the disguise of
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making amendments to bills sulinitted by the Council of Ministers.
The integrity of the Court and confidence in its work is
important. Even the National Council benefited indirectly fran
the decision which appeared, on the face of it, to be against
their wishes. This can be imagined by the increased confidence
and trust this decision brought to the Court, and that in the
future, all concerned will eventually benefit fran this.
Gra1 (Iervatious About the Effects of the Court's Decisicri ai
the Pe1aticxship Between the Natioual (ixxi1 arxl the Qri1 of
Mers.
The Supreme Court in its decisions, managed to establish its
independence frau the Government, and to prove its intentions to
defend and promote principled interpretations of the
Constitution.
The Court defended the area of power given to the National
Council and promoted its cause against the powerful Supreme
Council, so the effects of opinions of the former were protected,
despite their being, in nature, merely a consultative body.
The Court, through its role as umpire between the two
Councils, played a useful part in rtoving tensions, and solving
disputes about the distribution of powers between these two
Councils.
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C The Constitutional Limitations on the Jurisdiction and
Structure of the Federal JixJiciary.
During the early years of the Federation, the Supreme Court
was faced with several issues regarding its own jurisdiction and
the limits of the structure of the Federal Judiciary which are
possible under the Constitution. The period in which these
questions arose, was the period in which the guidance and the
authoritative declarations by the Court were rrost in need.
These cases were the results of several factors. One of the
main factors, which was true regarding other kinds of issues, was
the generalisation contained in the Constitution. The framers of
the Constitution chose to deal with a wide range of subjects in
general terms, leaving the details to the legislature. In the
early stages of the Federation, when the legislative vacuum was
extensive, the executive authorities were faced with situations
for which there was no legislative guidance, only general
Constitutional Provisions. In response they resorted to the
Supr Court for more detailed guidance in the application of
the Constitution (38) The legislative authority faced sate
difficulties in its effort to provide legislation for the
application of the Constitution. The Court's help and authority
was therefore needed in this situation (39).
There were unclear limits to the jurisdiction and function
of the Court in its power of interpretation, whether it included
the Constitution only or covered statutes and other legislation
as well, which prompted the Court to clarify its power and
provide guidance for the future (40)
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¶L (se of Emigraticn law
(Application for Constitutional Interpretation 1/1, 24 November
1973) 15 Official Gazette.
The PcMer of tbe Supr court in tbe Interpretaticri of Ordinary
law.
This case, which was the first case to come before the
Court, included several questions directed towards the Court.
These included enquirie which were mainly requests for
interpretation of regular law (41)• The Supreme Court answered
the questions about the Constitution, b.at refused to provide
interpretations of statutory provisions. The Court took this
opportunity to clarify its position on the proper areas of its
interpretation power.
The Prixiple EstablisId by tl Qxirt in this Case.
The role of the Supreme Court in interpreting the
Constitutional provisions was to renove ambiguities fran
these provisions, in order to clarify their meaning, and to
provide harrrony and consistency in their application. The
interpretation of the Constitutional provisions did not
extend to the interpretation of Statutory provisions, except
in the case that an interpretation of a statute was needed
for the determination of its compatibility with the
Constitution.
The significance of this principle for future cases was
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obvious, it was a declaration by the Court that it would not be
drawn into providing Statutory interpretations. The Court
restricted its duty to interpret Statutory provisions to
instances where the cctnpatibility of the provisions with the
Constitution was questioned before the Court, and then only to
the extent necessary for it to make a decision in these matters.
The Court regarded its duty as one which praroted the application
of the Constitution and renved doubts and ambiguities fran this
application, and declared its supremacy against Statutes and
other inferior forms of law.
The cse of Federal Açel1ate Qurts
(Application for Constitutional Interpretation 1/4, 14 March
1976) 37 Official Gazette.
According to the original design of the Federal Lower
Courts, they were given power to operate in a very limited
territory and with limited canpetence. The general territorial
jurisdictions were intended to be mainly the permanent Capital of
the Union, which was supposed to be purpose-built in lands
donated by Abu-Dhabi and Dubai on the border between them (42)
The canpetence of these Courts was designed to be all matters
arising in the permanent Capital of the Union, and "all Civil,
Carimercial and 1dministrative disputes between the Union and
individuals" (43)• The permanent Capital has not been built, but
has been abandoned without real prospect of it being built in the
foreseeable future. The option given to the Emirates, to
transfer their Judiciaries to the Federal Judicial System has
chapter 9
	 - 303 -
been used by the four flnirates, Abu-Dbabi, Sharj ah, •Aj man and
Fuj airaii (44)• The territory in which the Federal L,er Courts
have general canpetence has been widened extensively. These facts
and developments have created certain problems for the Federal
Authorities, because the original design of the Constitution for
the Federal Judiciary was felt to be inadequate to deal with the
emerging situation.
Originally the flnirates were presumed to keep their Judic-
iaries • The permanent Capital was supposed to be of limited size
and therefore a few primary Federal Courts would be sufficient to
deal with cases arising within its area. Appeals fran the Federal
Primary Courts were intended, or permitted, to be made to the
Supreme Court. The design provided for the Federal Primary Courts
was provisional and transitional in nature, which was the nature
of the Constitution. This design was certainly insufficient for
the develoçment that foflcMed and for the extended perieds of
operation that were repeatedly added to the Constitution.
One of the areas which caused the present case to be brought
to the Supreme Court was that there was no clear permission to
establish Federal Appellate Courts, whereas permission to create
Primary Courts was express (45)• The primary task of the Court
here was not to remove ambiguity from the Constitution, but
rather to provide an authoritative interpretation that was
flexible and that overcame the deficiency of the Constitution in
dealing with the deve1opint of the Federal Judiciary.
This case was important for the role that could be played by
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the Supreme Court in facing the develorinent that was occurring in
the country, and in providing a Constitutional interpretation
which enabled the country to develop and deal with new facts in
the changing circumstances at the time.
There were two questions included in this case:
1 - Does the Constitution, according to Articles 95 and 103,
allcM the establishment of Federal Courts of Appeal, which
are Courts specialising as Appeal Courts, to hear appeals
fran the Federal Primary Courts? Is the stipulation of the
types of Federal Court which were included in Article 95 of
the Constitution, meant to be comprehensive, preventing
additional types of Court? Is it permissible, according to
Article 95, to establish Federal Appellate Courts? (46)
2 - What is the meaning of the word "final" in the second
paragraph of Article 105? Does it allow any kind of appeal
fran judgements of the Federal Courts in appeals f ran Local
Courts?
Principles Aruumced by t Ccxirt in this Cse:
As answers to the two points that the application to the
Supreme Court required, the Court announced two principles:
1 - That the Constitution, according to Articles 95 and 103, did
not prohibit the establishment of Federal Appellate Courts.
This decision was based on several conclusions. It was
clear that Article 103 gave the legislature a wide discretion in
organising the procedure and the judicial institution for
appeals. This discretion included determination of the
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institution to which appeals from Primary Courts could be
brought, because the Constitution did not specify the Supreme
Court as the only Court to which appeals from Primary Courts
could be taken. The language used by Article 103 gave the
legislature the option of making appeals from Federal Primary
Courts to the Supreme Court. This necessarily meant that if the
legislature decided not to take this option, an alternative was
to establish Courts whose duty was hear appeals frau the Federal
Primary Courts • The absence of mention of Appellate Courts in
Article 95 did not mean that their establishment was prohibited.
The mention of Federal Courts in Article 95 is not meant to be
conclusive, and there was no evidence that the Constitution meant
to prohibit establishment of other Courts • The general rule was
that means which were not clearly prohibited by the Constitution,
and which can serve purposes stated in the Constitution, were
permitted by the Constitution to the legislature.
In the decision of the Court, there were explanations as to
the nature of appeals and their benefits. The conclusion of this
was that these procedures would serve the purposes of the
Constitution. The main points used by the Court to reach the
conclusion of the permission to establish Appellate Courts, were:
(a) The mention in Article 103 of the possibility of appeals
fran Primary Federal Courts, was optional.
(b) The mention in Article 95 of kinds of Federal Court, was riot
meant to be conclusive.
(c) That, generally, means which can serve purposes stated in
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the Constitution are allcMed to be used by the legislature,
unless specifically prohibited.
2 - That the meaning of the word "final" in Article 105 of the
Constitution, was that these decisions exhausted all
ordinary forms of appeal. This does not mean that the
decision cannot be subjected to extraordinary ways of
appeal, such as Cassation and petition for re-consideration.
Therefore, it was permissible for the law to subject
decisions of Local Courts, to extraordinary forms of appeal.
Fran the decision of the Court in this case, it can be seen
that the Court was not just involved in renoving ambiguities fran
the Constitutional Provisions. The Court was involved in a
judgement as to the permissible discretion allowed in the
interpretation of the Constitutional Provisions. Was this
interpretation supposed to be limited to the ideas at the time of
the drafting of the Constitution, as in the case of the design of
the Federal Judiciary? Or was it to take a general and wider
discretion to other areas not clearly prohibited by the
Constitution? The principle established by the Court in this case
of permitting use of means which are not clearly prohibited was a
useful one for the developnent of the Constitution. The question
of whether certain means or ways are prohibited can be a question
of judgement: that is relative. However, if such a question is
brought to the Court, it is prepared, as in this case, to give
its authoritative decision, and use its judgement in order to
further the general aims established by the Constitution and as
the Court understands them to be at the particular time and stage
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when they caiie before the Court. This decision is good evidence
about the the ways that can be used by the Court, and the role
that can be played by these decisions in promoting the
flexibility of interpretation of the Constitution in dealing with
the changing circumstances of the country.
11 Cse of Trial of Sior F1eral Officials
(Application for Constitutional Interpretation 3/4, 18 November
1976) 74 Official Gazette.
According to Article 99 (5) of the Constitution, the Supreme
Court has jurisdiction in:
• . trial of Ministers and Senior Officials of the Union
appointed by decree regarding their actions in carrying out
their official duties on the demand of the Supreme Court..."
The Minister of Justice submitted an application enquiring
whether this paragraph of Article 99 included all kinds of
actions, or if it embraced only criminal actions.
There were two opposing opinions. The first was that of the
Ministry of Justice, which stressed that criminal actions alone
were the subject of this paragraph. They argued that disciplinary
actions were the jurisdiction of the disciplinary council as far
as senior Federal officials were concerned, b.it Ministers could
not be subjected to such procedures. The Ministry of Justice
further argued that study of canparative Constitutions revealed
that Ministers were usually not subjected to disciplinary
procedures and that political responsibility was dealt with
sufficiently elsewhere in the Constitution. This suggested that,
chapter 9
	
- 308 -
according to this paragraph, criminal actions were the only kind
of actions which could form the subject for trial of Ministers
and senior Federal officials.
The alternative view was represented by the Public
Prosecution, which argued that the language used in the relevant
paragraph was wide and general enough to include all actions of
Ministers and senior officials, either disciplinary or criminal.
The Public Prosecution argued that there was no justification for
restricting the meaning of the appropriate paragraph.
'L Principle Anncunced by t Cbirt in this (se:
The Court decided that:
1 - Paragraph (5) of Article 99 of the Constitution was
comprehensive of all types of act that are related to
official duties, and that the jurisdiction In these cases
was given to the Supreme Court, whether the people involved
were Ministers or senior officials.
2 - There was no basis on which the meaning of the word
"actions" in the relevant provision could be understocri to
mean "crimes", because in another paragraph in the same
?rticle the word "crimes" was being used, which was the use
of this word in Paragraph (6). If the drafters or the
founders wanted to limit the actions in Paragraph (5) to
crime, they could have specified it, as happened in the
following paragraph. The Constitution delegated the
regulation of details of the trial of Ministers and senior
officials (according to who was concerned) to the
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legislature, to provide the types of actions, their
penalties and their procedures that could be followed in
these cases. Until there was legislation providing the
intended details there was no basis for specifying and
limiting a term in the Constitution, which was both general
and catiprehensive.
The Court's decision in this case was significant. The
reason for the importance of this decision was in the rules
followed in interpreting the Constitutional Provisions. The
Court registered the idea of restricting the meaning of a
Constitutional term which was, by its nature, a canprehensive
one. The Court announced that unless there was a clear
indication that this general term was meant to be less
caiprehensive than originally stated, the Court ou1d give the
term the full meaning originally designed for it. This kind of
interpretation, especially in the context, for example of
enumeration of the powers of the Federal Government and the
authorities of Federal officials, could be employed to support
the Federal Government, as was the case here, because according
to the interpretation given to the concerned provision, the
result was support for a wider jurisdiction for the Supreme Court
than the Ministry of Justice insisted.
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General (tiservatious alxxit the Effects of the Decisicris of the
Supr Court Regardir the Federal Judiciary.
The Supreme Court displayed, through its decisions in these
cases, its flexibility in interpretation of the discretion of the
establishment of Federal Courts and the jurisdiction provided for
these Courts • The Court' s interpretations in these cases allowed
wide discretion for the legislature to create the kinds of Courts
found to be necessary or useful for the performance and
establishment of justice, whether these Courts were Appellate
Courts, or any other kinds of Courts • Indeed the language used
by the Court was general enough to permit other means which may
serve the achievements of the aijns of the Federal Government.
The Court in these cases used interpretations which
permitted the widening of competence given to it by the
Constitution. The general provisions used in specifying areas of
cctnpetence or in enumerating spheres of power were to be given
the full meaning, to be interpreted generally, and to deal with
all concerned if they were general provisions. These provisions
were not to be restricted unless it was so required by the
Constitution.
These rules of interpretation of the Constitution praoted
increased powers for the Federal Government. The was necessary
because the Federal Government had limited and enumerated powers,
whereas the Enirates had the residuary power
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An essential task for the Supreme Court during the period
discussed in this chapter was the assurance of the continuation
of the federal system and preservation of the balance created by
the constitution. The court found for the federal government in
sane cases and for the fliiirates in others. The court resisted
demands from the federal executive to be provided with wide
powers, whilst the interpretations provided by the court limited
the powers of the emirates to ensure the progress and work of the
federal system. The court used its interpretation of constitut-
ional provisions, its understanding of the nature of the federal
system and the aims provided in the preaithle of the constitution
to prctote the federal balance it viewed as proper and necessary.
The federal institutions created by the constitution needed
assurance, so the court provided opinions that helped the Federal
National Council and the Federal judiciary to achieve the
organisation and jurisdiction necessary for their developiient.
One of the nost remarkable achievements of the court in this
period was its refusal to sulimLt to the demands of the federal
executive authority, representing the Supreme Council, for
concentration of power and for danination in the federal system.
The balance created by the constitution arid the federal system
serves, ultimately, to limit the powers of the executive and the
Supreme Council of the Union. The institution which could ensure
application of these provisions and preservation of the balance
of power was the Supreme Court. The consistent interpretations by
the Supreme Court were effective for the assurance of the
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application of the constitution and were necessary for the
continuation ax effectiveness of the federal system.
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more than five requests. See the discussion of the case
below.
6. For example, the Court established that it can hear
applications for Constitutional interpretations frau
individual ministers, in Case (1/1).
7 • See Case 1/1, below.
8. As in applications 1/2, 14 April 1974, and 2/4, 14 April
1976.
9. See Watts, R.L. New Federations: Experiments in the Carmn-
wealth Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1966, p164.
10. See the definition contained in Article 1 of the
Constitution. See also the purpose established in the
Preamble.
11. In Articles 120 and 121 of the Constitution.
12. See Taryam, A. The Establishment of the United Arab flnirates
1950-85 London: Croan Helm, 1987, pp200-219.
13 • For evidence, see cases 1/1 and 1/2 below.
14. Application for Constitutional interpretation 1/1. This
application was sulinitted on 24 October 1973 and decided on
29 Noveaber 1973.
15. According to Article 45 of the Constitution, there are five
Union authorities, these include the Council of Ministers.
16. Article 64, for example, holds that: "...Ministers shall be
politically responsible collectively before the
President...".
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17. At present there is a special institution in the Ministry of
Justice, which represents the Council of Ministers before
the Courts.
18. According to this paragraph, the Supreme Court has
canpetence regarding: "...crimes directly affecting the
interests of the Union. . S t' s The paragraph gives saite
examples of these crimes.
19. Law 6/1 973.
20. U.A.E. Pray. Const, Article 121.
21 • U.A.E. Pray. Const. Article 149 contains: ". ..As an
exception to the provisions of Article 121 of this
Constitution, the Enirates may prcznulgate legislation
necessary for the regulation of the matters set out in the
said Article, without violation of the Provisions of Article
151 of this Constitution..". This Article makes the matters
contained in Article 121 as concurrent jurisdiction. These
matters are within the the pczer of the Enirates to
legislate in, until and to the extent to which there is a
Federal legislation in them. In other words, the Emirates
can legislate in matters contained in Article 121 until
there is Federal occupation of the field in these matters.
The Federal Supremacy Principle is contained in Article 151
of the Constitution.
22. Union Law (11/1973) for the Regulation of judicial
relationships arrong the Emirates.
23. The Court did not explain the source of supervision in its
decision. The matter of the degree of ease is largely a
matter of policy and is hard to be judicially determined.
24. Application for Constitutional interpretation 1/2.
25. This case involved application to interpret Article 110 (3)a
of the Constitution.
26. Law 13/1 972.
27. According to Article 110 (3)a: "...If the Union National
Assthly inserts any amendment to the bill and this
amendment is not acceptable to the President of the Union or
the Supreme Council, or if the Union National Assembly
rejects the bill, the President or the Supreme Council may
refer it back to the National Assembly. If the Union
National Assembly introduces any arrendment on that occasion
which is not acceptable to the President of the Union or the
Supreme Council, or if the Union National Assembly decides
to reject the bill, the President of the Union may
pranulgate the Law after ratification by the Supreme
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Council..."
28. According to Article 101 of the U.A.E. Prov. Const.
29. Article 121 of the U.A.E. Pray. Const. starts with the
following paragraph: ". . . without prejudice to the provisions
of the preceding Article, the Union shall have exclusive
legislative jurisdiction in the following matters...".
30. See Chapter 7 for aDre details about the position of the
National Council and the effect it can have on the
legislation process.
31 • See Thrakijn, A. The Experience of the Federal National
Council (in Arabic) Beirut: Al Safir, 1986, p115.
32. Thid., p116.
33. See Al-Thbtabai, A.The Legislative Authorities in the Arab
Gulf States (in Arabic) Kuwait: Journal of Gulf and Arab
Peninsula Studies Publications, 1985, p264.
34. This scholar is: Dr. Wahid Ra'fat.
35. See, for example, Al-Tabtabai, The Legislative Authorities
op. cit., pp266-267.
36. Loc. cit.
37. Application for Constitutional interpretation 1/2.
38. See, for example, The Case of the Trial of Senior Federal
Officials, Case 3/4.
39. See The Case of Federal Appellate Courts, Case 1/4.
40 • The Case of Social Security Law, Case 1/2.
41 • There were included in the application, requests to
establish the limits of power of the authorities according
to the emigration law. The request was riot fashioned as a
Constitutional question, though the intention of the
applicant may have been to set the standard for what the
authorities could, and could not do, as the Constitution
prescribed their limits. For example, the case involved a
question about the powers of the executive authority in
deporting certain categories of irrtiigrants according to
Article 42 of Law 6/1 973.
42. U.A.E. Pray. Const. Article 9.
43. U.A.E. Prov. Const. Article 102.
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44. This option is according to Article 105 of the Constitution
which provides: "...All or part of the judicial authorities
in accordance with the preceding Article maybe transferred
by a Union law issued at the request of the flnirate
concerned, to the Primary Union Tribunals...".
45. U.A.E. Pray. Const. Article 95 which provides: "...The Union
shall have a Union Supreme Court and Union Primary Tribunals
as explained hereinafter...".
46. Article 103 of the U.A.E. Pray. Const. includes: ". . .The law
may stipulate that appeals against the judgements of these
Tribunals (Union Primary Tribunals) shall be heard before
one of the chambers of the Union Supreme Court. ..".
(emphasis supplied).
47. U.A.E. Pray. Const. Articles 120, 121 and 122.
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¶It decisicxis of tI Supre Court since 1978
Through the passage of time, the Federation was able to
prove its strength, and its ability to endure became evident. The
end of the first term of the Provisional Constitution marked the
end of the constitutional system as purely experimental. The
extension of its operation for a further period of five years
demanded that practical problems be addressed by the introduction
of long term solutions, Tensions that occurred in the early
stages of the Federation were absorbed by the federal government
with success • The oil boan happened at a time favourable to the
federal government: 1973, 1974 and 1975 were years of extensive
building of the infrastructure and provision of major services
(1)• The federal institutions became nore stable and regarded as
permanent governmental institutions. As regard for the constitut-
ional system, and for the country, changed, legislation that had
been delayed during the first period began to be prepared (2)•
The period fran 1978 to the present day has characteristics
that distinguish it fran the earlier period. The first period
was a period of establishment, of removal of doubts and
ambiguities. The second period, being a period of continuity and
of substantive constitutional challenges, has been different in
several major respects.
The first period was a period of establishment of the
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country, a move from a country of separate and independent
emirates to a federal system cariposed of emirates cctrniitted to
surrender parts of their individuality and sovereignty, to create
a federal state which would provide them with unity and represent
them on an international level. The irve to abiding by a written
constitution and surrendering parts of their sovereignty created
problems which needed the special authority and strong voice of
the Supreme Court to resolve, and to serve the purposes,
established by the constitution, of pratoting develorinent of the
federal system.
In this second period, the federal state no.i established was
reasonably stable. It had passed the experimental stage. Doubts
about the viability of the federal system and its suitability for
the emirates were fading. Fears of the emirates over their
sovereignty were quelled. The need for the continuance of the
federal system was obvious and the desire of the rulers to
continue with it was proved through their stand in overcaning the
crisis surrounding the expiration of the original term of the
constitution.
What was nDst needed n was further developaent of the
federal system, which involved confronting several major
practical constitutional problems. The U.A.E. has its unique
characteristics, which may or may not resemble those of other
countries, which were bound to create challenges and problems for
the constitution and the legislation which was being introduced
into the country.
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The U.A.E. is an Arab country inhabited by Muslims. These
two factors influence the constitution in particular ways. The
country is a developing one, open to the world, and cannot live
in isolation; its systems are heavily affected by those of other
countries. All of these created their own problems for the
U.A.E., sane important aspects of which required solutions fran
the Supreme Court. The Court's decisions in these matters were
bound to be of great significance to the country.
Legislation passed since the establishment of the country
has not always been obviously coherent with the constitution,
giving rise to special problems and requiring special solutions.
The Court was, and continues to be, the institution responsible
for providing insights, reiroving doubts and having the final say
about canpatibility of these statutes and legislations with the
constitution.
The start of this period was marked by the prctnulgation of
the cassation law, which transformed the Supreme Court fran a
mainly constitutional Court to a Court of Last Resort in all
matters. This change is significant. It has altered the position
of the Supreme Court and resulted in adverse consequences for its
constitutional jurisdiction (3).
Because of the large number of cassation cases, we shall
choose only sane of them which have constitutional significance
as examples of the Court's role in the constitutional order and
develoçznent in the country. All constitutional cases will be
reported and discussed, and the cases will be divided according
to their subject matter.
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aaracteristics of Law 17/1978 (Law of Cassaticxi)
This law was pranulgated and signed by the President on 18
December 1978, it was published on 30 December 1978 and,
according to its provision, it began operation two rronths later
on 1 March 1979 (4)
The petition of cassation is allcMed to challenge a decision
on the basis of error of Law, either material or procedural (5).
Errors of fact cannot be a basis for a petition of cassation.
The main purpose of cassation is to control and harmonise
interpretation and application of Law. This Law made the Supreme
Court the final appellate Court in all matters, other than
constitutional matters, and other subjects which are included in
the cciiipetence of the Supreme Court by the constitution and Law
10/1973. Petitions of cassation can be brought against decisions
of federal appellate Courts only (6)•
The effect of the introduction of this Law has been,
inevitably, to increase the volume of cases before the Supreme
Court and to change Its emphasis from concentrating on
constitutional and federalism cases and other issues of political
importance, into a Court of general ccitlpetence. The consequence
of the introduction of this Law was apparent in the practical
ending of the applications for constitutional interpretation that
distinguished the earlier period of the Court. A possible
explanation of the end of such applications to the Court is that
it became a Court of general canpetence and, therefore, was not
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worthy and capable of attracting the confidence that a
specialised Court may attract. The new face of the Supreme Court
is different from that originally introduced by the constitution,
though no literal contradiction is available
The operation of the cassation Law necessitated a reform of
the composition of the Supreme Court and the formation of its
chambers. This introduced reform was necessary to acco1TIwate the
increased volume of cases before the Court, due to the petitions
of cessation. Law 14/1985 reniz,ved the limit on the number of
alternate judges that can be appointed to the Court. Originally,
Article 3 of Law 10/1973 prescribed that the maximum number of
alternate judges that could be appointed to the Court is three.
The amended Article 3 provides that: '...a sufficient number of
alternate judges can be appointed to the Court...". There is no
limit to the number of alternate judges, which is a significant
change to the membership of the Court (8)• Originally in Law
10/1973 a maximum of one alternate judge could sit on any chamber
of the Court . Law 14/1985 removed this restriction from rrost
chambers. Only the Constitutional Clamber is restricted to one
alternate judge. Matters of the first seven items of Article 33
can be decided by five-member chambers, of whan there could be
two alternate judges. Other matters could be decided by chambers
of three judges, two of whom could be alternate judges
By the nature of their positions, the alternate judges are
prone to pressure. The appointment of alternate judges by
decisions from the executive, without consultation with the
National Council, and the nature of their terms of office being
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fixed yet renewable, place them in a position whereby they are
unprotected fran arbitrary reval fran office. The matters with
which the chambers in which these alternate judges sit are
concerned can be very important and politically sensitive, such
as disputes between the emirates and the Union. In matters
arising under the cassation Law, jurisdiction can be heard by
panels on which the majority (two out of three) are alternate
judges.
The importance of matters included in the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, either the original or the added cassation
jurisdiction, cannot be overlooked; and the new prescriptions for
the imposition and formation of chambers provided for by Law
14/1985 deprive the Supreme Court of the special protections
provided by the constitution, making a substantial number of
members of the Court vulnerable, which gravely affects the
special nature and protection required for the Supreme Court.
Cases decided sir introducticn of the cassaticxi jurisdicticn
A. Cases involving federal distribiti of per
(a) 11 Fisheries (	 (11)
(Application for constitutional interpretation 5/8, 8 November
1981) 100 Official Gazette.
This is the last of the applications for interpretation that 	 I
characterised the first period. It was requested by the Council
of Ministers on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture.
This case involves the entry by one of the emirates into
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agreement with a neighbouring country to determine rights to
engage in fishing activities in adjacent sea areas. As an
objection to this agreement, the Ministry of Agriculture rroved to
obtain a declaration frau the Supreme Court that regulation of
fisheries is the sole power of the federal government, according
to Article 121 of the constitution, and that the emirates do not
have the right to enter into agreements with other countries
about fisheries. Article 121 provides:
without prejudice to the provisions of the preceding
article, the Union shall have exclusive legislative
jurisdiction in the following matters:...protection of
agricultural and animal wealth.
Article 120, which precedes this article, prescribed matters
on which: "the Union shall have exclusive legislative and
executive jurisdiction", and anrig these matters is: "1 - Foreign
Affairs".
Article 123 provides:
As an exception to Article 120 concerning exclusive
jurisdiction of the Union in matters of foreign policy and
international relations, the member emirates of the Union
may conclude limited agreements of a local administrative
nature with the neighbouring states or regions, save that
such agreements are not inconsistent with the interests of
the Union or with Union laws and provided that the Supreme
Council is informed in advance...
Article 149 provides:
As an exception to the provisions of Article 121 of this
constitution, the Emirates may promulgate legislations
necessary for the regulation of the matters set out in the
said Article without violation of the provisions of Article
151 of this constitution.
Article 151 contains the supremacy clause, that the federal
constitution and legislation should prevail over local ones.
The dispute then involves entry into an international
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agreement by an emirate, according to the exception provided by
Article 123, from the exclusive control of the federal government
over foreign affairs according to Article 120 (1). The agreement
entered by the emirate concerned, effectively involves regulation
of fisheries, and this is an exception of the federal
government's power of regulating animal wealth. The questions
involved in this case are two:
1 whether or not the regulation of fisheries is a part of the
federal government's power of regulating and legislating in
matters concerning animal wealth;
2 whether or not the emirates are excluded from legislation in
matters dedicated by Article 121 to the federal government's
legislative power.
Pri.rxip1es anrmed by the Qurt in this case
The Supreme Court announced two main principles in this
case:
1 - The first is that regulation of fisheries, restrictions and
requirements of special permits is within the legislative
power of the federal government. The main basis for such a
finding is that fish are part of the animal wealth, the
regulation of which is a part of the legislative power given
to the federal government by Article 121 of the
constitution.
2 - The second is that originally the federal government has the
power to regulate matters included in Article 121, but as an
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exception to this rule, Article 149 gives the emirates the
right to legislate in these matters until and to the extent
of federal legislation. Foreign affairs are within the
legislative and executive federal power, but as an exception
the emirates are allowed to conclude agreements of an
administrative nature with neighbouring countries.
The result of these two rules is that the emirates can enter
into agreements with neighbouring countries to regulate fishing
activities in the adjacent waters. The agreement entered into by
the emirate concerned is, as a consequence of the principles and
firxlings of the Court in this case, not inconsistent with the
constitution.
This case was not presented in the form of a direct
challenge to an act taken by one of the emirates. It was brought
in the form of an enquiry and application for the interpretation
of sane of the constitutional provisions. The real cause of the
nve to bring this case was to challenge the canpatibility of an
agreent made by one of the emirates with a neighbouring country
with the provisions of the constitution. The reasons for
avoiding the direct challenge, resorting instead to an
application for advisory opinion were political. Direct challenge
by the Federal Cabinet to an action of one of the emirates,
necessarily headed by a member of the Federal Supreme Council, is
sensitive and could result in negative consequences. Bringing an
application for the interpretation of constitutional provisions
is less sensitive than a direct challenge of unconstitutionality
of an act of an emirate.
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It is unclear fran the documents available whether or not
permission fran the Supreme Council was granted for the emirate
concerned to enter into this agreement (12)• however, regardless
of whether or not permission was granted to the emirate, it would
have been very difficult for the Supreme Council to agree on
challenging this act by an emirate which is headed by a member of
the Council. The matter of challenging the constitutionality of
the entry of the emirate concerned into the agreement was left to
the Federal Cabinet to bring to the Supreme Court. The Cabinet
chose a way which saved it fran a direct confrontation with the
emirate concerned.
The Supreme Court, as is evident fran its decision, was
aware of the facts of the case. All the political factors
affecting the matter involved in this case played some role
favouring the emirate concerned. The Supr Court had under its
disposal means by which it could have redressed the balance, and
defended the interests of the federal government despite the
negative effects of the political factors. Article 123 of the
constitution required that an agreeint which may be entered into
by one of the emirates should not be inconsistent with the
interests of the federal government (13),
The act of bringing this application, and therefore the
challenge, is clear evidence of the disapproval of the federal
authorities with the contents of the agreement entered into by
the emirate concerned. The announcement by a federal authority,
even in an indirect way, of its disapproval of an international
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agreement, could have been used to render this agreement void
because of its contradiction with the interests of the Union.
The Supreme Court could have stressed the condition of the
consistency of international agreements of the emirates with the
interests of the Union, and could have explained the ways by
which any inconsistency of international agreements of the
emirates with the interests of the Union could be discovered.
The direct or indirect declaration of the Federal Cabinet could
be used as evidence which may lead to the investigation of the
contents and circumstantes of international agreements by the
Supreme Court, to decide on their viability (14)
(b) Shah !bah Case
(Criminal cassation case 1/8, 23 September 1985)
This case involves the constitutionality of an executive act
by the ruler of the Ekuirate of Fujairah. The executive order was
carried out according to authorisation by the local law of
criminal procedure, which meant that a decision had to be made on
the constitutionality of sane provisions of this local law, on
the grounds of their incompatibility with the federal
constitution, which renders them invalid according to the federal
supremacy of Article 151 of the constitution.
The facts of the case involved two people who were convicted
by the federal primary Court of Fujairah for assault, causing
bodily harm to a third person. The two convicted people appealed
to the federal appellate Court. While the case was pending
awaiting appellate hearings, an amnesty order was issued for
chapter 10
	 - 328 -
these two people. They were released and the appellate court
decided to dismiss the case on the grounds of the amnesty issued
by the ruler, by authorisation fran the local criminal procedures
law. The appellate Court decided that, because of the order of
amnesty, the criminal action was terminated.
The Public Prosecution Authority brought appeal of cassation
to the Supreite Court. The appeal was based on two points of
error of Law:
1 - The first is that the decision of the Court of Appeals
confused two different kinds of amnesty. The first kind is
amnesty fran the crin, which effectively renders lawful the
acts on which conviction is based, with the result of
reitoving all the effects of the conviction. This kind of
amnesty is authorised by rtic1e 109 of the constitution,
through the pranulgation of a special law (15) The second
kind of amnesty is amnesty from sentence, which is
autborised by the constitution to be granted by a decree
signed by the President following recctrinendation of special
committee created for this purpose (16)• Amnesty from
sentence does not refrove the criminal nature of the actions
of the convicted, and does not stop criminal action. The
ultimate effect of amnesty from sentence is to stop
application of sentence resulting from a final Court
decision.
2 - The second point of error of Law is that the decision was
based on legal provisions which are no more applicable. The
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decision was based on Articles 186 and 187 of the local
criminal procedures act, which give the ruler the right to
grant amnesty to persons involved in criminal proceedings.
According to Article 107 of the constitution, only the
President can grant pardon fran sentence. General amnesty
for crimes is allowed only by legislation, according to
Article 109. By the application of the supremacy of the
federal constitution and legislation over local legislation,
the local articles allc .zing the ruler to grant amnesty are
no nore applicable ( 17)•
the Court's decisicn in this case
The Supreiie Court accepted the points raised by the Public
Prosecution and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal.
The Court decided that, because the Court involved is a federal
Court, it applies local legislation only as far as it does not
conflict with the constitution or federal Law. In this case, the
constitution prevails on local legislation conflicting with its
provisions.
The powers given to the ruler of Fujairah by the local crim-
inal procedure Law are examples of the wide range of powers the
rulers used to enjoy before the federation. These rulers, as far
as internal matters in their emirates are concerned, were reluc-
tant to surrender power to the federal institutions • The ruler
of Fujairah in this case acted in the way he had been accustaned
to act. The new factor in this case, absent before the Union, is
action of federal authorities which were prepared to object to an
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order by ruler in his emirate, depending on limitations imposed
by the constitution for the benefit of the Union.
Sane institutions, even after becaning federal institutions,
were still treating the rulers as having unlimited pciers in
their emirates. The institutions, which used to be local and
later transferred to federal control, needed time to get used to
the new situation. The Court of ppeal which was involved in the
case was transferred to the Union in 1978 (18)•
The Supreme Court's decision in this case is a significant
precedent in balancing the federal system and enforcing the
limits prescribed by the constitution on the powers of the
emirates and their rulers.
B., (ses involvirj cxinpatlbility with t1 axistituticxi of laws
afleged to be incxvçatible with Islamic Shari'a
Introdxticxi
The constitution provides in Article 7 that:
Islam is the official religion of the Union. The Islamic
Shari'a shall be a main source of legislation in the Union.
The choice to refer to Shari 'a as "a main source", is in
contrast to reference to it as "the main source" (19)., It is
understood that the language used in Article 7 puts Shari 'a on an
equal basis with other sources of Law. The emphasis in this
Article is on sources of Law, so it is meant principally for
legislatures, to guide them in the pranulgation of laws. If no
clear legislation is available, then the Courts, while looking to
other sources of Law, should bear this guidance in mind in
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choosing rules that are not incaripatible with Shari'a (20)•
This explanation is supported by the content in Article 8 of
Law 6/1 978, which set up the Union Courts of First Instance and
Appeal, and transferred to these Courts the jurisdiction of the
local judicial bodies of four emirates (Abu-Dhabi, Sharjah, Ajman
and Fuj airah). This Article provides:
The Union Courts shall apply the provisions of the Islamic
Shari'a, Union Laws, and other Laws in force, just as they
shall apply those rules of custom and general legal
principles which do not conflict with the provisions of the
Shari'a.
In its reference to Union Laws and other Laws in force, this
Article puts them on equal terms with the rules of Shari'a, but
in its reference to the remainder of sources, the Article requi-
red that the rules taken fran those sources should be canpatible
with Shari'a. These Courts, federal, primary and appeal, have the
general cctnpetence in their respective emirates, and the one in
Abu-Dhabi has the canpetence provided for the primary federal
court in the capital. So in civil and criminal matters, where
federal legislation and local legislation apply in the
territorial jurisdiction of the included emirates, there is
generally no confusion about the sources of Law and the rules
applicable, according to Law 6/1978 and according to the
constitution (21)•
The Supreme Court's statute (Law 10/1973) provides in
Article 75 that:
The Supreme Court shall apply the Islamic Shari' a, Union
Laws and other laws in force in the member fluirates of the
Union conforming to the Islamic Shari'a. Likewise it shall
apply those rules of custan and those principles of natural
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and comparative Law which do not conflict with the
principles of that Shari'a.
It should be noted that in Article 8 of the Lower Courts
Statute 6/1 978, Union Laws and other applicable Laws are not
expressly required to conform to Shari'a, whereas in Article 75
of the Supreme Court's Statute, express provision is included to
require Union Laws and other applicable Laws to conform to the
rules of Shari'a. It should be noticed, moreover, that the
Supreme Court's Statute was not intended for general application
regarding civil and criminal matters, but to apply originally
only to matters included in Article 99 of the constitution and
Article 33 of Law 10/1973 (22),
In 1978, and by Law 17/1978, cassation jurisdiction was
given to the Supreme Court. This Law prescribed rules and
procedures for petitions of cassation to the Supreme Court to
oversee the application by lower Courts of laws applicable in the
country. Article 33 of Law 17/1978 (the cassation law) provides
that:
Law 10/1973 of the Federal Supreme Court should apply
regarding matters not regulated in this Law.
One of the matters not regulated in Law 17/1978 is the
hierarchy and applicability of the different sources of rules, so
Article 75 of Law 10/1 973 applies for cassation cases.
A strange situation is created by the rule just mentioned,
in that the Federal I .,er Courts are bound by Article 8 of Law
6/1 978 regarding the priority and applicability of the different
legal rules, whereas the Court of Cassation (the Supreme Court),
which is supposed to oversee the application by lower courts of
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the existing laws, is governed by a different rule regarding the
priority of sources of rules, which is Article 75 of Law 10/1 973.
This resulted in making parts of Law 10/1973, which was passed to
create and regulate a Court of special calipetence, applicable
regarding commercial, civil and criminal matters. The
significance of this result is that Article 75 insists on the
canpatibility with Shari'a of all legal provisions and rules to
be applied by the Supreme Court, as a consequence of which
several local and federal laws could now be challenged for
incanpatibility with Shari'a.
This raises again the idea mentioned in Chapter Eight, that
the Supreme Court is not suitable to be given the jurisdiction of
cassation. The problem of the applicability of the rules of
Shari'a is another problem created by Law 17/1978 (law of
cassation) and it would have been better to establish a special
court of cassation with a clear stipulation for the applicable
laws than to create the current confusion for lcer Courts and
for the Supreme Court itself.
Under the trend of the revival and reiristateitent of Shari' a
in the Islamic World (23) and because of the :Inportance of Islam
as one of the bases of society in the U.A.E. (24), the issue of
the supremacy of Islamic Shari' a over other sources of Law was
bound to cane before Lower Courts and eventually to the Supreme
Court.
The importance of the matter of application of Shari 'a is
signified by the prohibition in Shari'a of bank interest and
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usury (in - piba), the application of which has great
significance to the country's banking and cc*imercial operations.
Another area of importance to the application of the rules of
Shari' a is in criminal matters, especially as related to drinking
alcohol, and its prohibition and special penalties under Shari'a.
ses alx,ut the legality and aEStitUtima]ity of bank interest
(Riba)
(a) '1 Janatta Bank (se
(Application for constitutional interpretation 14/9, 28 June
1981) 95 Official Gazette.
In 1979 two new laws organising the federal judiciaries
began operation sirrniltaneously (25), creating confusion about the
prevalence of the sources of Law and of applicable legal rules
governing the federal judiciary. An important part of the
emerging confusion concerned the applicability of the interest
rate on loans involving banks and cannercial transactions. A
large number of cases came to the Courts in Abo-Dhabi regarding
interest payments, and several decisions were taken by primary
and appeal Courts in this emirate. The Janatta Bank case was the
case in which the Constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court
sought to use its authority to reve the confusion by settling
the matter and avoiding difficulties for the commercial
operations and banking systems in the country.
We shall examine the situation in Abu-Dhabi during the first
two years of operation of laws regarding the federal judiciary.
Abu Dbabi Law of Civil Procedures (Law 3/1970) allcis, in
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its Articles 61 and 62, the Civil Court to require the levying of
interest upon a judgernent sum until the full debt has been paid.
In 1979 and 1980 satie Courts in bu-Dhabi argued that Law 3/1 970
of Abu-Dhabi did not order or command the judge to include
levying of interest but permitted such inclusion in civil
decisions • Since Law 6/1 978 made Shari' a the first source of law
for federal Courts and it is obvious that payment of interest is
against Shari 'a, these Courts refrained fran including payment of
interest in their decision. They declared that federal Courts
were prohibited by statute fran including any interest payment in
their decisions (26)
The confusion reached the Supreme Court, under its new role
as a Court of cassation: the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court
faced several petitions and appeals (27)• The Civil Chamber of
the Supreme Court was unable to act, because of its problem with
Law 17/1978 (Law of cassation) and its reference to Article 75,
which prohibited enforcement by the Supreme Court of any Law
unless such a Law or instrument is canpatible with the rules of
the Islamic Shari 'a. The Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court
sought the help of the Constitutional Chamber, which is more
powerful and is empowered to give constitutional interpretations
which are binding on all (28)•
The Civil Chamber had before it the case of Janatta Bank v.
Nal ib Transportation and Construction jy (29) In tlüs case
the Federal Appeal Court of Abu-Dhabi refused to order the
payment of interest with its decision ordering the payment of the
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original loan, arguing that payment of interest is against
Shari'a and that the Law prohibits any decision by federal courts
that is in breach of Shari'a rules (30)
The Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court submitted a
constitutional question to the Constitutional Chamber, asking for
a declaration on the compatibility with the constitution of
Articles 61 and 62 of Law 3/1970 of the Ehirate of Abi-Dhabi,
which permitted the order by civil Courts to levy interest. The
underlying premise is that, if these articles are permitted and
supported by the constitution, and that Article 7 of the
constitution (of the Shari'a as a main source of Law) does not
have the effect of over-ruling such articles, then there is no
justification for lower federal courts avoiding the enforcement
of such articles. The ultimate effect of the Court's decision in
this case would not be confined to Abu-Dhabi, but would have
effect in other emirates which subscribed to the federal
judiciary and, because of the constitutional authority, in the
rest of the country.
The question suhnitted to the Supreme Court in this case was
whether or not ArtIcles 61 and 62 of the Civil Procedures Law of
Abu-Dhabi, which permit the inclusion of interest payments in
judicial decisions, were canpatible with the constitution In the
light of its Article 7.
Prirxip1es aniirxd by tI Oxirt in this case
Before discussing the principles established by the Court in
this case, it is beneficial to consider the importance of the
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subject matter in general. The case arose due to confusion
resulting partly fran conflicting decisions by lcMer courts and
partly because of the inability of the Cassation Chamber of the
Supreme Court to offer help in avoiding these confusions. This
environment of uncertainty created negative feelings in the
caiunercial banking sector and pranpted large numbers of debtors
to default, signalling a crisis that required an authoritative
voice to resolve. In order to protect carinercial banking and
cainnercial transactions in the area, reassurance was required.
The confusion was triggered by new federal legislation,
6/1978 and 17/1978. This latter gave cassation jurisdiction to
the Supreme Court, which is governed by Law 10/1973 and its
Article 75, which insists on conformity with Shari'a of all
legislation to be applied by the Court.
The sense of urgency about the need to bring an end to the
confusion can be appreciated fran the speed at which this case
was decided. The case was brought on 24 May 1981 and decided on
28 June 1981 • The case was important and the decision set a
precedent used as a basis in subsequent decisions by federal
courts (31)
The Supreme Court established three important principles in
this case:
1 - That prctnulgation of laws is the duty of the legislature and
that Article 150 of the constitution directed the federal
legislature to issue laws to replace legislation which
existed before the federation, and to regulate matters in
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detail in accordance with the constitution's purposes and
orders (32); that Article 7 of the constitution is a
direction fran the constitution to the federal legislature
to issue laws and regulations and to have the Islamic
Shari'a as a main source of such legislation. The speed and
the form of such federal legislation, especially regarding
Islamic Shari'a rules, is a matter of policy which is not
for the judiciary to decide.
2 - That the Laws, regulations, orders and other measures in
force at the time when the constitution commenced its
operation are saved f ran application of Article 151 (federal
supremacy clause) because of the protection exterded to them
by Article 148 (33).
The Court argued that it was obvious f ran Article 148
and the following articles, that the framers of the
constitution differentiated between two categories of
legislation. In the first category is legislation in force
at the time of caning into force of the constitution. This
category is granted extension of authority and continuation
of application by Article 148.
In the second category is all legislation issued
subsequent to the caning into force of the constitution.
This category is regulated by Articles 149 and 150 (34)
The hierarchy of this second category is established by
Article 151 (federal supremacy clause). This second
category is subject to review by the Suprat Court to ensure
observation of the order established by Article 151.
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Accordingly, all measures of legislation preceding the
caning to force of the constitution remain in force and
acquire authority fran the provisions of the constitution so
far as they remain unamended or abolished expressly. There
is no excuse f or any authority in the country to refrain
fran observing legislation preceding the operation of the
constitution, as they stand, under the cover that sane of
these laws do not conform with the provisions of the
constitution. The reason for the continuation of the
operation of such legislation is that the constitution
expressly ordered their observation and saved them from
application of Article 151. Indeed, the Court argued, any
abandonment of the application of these measure would airunt
to abandonment of constitutional orders prohibited by
Article 145.
Because of the foregoing, the Court argued, Articles 61
and 62 of the Civil Procedure Code of At.i-Dhabi are parts of
a law which came into force before commencement of the
operation of the constitution, therefore, these two articles
are considered to be constitutional according to Article 148
of the constitution. Nothing in Articles 8 of Law 6/1978 or
75 of Law 10/1973 (which ordered federal courts to apply the
Islamic Shari'a), affects or removes the constitutional
authority extended to the two articles of the A*i-Dbabi Law
by the constitution.
3 - That the purpose of the language used in Article 62 of A1i-
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Dhabi's civil procedure code is to establish the maximum
allowable rates of interest. Nothing in this or Article 61
authorises the judges to refrain fran enforcing the interest
rate agreed by parties or abandon the payment of interest in
their judgement. The purpose of establishing maximum rates
of interest is the protection of debtors fran exploitation.
Therefore, if the parties exceeded in their agreements the
prescribed limits, it becanes the duty of the judges to
decrease the rate of interest to conform to the maximum
limit prescribed bythe code.
Evaluaticxi of the pririples established by the Qirt in this
se
Evaluation will be confined to the first two principles, due
to their significance to the purposes of this study.
1 - That issuing federal Laws to replace local legislation
(especially legislation inconsistent with the constitution),
and the direction of Article 7 to make Shari'a a main source
of Law, are matters of policy not for the Courts to
question.
If the timing, form and details of new federal legislation
ordered by Article 150 of the constitution are mainly matters of
policy for the legislature to decide, there is a duty on the
Supreme Court to review caupliance of the legislature with the
orders and provisions of the constitution. Any undue delay in
issuing federal legislation required by the constitution could
result in effects contrary to those sanctioned by the
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constitution. The determination of the existence of undue delay
is a matter of judgement but it cannot be left entirely to the
legislature without any checking and supervision fran the Supr
Court, which has the power of judicial review of
constitutionality. Although the legislature has wide discretion
for choosing the timing of the passing of legislation requested
by the constitution, the power of review given to the Supreme
Court can be invoked to remedy obviously unjust or negative
effects resulting fran any clearly unnecessary delay in issuing
federal laws. Moreover, if the details of issuing federal
legislation are largely a matter of policy, leaving local
legislation in contradiction to the provisions of the
constitution, is not a matter of policy left to the discretion of
the legislature. Depriving such legislation of effect is a matter
of principle governed directly by the constitution, particularly
by Article 151, and is subject to review and enforcement by the
Supreme Court's decisions in accordance with Article 99 of the
constitution and Article 33 of Law 10/1973.
2 - That all local legislation in force before the caning into
force of the constitution is saved by Article 148 of the
constitution fran being subjected to the order of Article
151 and, therefore, not subject to review by the Supreme
Court.
This principle is based on an interpretation of some
constitutional provisions, which is not obviously sanctioned by
the language used in these provisions, especially Article 148.
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The interpretation provided by the Court is not compatible with
the literal meanings of these provisions, nor with the federal
system created by the constitution. Such interpretations were
not essential for arrival at the conclusion that the Court
reached.
It is essential to remember that the constitution is the
supreme Law of the land. This constitution prevails not only
over local legislation, but also over the constitutions of the
member emirates. Any legislation of the member emirates is
supposed to be sanctioned by the local constitution, whether this
is written or customary. To argue that the federal constitution
prevails over local constitutions but not over some inferior
legislation is not reasonable, and is contrary to Article 151 of
the federal constitution.
The constitution which created the federal system and
distributed powers between the federal government and the
emirates has the position of being the supreme law of the land.
After the constitution came into force, all legislation in the
country has been required to observe the constitution-imposed
limitations. It is against this premise for the Supreme Court to
deduce, as the Court did in this case, fran an article of this
constitution, a rule not clearly stated nor strongly implied by
its language that it sanctions breach by any kind of legislation
of its rules and limitations.
Article 148 can be understood to have a meaning similar to
that of Article 149. According to Article 149 the emirates have
the power to legislate in matters included in Article 121 until
chapter io
	 - 343 -
the federal government uses its right to legislate . in these
matters, and to the extent that local legislation does not
contradict federal legislation in these matters. In other words,
the emirates have the right to legislate in these matters until
and to the extent of federal occupation of the field. Likewise,
Article 148 could be understood to have similar meaning.
According to this understanding, local legislation existing in
the emirates prior to the caning into force of the constitution
remains valid to the extent that it does not conflict with the
provisions of the constitution or federal law.
Nothing in Article 151 or in any other provision of the
constitution necessarily or expressly indicates that legislation
existing before the caning Into force of the constitution is to
be excluded from the federal supremacy rule of Article 151.
Indeed, fran the language used in Article 150, that the federal
authorities shall issue legislation as soon as possible to
replace existing local legislation, especially those conflicting
with the federal constitution, this constitutional sanction could
be understood to have the same meaning as the sanction in Article
101, for the concerned authorities, upon a decision by the
Supreme Court of the incanpatibility with the constitution of
their legislation, that they:
shall be obliged to hasten to take the necessary measures to
remove or rectify the constitutional inconsistency.
This cannot be understood to mean that, until inconsistency
with the constitution is rectified, such legislation should
remain valid. In the same light, it is not a convincing argument
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that provisions of emirate legislation operating before the
constitution came into force should be held valid until amended
or abolished.
The Supreme Court, in its decision in this case, used a
measure of self restraint, and the judgement was neither
beneficial nor detrimental to the constitution. The arguments
used by the Court in this case give the emirates a wide
discretion, removing from federal supremacy some local
legislation that had been subject to federal rules. The result
of arguments used by the Court in this decision are to the
disadvantage of the federal government. The federal system
requires suhitission by member emirates of parts of their pcMers
to the central government. Canpatibility of local laws with the
federal constitution is required by the nature of the federal
system and by express provisions of the federal constitution.
The principle announced by the court in this decision contradicts
the federal system and the requirements of the federal
constitution.
(b)	 BarLda nk cse
(Civil cassation case 17/5, 6 September 1983)
This case was among the cases brought to the federal courts
of Abu-Dhabi in the environment of uncertainty of the legality of
bank interest payments created by Laws 6 and 17 of 1978. Baruda
Bank brought the case to recover the principal debt and interest
accruing fran the defendant, bu-Dhabi Electronics Cciiipany. The
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Court of first instance ordered payment of the principal debt but
refused to include an order of payment of the interest accruing.
The Court argued that, because it is ordered to apply Shari'a,
and interest payment is prohibited according to Sbari'a, it could
not order such payment.
The Bank appealed, and the appellate Court reversed the
decision of the lower Court and ordered payment of the principal
and the interest. The defendant in these proceedings brought a
challenge of cassation to the Supreme Court, requesting reversal
of the appeal Court's decision, on the ground of error of Law in
its enforcement of the interest clause in the original agreement.
The cassaticxi Icisicxi
The Supreme Court upheld the appeal Court decision and cited
the constitutional decision in the Janatta Bank case
(constitutional interpretation 14/9). This authority of the
Janatta Bank case shows the importance of that decision for later
cases.
iwina]. Cases a1xft the applicati(n of Shari 'a
The confusion created by the enactments of Laws 6/1 978 and
17/1978 of the federal judiciary involved uncertainty and
questioning of sczTe local criminal laws as to their caripatibility
with Article 7 of the constitution and their application by
federal Courts under the new Court legislation. The majority of
the cases involved the applicability of the special penalty
prescribed by Shari'a for the drinking of alcohol by Muslims, and
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whether this penalty should be applied in conjunction with, or as
a replacement to, the punishments prescribed by local
legislation. The causes of the confusion in this matter are the
same that resulted in confusion about interest payments, but the
consequences are less significant (35).
(a) '1t cese of the cxiatThility with tl cxnstituticxi of t
pinJ.shint of dimness in a pibflc place uxx]er Abi-t1abi
Law 8/1976	 -
(Application for constitutional interpretation 1/8, 8 Novnber
1981) 100 Official Gazette.
A number of cases for constitutional interpretation were
joined with this case to be provided with one decision, due to
the similarity of their requests (36)• These cases were referred
by the Abu-Dhabi Appeal Court for decisions on the canpatibility
with the constitution of the penalties imposed by the Ab.i-Dhabi
Alcoholic Drinks Law (Law 8/1 976). The Court of Appeal invoked
Article 7 of the constitution, which makes Sbari'a a main source
of law, Federal Law 6/1978 of the federal judiciary, the
application of which leads to application of the penalties
imposed by the Abu-Dhabi Alcoholic Drinks Law and Law
17/1978 of cassation, which refers to Article 75 of Law 10/1973
of the Supreme Court, in which application of Shari'a is
stressed.
The Court of Appeal argued that there appeared to be a
conflict between the application of Article 75 of Law 10/1973,
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which makes the penalty for drunkenness and consumption of
alcohol by a Muslim to be flogging as an Islamic Ha&1, and the
application of Law 8/1978 of Abu-Dhabi, which provides for
another penalty (38)• The Court of Appeal argued in its
application that the problem is created by the inclusion of a
penalty other than that prescribed by Shari'a, which is a breach
of the rules of Shari'a arrounting to a breach of the constitution
in its sanction that Shari'a be made a main source of
legislation.
Principles estabflshed by the decision of Qirt In this case
The Court used several principles in order to reach its
final result, sane of which were already established, others of
which were new. The principles used in this case were as follows.
1 - That Article 7 of the constitution cannot be used as a basis
for the scrutiny of legislation with the constitution
because of non-compliance with Shari'a. The purpose of
Article 7 is to provide guidance for legislators in the
legislative process; compliance with this guidance is a
matter of policy not for the Courts to question.
2 - That the proper basis for constitutional scrutiny is Article
75 of Law 10/1973, which provides that the Court in its
disposal of matters in its original jurisdiction, provided
by Article 33 of its statutes including constitutional
scrutiny of legislation, has to disregard any measures
incanpatible with Shari'a. As a result of this, the Court
argued that, to decide on the constitutionality of
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punishments included in Law 8/1 976 of Abu-Dhabi, it needed
to decide on the caupatibility of the punishments included
in Article 17 of that Law with the rules of Shari'a (39).
If these rules were found to be caupatible with Shari'a,
then they would be constitutional, and vice-versa.
3 - That the punishment prescribed in Article 17 of Abu-Dhabi
Law 8/1 976 is for a special crime of drunkenness in a public
place or public road, whether such a person is a Muslim
subject to the Islamic punishment of Hadd or a non-Muslim.
This is a special crime described by its defined condition;
for such a crime a special discretionary punishment is
al1cied by Shari'a, which could be regulated by legislation.
There is nothing to prohibit the application of the Hadd
punishment for Muslims in addition to the punishment
provided by Article 17. Therefore, Article 17 of AIj-Dbabi
Law 8/1 976 is not against Shari'a and, consequently, it is
constitutional.
Evaluaticn of tI Oirt' s disicxi
The principle, reiterated by the Court here, of considering
compliance with Article 7 a matter of policy not to be questioned
by the Courts, has been evaluated above (40)• Evaluation here
will be confined to the principle announced by the Court that
Article 75 of its statute is the basis on which compatibility
with Shari'a is essential to decide that a provision of law is
compatible with the constitution. Central to this principle is
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the Court's argument that Article 75 governs the original
jurisdiction of the Court contained in Article 33 of its statute,
including constitutional scrutiny of legislation.
Article 75 provides:
The Supreme Court shall apply the rules of the Islamic
Shari'a, Union Laws and other laws in force in the member
Eknirates of the Union conforming to the Islamic Shari'a, as
well as those rules of custom and those principles of
natural arid canparative law which do not conflict with the
principles of that Shari'a.
This article is not meant to be a cctnprehensive catalogue of
all the sources of regulations that can be applied by the Court
in all the matters in its original jurisdiction. There is one
essential source anitted fran Article 75, and this source is the
constitutioti itself. This anission makes the idea that Article 75
is a canprehensive catalogue of applicable sources of regulation
for the Court unfounded, arid is certainly a wrong idea. An
explanation of the cinission of the constitution fran Article 75
is that it Is implied that the Court will apply the
constitutional provisions directly in cases of constitutional
interpretation and scrutiny. Article 75 is, according to this
understanding, to apply to the other items in the original
jurisdiction of the Court.
According to the afore-mentioned idea, the Court was wrong
to base its constitutional scrutiny in this case on Article 75.
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(b) Case regardir the xristituticzality of the pinishint for
drunkenness xxitair1 in law 8/1976 of Abi-J*iabj.
(Application for constitutional interpretation 4/9, 25 November
1983) 135 Official Gazette.
Several cases were joined with this case to be provided with
one decision, due to the similarities of their requests (41)•
Basically, the causes and requests in this and the cases joined
with it are the same that were in case no. 1, year 8 discussed
above. This case concerned the compatibility with the
constitution of the punishment of drunkenness contained in
Article 17 of Law 8/1976 of Abu-Dhabi, because of the provision
of a punishment other than required by Shari' a.
'I1 principles established tj the Cc*irt
The Court based its decision on two main principles.
1 - That, although it may appear from Article 7 of the
constitution that Shari'a is to be on equal terms with other
sources of Law because it is referred to as "a main source"
instead of "the main source" of Law, the doubt has been
reved by Article 75 in which the legislature has explained
the intention from Article 7 of the constitution that
Shari'a is to have a paramount position that makes it
prevail over other sources of Law.
2 - That applying the punishment required by Shari'a to the
consumption of alcohol by a Muslim, therefore, is made
obligatory by Article 7 of the constitution, according to
its added explanation by Article 75 of the statute of the
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Supreme Court. At the same tbie, the rules of Shari'a permit
the imposition of discretionary punishments over special
kinds of crime. This discretion can be regulated by the
legislature.
The crimes mentioned in Article 17 of Law 6/1976 of
Abu-Dhabi are nore than just consumption of alcohol, and
include acts catinitted by Muslims as well as non-Muslims.
The Court arrived at the same conclusion at which it arrived
in the previous case, that there is no conflict between Shari'a
and the punishment rules of Law 6/1976 of Abu-Dhabi, therefore
the Abu-Dhabi Law is not unconstitutional.
Evaluaticri of tI decisiczi
As a start, the case here did not warrant a special
decision, because the case discussed above (case No. 1, Year 8)
included a similar request. It was acceptable for the Court of
Appeal to refer the case because of the environment of confusion
created by the federal judiciary statutes (6/1978 and 17/1978),
since at the time of the referral (5 April 1981) the decision in
the case having the same question (No. 1, Year 8) was undecided,
but at the time of deciding this case (No. 4, Year 9), which was
25 December 1983, the other case had already been decided
(decision in case No. 1, Year 8 was on 8 November 1981), it was
sufficient for the Court to refer to the earlier decision.
In evaluating the principles used in the decision, we shall
deal with those unique to this case.
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1 - That the legislature in Article 75 of Law 10/1973 provided
explanation about the meaning of Article 7 of the
constitution, the result of which is for Shari'a to be the
main source of Law.
The decision here confuses two different providers of
binding rules of Law: the first is the constitutional
framers who have a paramount and supreme position; the
second is the regular legislature, who are subordinate to
the first. The regular legislature has the right and power
to legislate in the fields and to the extent provided by the
constitution. The provisions of the constitution bind the
legislature, but the legislature does not have such a
binding effect on the constitutional framers or
constitutional provisions. The Court argued in this case
that the legislature in Article 75 of Law 10/1973,
effectively transformed the place of Shari t a among the
sources of Law fran being "a main source" into "the main
source" of Law. Their argument is unacceptable because of
the inherent hierarchy of the two sources of rules, the
constitution and the regular Law (42),
2 - That the use of Article 7 of the constitution as a provis-
ion enforceable by the Court contradicts a principle estab-
lished earlier by the Court that Article 7 is neant as a
guidance to the legislature & that canpliance with it is not
for the Court to question (43)• in order for the Court to
change this principle, a special procedure has to be foll-
owed, which has clearly not been followed in this case (44)•
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(c) Case concerning the compatibility with the constitution
of Article 58 of tI Atu-Etabi Criminal Code.
(Application for constitutional interpretation 1/14, 19 April
1987) Not published in the Official Gazette.
This case involved a person who was prosecuted and brought
to the Court of first instance of Abu-Dbabi on the grounds of
breaching public morals, as defined by Article 58 of the Abu-
Dhabi Criminal Code. The Court of first instance decided to
sulinit an application of constitutional interpretation to the
Supreme Court, inquiring about the compatibility with the
constitution of Article 58 (45)• The referring Court argued that
the article in question did not define precisely the acts which
represent a breach of public morals, which gives rise to a
possibility of incanpatibility of this article with the constit-
utional principle established by Article 27 of the constitution
that "All crimes and punishments shall be defined by Law. ..".
PrirEiples establisI1 by tl Cc*irt 's decisii
The Court, in sustaining the compatibility with the
constitution of Article 58 of the Abu-Dbabi Penal Code, depended
on two points.
1 - That it is apparent from Article 58 that there is no
ambiguity in the acts subject to it. These are all acts
that represent breach of public morality. Therefore, there
is no conflict between this Article and Article 27 of the
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constitution in its principle that punishments and crimes
shall be defined by Law.
2 - That the absence of precise definitions of the acts
representing breach of public morality does not deprive this
Article from compatibility with the constitution. The
absence of precise definition of the acts covered by Article
58 is a sign of flexibility in order to suit the custans and
culture in its development and changing considerations.
Basic guidance to the definition of public morality should
be sought in the Islamic Shari'a, which is the official
religion of the state and the religion of the inhabitants of
the country.
It is apparent fran this case, as well as fran others, that
the Court in its relations with other authorities practises self
restraint and avoids finding legislation unconstitutional.
General (tservaticxs
The importance of the Supr Court for the federal system
and the constitutional system in general continued to gather more
evidence in this period. The prpmulgation of the federal
judiciary Laws (Law 6/1 978 and Law 17/1978) brought new
confusions and challenges to the Supreme Court.
It is evident that the Supreme Court, because of its
original design and because of its statute (Law 10/1973), is not
suitable as a Court of cassation. Article 75 of the Courtts
statute, which is unique in insisting on the prevalence of
Shari'a over other sources of Law, created a crisis in the
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country, especially since Article 7 of the constitution and Law
6/1 978 of lower federal Courts do not have the same degree of
insistence on prevalence of the rules of Shari'a.
In order for the Court to avoid the creation of further
confusion, especially for the financial sector, it resorted to
interpretations to the constitution which are in sane cases not
canpatible with the federal system. The large number of cases
caning to the Court increased its responsibility, especially due
to the binding power of its constitutional decisions. The
interpretations provided by the Court, either in the cases of
bank interest payments or consumption of alcohol were, in my
view, insufficient and not well founded. The main cause of the
problem is Article 75 of Law 10/1973 and the Court failed ho cane
up with an interpretation to this article that reives the cause
of the confusion.
As a solution to the problem the following argument could
serve the purpose of reiioving the restrictions imposed by Article
75 of Law 10/1973. It is worth remembering the original purpose
of Article 75, which is to govern the items of the Supreme
Court' s canpetence other than the constitutional interpretat-
ions. A main reason for this understanding is the absence of
mention of the constitution itself in Article 75 (46)
It is also worth remembering the original purpose of the
special appeal of cassation. The purpose of cassation is to
control legality, that is to supervise adherence by the Courts to
the rules prescribed by Law (47)• The result is that in its
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constitutional review the Supreme Court has to resort directly to
the provisions of the constitution without regard to Article 75
of its statute, because this is implied in the statute itself.
In its review of cassation cases, the Supreme Court has to resort
to Law 6/1978 for reviewing adherence by the Courts to the
hierarchy of sources of Law provided by the legislature.
By using this argument the Supreme Court can avoid the
contradictions it faces as a result of legislation providing it
with jurisdiction incanpatible with its original purpose. Giving
the Supreme Court the Cassation jurisdiction not only had a
negative effect on the Supreme Court as a specialised court, but
also confused the 1c.zer courts and caused a large number of cases
to come to the Supreme Court for which contradicting and
unfounded decisions were given.
The Supreme Court was intended by the Constitution to be a
primarily constitutional court. Preservation of its original
nature, understanding the importance of its constitutional juris-
diction and solution to the confusion created by the law of
Cassation make it necessary to transfer cassation from the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to a special court suitable for
this purpose.
At present the argument provided in this part as a
suggestion for renoving the confusion about the application of
the rules of Sbari'a can serve as a way in which the Court could
avoid the continuation of interpretations that are contrary to
the design and objectives of the Constitutuion.
Qpter T Footes
The quantity of oil produced in the U.A.E. went up fran 51 .1
million metric tons in 1971 to 81.8 million metric tons in
1975. The incarie fran- exportation of oil rose fran 431
million dollars in 1971 to 6500 million dollars in 1975.
See Al-Farra, M. "The Geography of Oil in the U.A.E." in:
The Arab League, Institute of Arab Research, The tJ.A.E.: A
General Survey Cairo: 1978, pp.452 and 471.
2 The work started in preparing major legislations such as
Criminal Law, Civil Law and other Laws concerning ccmnercial
activities. The long term projects involved in preparing
these Laws represent evidence of the confidence emerging as
to the durability of the federation and the confidence that
the constitutional system in existence is to remain for a
long time to cane. The main Laws which were pranulgated in
the 1980s:
- Carinercial Agency Law, Law 18/1981
- Law of Civil Transactions (Civil Code), Law 51/1985
- Law of Islamic Banks, Financial Institutions and
investment canpanies, Law 6/1 985
- Criminal Law, Law 6/1 986
3	 See Chapter Eight.
4 This Law was published in the Official Gazette, issue No. 64
of 30 December 1978.
5 Law 17/1 978 Article 4
6 Law 17/1 978 Articles 1 & 4
7 See discussion on the effects of the cassation jurisdiction
on the Supreme Court in Chapter Eight.
8 The principle of appointing alternate judges to the Court is
deserving of criticism because the matter of membership of
the Court is established by Article 96 of the constitution,
which entails that any further prescription for the
membership of the Court by legislation should be of adding
details to the constitutional prescription not of a canplete
transformation of the Court. Even if these judges are
called alternate judges, they mainly have the same powers of
the full members of the Court, with sane exceptions. The
only main difference between these members and full members
of the Court, according to the original constitutional
design, is the security of office which exists for the full
members and does not exist for the alternate judges. See
Chapter Eight for further discussion of the matter.
Article 3
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10 Article 9 of Law 10/1973 as amended by Law 14/1 985
11 This application was suhuitted to the Court on 5 August
1980. The law of cassation (17/1978) carte into effect early
in 1979, so the virtual end of applications fran government
authorities constitutional interpretation coincided with the
intreduction to the court of the new jusrisdiction.
12 Article 123 of the constitution requires the permission of
the Supreme Council for any agreement to be made by a member
emirate with neighbouring countries.
13 Article 123 provides that international agreements by member
emirates with neighbouring countries are permitted if they
are of administrative nature and "save that such agreements
are not inconsistent with the interests of the Union".
14 According to Article 123 of the constitution.
15 Article 109 of the constitution provides:
there shall be no general amnesty for a crime or for
specified crimes except by Law. The pranulgation of the
law of amnesty shall consider such crimes being deemed
never to have been committed, and shall remit the
execution of the sentence or the remaining part of it.
16 Article 107 of the constitution provides:
The President of the Union may grant pardon fran the
execution of any sentence passed by a Union judiciature
before it is carried out or while it is being served,
or he may carinute such sentences, on the basis of the
reocirinendation of the Union Minister of Justice, after
obtaining the approval of a carinittee formed under the
chairmanship of the Minister.
17 According to Article 151 of the Constitution.
18 By Federal Law 6/1978
19 The original Egyptian constitution of 1971 and the Kuwaiti
constitution provide in Article 2 of each that Shari' a is a
main source of law. The current amended Egyptian
constitution and the constitution of tar provide that
Shari'a is the main source of law.
20 See Al-Jamal, Y, The Constitutional System in Kuwait Kuwait:
(in Arabic) Kuwait University Press, 1970, p.469. In case
for interpretation 14, year 9, the Supreme Court stated that
the content of Article 7 that Shari'a is a main source of
law is a guidance to the legislature and is a matter of
policy not for the Court to question. See reporting and
discussion of the case infra.
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21 Article 1 of Law 6/1 978 provides that the Primary Courts in
the flnirates of Abu-Dhabi, Sharjah, Ajman and Fujairah
should becane Federal Primary Courts on the start of caning
to force of this law and that appellate courts in these
emirates should becane Federal Appellate Courts.
Article 2 provides that the jurisdictions of the local
courts that are subject to Article 1 should be transformed
to the federal courts.
Article 3 provides that the Federal Primary Court in the
capital of the Union shall have jurisdiction in the adminis-
trative disputes between the Union and individuals, while
civil and cainercial disputes between the Union and
individuals shall be heard by the federal primary courts
according to the place of residency of the defendant.
Notice the reference in this article to "the capital of the
Union", not the permanent capital in Article 102 of the
constitution and the difference in the jurisdiction between
the Court of Article 3 of Law 6/1 978 and the Court of
Article 102 of the constitution.
22 These matters include: disputes between the emirates and
between them and the Union; interpretation of the provisions
of the constitution by application or as a result of
challenge of unconstitutionality of legislation; trial of
senior federal officials regarding actions in carrying out
their official duties; crimes directly affecting the inter-
ests of the Union; resolution of conflict of jurisdiction
between federal judiciary and local judiciaries and inter-
pretation of treaties and international agreements. (Article
99 of the constitution and Article 33 of Law 10/1973)
23 See Ballantyne, W.M. Legal Deve1oinent in Arabia: A Selec-
tion of Articles and Addresses on the Arabian Qilf. London:
Graham and Trotman Ltd. 1980, pp.109-120.
24 See Heard-Bey, F. From Trucial States to United Arab
flnirates: A Society in Transition. London: Longrnan, 1982,
pp.126-i 63.
25 This year was the first to withess the operation of both
laws 6/1978 and 17/1978, the former became effective on 15
June 1978 and the latter on 30 February 1979.
26 Article 61 of Law 3/1 970 of A.i-Dhabi Civil Procedure Law
permits the Courts to specify the camncanent and ending
points of the interest they include in their decisions.
Article 62 specifies the maximum enforceable limits for
interest rates in ccrinercial and non-carinercial
transactions. For example, in civil appeal case No 5, 1979,
the Court refused to include interest payment with its
decision.
27 Civil cassation cases 5, 6 and 40/2.
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28 According to Article 101 of the constitution.
29 Civil cassation case 40/2.
30 Depending on Article 8 of Law 6/1978 (the Law establishing
federal primary and appeal courts).
31 See the next: case belcw.
32 Article 150 of the constitution provides:
The Union authorities shall strive to issue the laws
referred to in this constitution as quickly as possible
so as to replace the existing legislations and systems,
particularly those which are not consistent with the
provisions of the constitution.
33 Article 151 of the constitutions provides:
The provisions of this constitution shall prevail over
the constitutions of the member mtrates of the Union
and the Union Laws which are issued in accordance with
the provisions of this constitution shall have priority
over the legislations, regulations and decisions issued
by the authorities of the Emirates. In case of
conflict, that part of the inferior legislation which
is inconsistent with the superior legislation shall be
rendered null and void to the extent that relmDves the
inconsistency. In case of dispute, the matter shall be
referred to the Union Supreme Court for decision.
Article 148 provides:
All matters established by laws, regulations, decrees,
orders and decisions in the various member flnirates of
the Union in effect upon the cc*ning into force of this
constitution, shall continue to be applicable unless
amended or replaced in accordance with the provisions
of this constitution.
34 Article 149 is the occupation of the field clause which
allows the emirates to legislate in matters included in
Article 121 until and to the extent of federal legislation
occupying the field. ArtIcle 150 orders the federal
authorities to issue legislation referred to in the
constitution as quickly as possible.
35 Because the problem regarding the bank interest payments
involved disrupting the catinercial sector of the country.
36 The cases which were joined with this case are applications
for interpretations nos • 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 for year 8, and 1, 2,
3, for year 9.
37 In Article 17
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3. A basic cause of this is the granting by Law 17/1978 of
cassation jurisdiction to the Supreme Court. This Court is
not suitable to operate as a cassation court, a main reason
for this conclusion being the .problem created here and in
other cases by having a cassation court governed by a
statute not ccinpatible with the statute governing the lower
courts. See Article 8 of Law 6/1 978 and Article 75 of Law
10/1973, which is referred to by Law 17/1978 (statute of
cassation). See other argument in Chapter Eight.
39 Article 17 of the Abu-Dhabi Law 6/1976 provides:
Any person caught in a public place or public road in a
state of apparent drunkenness, should be punished by
imprisonment for a period not less than two months and
not more than one year, in addition to a fine of not
less than five hundred Dirhams and not more than two
thousand Dirhams. If such a person ccimnitted a breach
of public safety or public morals, the punishment
should be imprisonment for a period not less than six
months and not more than two years, in addition to a
fine of not less than one thousand Dirhams and not more
than five thousand Dirhams, without prejudice to any
other punishment provided by the penal code or any
other law.
40 See Case of Janatta Bank (constitutional case no.14, Year 9)
discussed above in this chapter.
41 The cases which were joined with this case are cases of
constitutional interpretation nos • 5 to 13 and 15 to 23,
Year 9 • In later cases, this case and case no. 1, Year 8,
were used as binding precedents. These cases are nos • 1,
Year 10 and 14, Year 10, to which decisions in other cases
in the same year were referred.
42 See the argument provided before that Article 75 is not
meant to govern the constitutional interpretation or general
matters.
43 See constitutional cases nos. 14, Year 9, and 1, Year 8,
discussed earlier.
44 Article 65 of the statute of the Supr Court (Law 10/1973)
provides for the establishment of a special cctrrnittee, the
duty of which is to consider cases referred fran the
chambers of the Supreme Court who decided to abandon or
amend principles established earlier.
45 Article 58 of the Abu-Dhabi Criminal Code provides in
paragraph 4 that:
Any person who carinits an act representing a breach of
public morals shall be punished by imprisonment for a
period not less than three months and not more than two
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years and by a fine of an anunt not less than five
thousand Dirhams and not more than twenty thousand
Dirharns, or by one of these punishments.
46 See argument to this pur5ose above in this chapter.
47 See Cappelletti, M. Judicial Review in the Contporary
World Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs Merrill Co., 1971,
ppl2-16.
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During the past few decades the United Arab fttirates has
experienced, and continues to experience, rapid develorxnent and
accelerating change. This developent, facilitated by wealth
acquired from oil, has resulted in the transformation of the
Enirates into a wider and more open society, receptive to new
experiences, and responsive to institutions in other parts of the
world. The transformation underway is happening through the
interaction between local culture and institutions with those
brought in from elsewhere in the world. Experience has
demonstrated to the Eknirates that the demands of a growing, more
educated and open society need the kind of political and social
unity engendered by the federal system and the modernisation of a
traditional way of government.
Federalism is in its nature a system of two co-ordinated
units of government, each with its respective sphere of power,
delimited by a written constitution which seeks to ensure neither
that central power grows to such an extent that the identity of
the local units as distinct governments is threatened, nor that
the separate areas of power at the local level emasculate the
central authority and put in jeopardy the whole federal
enterprise. Experience has shown that constitutional courts, as
independent umpires of the federal system, have a crucial role to
play in preserving the federal balance. The courts can protect
each sphere of government from the creeping encroachment on its
powers by the other and yet are flexible and sensitive enough to
adapt the federal arrangements to changing circumstances.
Ultimately, where the political differences between the units are
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irreconcilable, the courts provide authoritative decisions on the
interpretation of the constitution. It is this role which the
Supreme Court of the U.A.E. is inevitably called on to perform.
Deeper and wider understanding of the place of the Supreme Court
in the constitutional and federal system of the U.A.E. is needed.
Equipping the Supreme Court to carry out its important duties is
essential for the success not only of the Court itself, but also
the performance of the constitutional and federal systems of the
country. Support of the written Constitution and improvement in
its application, protection of rights of governments and people,
solutions to constitutional problems, all of these call for the
strengthening and supporting of the role of the Supreme Court.
The experience of other systems, particularly the U.S. and
West Germany, shows that judes in constitutional courts have a
particularly wide judicial discretion. The understanding of this
phenomenon has developed in the U.S. by reference to cases
involving individual rights, but the lessons which are learned by
a study of such cases are equally applicable to questions of
federalism. In the U.S. the Supreme Court had to claim for itself
the final power of interpreting the Constitution because there
was no explicit provision in the Constitution. No similar
difficulty arises for the Supreme Court of the tJ.A.E. because of
its express authority to interpret the Constitution. The issue
is not whether the Court shall do so, but how it shall do so.
Constitutions do not only establish rights and duties of
government, they also establish the basic and fundamental rights
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o people. Constitutional Courts in their interpretation of
constitutional charters and in their settlement of constitutional
complaints, have some effect on the rights and duties established
by constitutions • These facts increase awareness and intensify
attention given to constitutional Courts. By increased attention,
fuller understanding and clearer analysis and arguments
concerning the work of constitutional courts, there is more
chance of improvement and develoçinent.
As in the other countries studied, the Supreme Court in the
U.A.E. plays an important role in the constitutional order arid
the federal system. The importance of constitutional interpret-
ation by the Supreme Court has been enhanced by the successive
extensions in duration of the Provisional Constitution. This has
subjected the interpretative provisions of the Court to a longer
pericid of use, and therefore in the context of a rrore advanced
political and legislative environment, than intended by its
framers, calling for involvement by the Supreme Court in
interpretations for newly emerging needs and inquiries.
The original competence of the Supreme Court of the U.A.E.
suggests that it can play a role similar to that of the U.S.
Supreme Court arid the West German Constitutional Court. There
are, however, several factors which restrict the effectiveness of
the U.A.E. Supreme Court as a constitutional court.
Cc*npared to the U.S. and West German courts, the U.A.E.
Supreme Court has some major differences. These differences
concern the specialisation of the court; the conditions of
appointment of its justices, their tenure and protection; and the
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institutional independence of the court.
Whilst the U.S. and West German courts are specialised
courts, de facto or de lure, the U.A.E. Supreme Court is a court
of general jurisdiction. This fact, in addition to the legal
system in which it operates as a civil law system, makes the
court ineffective as a constitutional court. The Supreme Court is
currently over-burdened with cassation cases, and is effectively
denied the resources and the confidence needed for it to become
an effective constitutional court.
Whilst the US, and West German courts are provided with
institutional independence and are placed in praninent positions
in relation to other branches of their respective governments,
the U.A.E. Supreme Court lacks the necessary independence. The
U.A.E. Supreme Court is linked to, and subject to the influence
of, the Ministry of Justice in administrative matters, financial
needs and choice of members.
mongst the most important differences between the U.A.E.
Supreme Court and those of the U.S. and West Germany, is the
procedure for the appointment of justices. The U.S. and West
German procedures are designed to give the full legislatures and
the member states of the federal systems major roles in the
appointment of justices. This system is designed on an
understanding of the roles that a constitutional court can play
in the developnent and shaping of its country's constitution and
federal system. The U.A.E. Supreme Court, ho r,,ever, is staffed
according to procedures that shci a lack of appreciation of the
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real effect that a court can have.
Whilst the U.S. and West German constitutional justices are
provided with protections and guarantees to operate without fear
of reprisals by their political branches, the U.A.E. justices
lack such protections. There are many defects in the legislative
enactments dealing with the membership of the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court's statute allis the appointment of foreign judges
for limited terms of office, as an exception to the conditions of
appointing nationals of the country with life tenure. This
exception has been and remains the general rule for appointment
to the Supreme Court. No U.A.E. national has been appointed to
the court, nor has there been anyone appointed with life tenure.
The consequence of this is that the original procedures designed
to protect the judges and provide them with the necessary
confidence are not utilised, with consequential reduction in the
effectiveness of the court. The Supreme Court's statute, as
amended provides for an option of appointing to the court an
unlimited number of alternate judges. This adds to the already
damaging regulations dealing with the membership of the court.
The U.S. Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court of West
Germany have major roles to play in the development of their
respective constitutional systems, in part due to the large
number of constitutional cases they receive. The tJ.A.E. Supreme
Court, by way of contrast, receives few constitutional cases.
This is due to its relatively recent establishment and also to
the system in which it operates. The effect is that the Supreme
Court is unable to play a full role in the develoçment of the
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constitutional system. The passage of time and the further
developoent of the U.A.E. and its constitutional system may allow
the Supreme Court greater opportunity to practise its
constitutional role.
In addition to these differences which limit the
effectiveness of the Supreme Court, there are differences which
are supposed to allow the court greater freeda'n and give it nore
opportunity to be an effective constitutional court. In countries
such as the U.S., where there is no clear sanction given for
constitutional review by the supreme court, doubts are expressed
and controversy flares up about the legitimacy of such review.
There is no doubt about the right of the U.A.E. Supreme Court to
provide final and birding constitutional interpretations because
of the clear sanction for such interpretation by the
constitutional text.
In derrocratic countries, such as the U.S. arid West Germany,
the choices employed by constitutional courts in their review of
legislation are often criticised on the grounds that they
contradict majority rule and that they are undecratic. In the
U.A.E., the political system is not denocratic, and such disputes
are therefore inapplicable.
The finality of constitutional review is a threat to
political power within the tJ.A.E. and to the individual emirates.
This threat to traditional and political power makes the influ-
ence of the political organs on the Supreme Court such a serious
obstacle to its fulfilling its full constitutional potential.
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The Supreme Court has played an important role in the early
years of the establishment of the federation arid the operation of
the written Constitution to support the federal system, and
solved disputes about the rights of different authorities. All of
these have helped the federal system to continue and pass through
the critical first few years. But in order for the federation to
continue into the future, arid to prosper for the good of the
Enirates and their people, rrre still is needed fran the Court.
The Supreme Court has played an important role to support the
application of the constitution without negative implications for
individuals and ccmnercial activities, especially in the field of
application of Sharia. For the Supreme Court to continue and to
improve the manner in which it plays its constitutional role,
improvements are needed in its canposition and regulation.
Recognition has to be given to the important role that can
be played by the Court for the deve1optnt and maintenance of the
constitutional system of the country, and to the need for greater
confidence in its independence, in order to encourage resort to
it by government authorities, courts and individuals. Distancing
the process of appointing members of the Court f ran the canpiete
domination by the executive authority, granting the Court
institutional independence from the Ministry of Justice and
preservation of the number of judges established by the
Constitution and their life tenure are important for supporting
the independence of the Court. The Court was intended by the
framers of the Constitution to be mainly a Constitutional Court.
If preserving the Constitutional nature of the Court is
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desirable, cassation jurisdiction must be nved to another Court.
In discharging its role of constitutional interpretation a
court will find itself embroiled in questions of political
controversy to which the Constitution provides no clear answers.
The court's judgeitent will, inevitably, favour one side over the
other. In order to convince the losing party that the court has
not made a political choice, it is necessary that the court in
its judgeinent strives for judicial coherence, justifying its
decisions by reference to the values, as well as the express
words, of the Constitution; keeping in mind its own
pronouncements on other constitutional issues; and being aware
that, if it is to survive over a long time, a constitution must
be adapted to the changing circumstances of its State and of the
world. Sometimes, the best a court can do is to shG,i that its
decision is a defensible interpretation rather than denstrate
that it is the only conceivable one. This is the general lesson
of comparative constitutional law. A comparison between the U.S.
and West German Supreme Courts shows that the language and
structure of a constitution is significant to the outcomes of
particular cases: there is no single ndel of federalism. An
examination of the carinerce clause jurisprudence of the U.S.
Supreme Court shows just how important a court's contribution to
the develcpnent of a particular national version of federalism
can be. The judgements of the Supreme Court prevented the States
from arrogating local intrests over the needs of the national
market and then created the legislative opportunity for Congress
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to take the integration of the national economy further as
changed conditions demanded further governmental action.
It is against this background that the constitutional
position and jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the U.A.E.
must be considered. It is not suggested that the precise details
of the U.S. or West German systems should be decisive for the
U.A.E., I.it that it should be recognised what the Supreme Court
in any federal system must do. Although the Court is given a
major place in the U.A.E. system, there is evidence that the
proper nature of constitutional interpretation is not fully
appreciated within the U.A.E., perhaps even by the judges
themselves. When exercising its judicial discretion on federalism
questions, the Court should be aware of certain features of the
Constitution. Although it emphasises the importance of the
federal enterprise in the Preamble, the actual structure of
government gives great weight to the interests of the individual
emirates by reason of the direct participation in sane organs of
government and their ability to exercise pcierful influence over
others • The dangers to the federal system appear to cane more
fran local government than fran the national government. In these
circumstances, there is a special responsibility on the Court to
act as a counterweight to tendencies which, if taken to extremes,
could destroy the federal system. The study of the practice of
the Court shows that it has sometimes been aware of this
obligation, and its understanding of its role should develop as
it deals with more cases. Equally, the cases show some
inconsistency and weakness of reasoning which undermines the
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coherence of its jurisprudence, an important matter if its
judgements command less than enthusiastic acceptance by the
political organs of government. The Supreme Court has not been
assisted in fulfilling its constitutional role by sane of the
changes made to its jurisdiction, particularly the addition of
cassation functions.
Constitutional Courts are not without discretion in their
interpretations of constitutions, and the Supreme Court of the
U.A.E. is no exception. Recognition of the real potential, nature
and functions of these Courts is better than denying the
realities about these characteristics.
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(1)
We, the Rulers of the Eknirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah,
Ajman, Urrnt Al Qawain and Fujairah (2):
Whereas it is our desire and the desire of the people of our
flnirates to establish a Union between these Ehirates, to pranote
a better life, nore enduring stability and a higher international
status for the Bhtirates and their people;
Desiring to create closer links between the Arab Enirates in
the form of an independent, sovereign, federal state, capable of
protecting its existence and the existence of its members, in co-
operation with the sister Arab states arid with all other friendly
states which are members of the United Nations Organisation and
of the family of nations in general, on a basis of mutual respect
and reciprocal interests.and benefits;
Desiring also to lay the foundation for federal rule in the
caning years on a sound basis, corresponding to the realities arid
the capacities of the Eknirates at the present time, enabling the
Union, so far as possible, freely to achieve its goals,
sustaining the identity of its members providing that this is not
inconsistent with those goals and preparing the people of the
Union at the same time for a dignified and free constitutional
life, and progressing by steps tcards a cartprehensive, repre-
sentative, deflocratic regi in an Islamic and Arab society free
fran fear and anxiety;
Arid whereas the realisation of the foregoing was our dearest
desire, tiards which we have bent our strongest resolution,
being desirous of advancing our country and our people to the
status of qualifying them to take appropriate place among
civilised states and nations;
For all these reasons and until the preparation of the
permanent Constitution for the Union may be completed, we
proclaim before the Supreme and Cmnipotent Creator, arid before
all the peoples, our agreement to this provisional Constitution,
to which our signatures were appended, which shall be implemented
during the transitional period indicated in it;
May Allah, our Protector and Defender, grant us success.
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Article 1
The United Arab Emirates is an independent, sovereign,
federal state and is referred to hereafter in this Constitution
as the Union. The Union shall consist of the following
Emirates: -
lthu Dhabi - Dubai - Sharjah - Ajrnan - tJnin Al Qawain -
Fujairah - Ras Al Khaimah. (3)
Any other independent Arab country may join the Union,
provided that the Supre Council agrees unaninously to this.
Article 2
The Union shall exercise sovereignty in matters assigned to
it in accordance with this Constitution over all territory and
territorial waters lying within the international boundaries of
the member Emirates.
Article 3
The member Emirates shall exercise sovereignty over their
n territories arid territorial waters in all matters which are
not within the jurisdiction of the Union as assigned in this
Constitution.
Article 4
The Union may not cede its sovereignty or relinquish any
part of its territories or waters.
Article 5
The Union shall have a Flag, an Emblem and a National
Anthem. The Flag arid the Emblem shall be prescribed by Law.
Each Emirate shall retain its own flag for use within its
territories.
Article 6
The Union is a part of the Great Arab Nation, to which it is
bound by the ties of religion, language, history and common
destiny.
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The people of the Union are one people, and one part of the
Arab Nation.
Article 7
Islam is the official religion of the Union. The Islamic
Shari'ah shall be a main source of legislation in the Union. The
official language of the Union is Arabic.
Article 8
The citizens of the Union shall have a single nationality
which shall be prescribed by law. When abroad, they shall enjoy
the protection of the Union Government in accordance with
accepted international principles.
No citizen of the Union may be deprived of his nationality
nor may his nationality be with3rawn save in exceptional circum-
stances which shall be defined by Law.
Article 9
1 • The Capital of the Union shall be established in an area
allotted to the Union by the Emirates of Abe Dhabi and Dubai
on the borders between them and it shall be given the name
"Al
2. There shall be allocated in the Union budget for the first
year the anount necessary to cover the expenses of technical
studies and planning for the construction of the Capital.
However, construction work shall begin as soon as possible
and shall be canpieted in not nre than seven years fran the
date of entry into force of this constitution.
3. Until the construction of the Union Capital is canpiete, Abe
Dhabi shall be the provisional headquarters of the Union.
Article 10
The aims of the Union shall be the maintenance of its indep-
endence and sovereignty, the safeguard of its security and
stability, the defence against any aggression upon its existence
or the existence of its member states, the protection of the
rights and liabilities of the people of the Union, the
achievement of close co-operation between the Emirates for their
catnon benefit in realising these aims and in praroting their
prosperity and progress in all fields, the provision of a better
life for all citizens together with respect by each Emirate for
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the independence and sovereignty of the other Emirates in their
internal affairs within the framework of this Constitution.
Article 11
1. The Eknirates of the Union shall form an econanic and customs
entity. Union Laws shall regulate the progressive stages
appropriate to the achievement of this entity.
2. The free movement of all capital and goods between the
Emirates of the Union is guaranteed and may not be
restricted except by a Union Law.
3. All taxes, fees, duties and tolls imposed on the rrovement of
goods from one member Emirate to the other shall be
abolished.
Article 12
The foreign policy of the Union shall be directed towards
support for Arab and Islamic causes and interests and towards the
consolidation of the bonds of friendship and co-operation with
all nations and peoples on the basis of the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations and ideal international standards.
PART 1fl
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Article 13
The Union arid the member Emirates shall co-operate, within
the limits of their jurisdiction and abilities, in executing the
provisions of this Part.
Article 14
Equality, social justice, ensuring safety arid security and
equality of opportunity for all citizens shall be the pillars of
the Society. Co-operation arid mutual mercy shall be a firm bond
between them.
Article 15
The family is the basis of society. It is founded on
morality, religion, ethics and patriotism. The law shall
guarantee its existence, safeguard and protect it from
Appendix A	 - 379 -
corruption.
Article 16
Society shall be responsible for protecting childhood and
imtherhood and shall protect minors and others unable to look
after themselves for any reason, such as illness or incapacity or
old age or forced unemployment. It shall be responsible for
assisting them and enabling them to help themselves for their n
benefit and that of the carinunity.
Such matters shall be regulated by welfare and social
security legislations.
Article 17
Education shall be a furamental factor for the progress of
society. It shall be caiipulsory in its primary stage and free of
charge at all stages, within the Union. The law shall prescribe
the necessary plans for the propagation and spread of education
at various levels and for the eradication of illiteracy.
Article 18
Private schools may be established by individuals and
organisations in accordance with the provisions of the law,
provided that such schools shall be subject to the supervision of
the caupetent public authorities and to their directives.
Article 19
Medical care and means of prevention and treatment of
diseases and epidemics shall be ensured by the cainunity for all
citizens.
The cxxtinunity shall pramDte the establishment of public and
private hospitals, dispensaries and cure-houses.
Article 20
Society shall esteem work as a corner-stone of its develop-
ment. It shall endeavour to ensure that employment is available
for citizens and to train them so that they are prepared for it.
It shall furnish the appropriate facilities for that by providing
legislations protecting the rights of the employees and the
interests of the employers in the light of developing
international labour legislations.
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Article 21
Private property shall be protected. Conditions relating
thereto shall be laid down by Law. No one shall be deprived of
his private property except in circumstances dictated by the
public benefit in accordance with the provisions of the Law and
on payment of a just canpensation.
Article 22
Public property shall be inviolable. The protection of
public property shall be the duty of every citizen. The Law
shall define the cases in which penalties shall be imposed for
the contravention of that duty.
Article 23
The natural resources and wealth in each flnirate' shall be
considered to be the public property of that Enirate. Society
shall be responsible for the protection and proper exploitation
of such natural resources and wealth for the benefit of the
national econany.
Article 24
The basis of the national econany shall be social justice.
It is founded on sincere co-operation between public and private
activities. Its aim shall be the achievement of economic
developnent, increase of productivity, raising the standards of
living and the achievnent of prosperity for citizens, all within
the limits of Law.
The Union shall encourage co-operation and savings.
PA1?.P ¶I1REE
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Article 25
All persons are equal before the law, without distinction
between citizens of the Union in regard to race, nationality,
religious belief or social status.
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Article 26
Personal liberty is guaranteed to all citizens. No person
may be arrested, searched, detained or imprisoned except in
accordance with the provision of law.
No person shall be subjected to torture or to degrading
treatment.
Article 27
Crines and punishments shall be defined by the law. No
penalty shall be imposed for any act of cainission or cniission
canmitted before the relevant law has been prcrnulgated.
Article 28
Penalty is personal. n accused shall be presumed innocent
until proved guilty in a legal and fair trial. The accused shall
have the right to appoint the person who is capable to conduct
his defence during the trial. The law shall prescribe the cases
in which the presence of a counsel for defence shall be assigned.
Physical and moral abuse of an accused person is prohibited.
Article 29
Freedcin of movement and residence shall be guaranteed to
citizens within the limits of law.
Article 30
Freedan of opinion and expressing it verbally, in writing or
by other means of expression shall be guaranteed within the
limits of law.
Article 31
Freedan of caiinunication by post, telegraph or other means
of caiinunication and the secrecy thereof shall be guaranteed in
accordance with law.
Article 32
Freedan to exercise religious worship shall be guaranteed in
accordance with established custcins, provided that it does not
conflict with public policy or violate public morals.
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Article 33
Freedan of assenbly and - establishing associations shall be
guaranteed within the limits of law.
Article 34
Every citizen shall be free to choose his occupation, trade
or profession within the limits of law. Due consideration being
given to regulations organising sane of such professions and
trades • No person may be subjected to forced labour except in
exceptional circumstances provided for by the law and in return
for canpensation.
No person may be enslaved.
Article 35
Public office shall be open to all citizens on a basis of
equality of opportunity in accordance with the provisions of law.
Public office shall be a national service entrusted to those who
hold it. The public servant shall aim, in the execution of his
duties, at the public interest alone.
Article 36
Habitations shall be inviolable. They may not be entered
without the permission of their inhabitants except in accordance
with the provisions of the law and in the circumstances laid dcMn
therein.
Article 37
Citizens may not be deported or banished fran the Union.
Article 38
Extradition of citizens and of Political refugees is
prohibited.
Article 39
General confiscation of property shall be prohibited.
Confiscation of an individual' s possessions as a penalty may not
be inflicted except by a court judgnent in the circumstances
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specified by law.
Article 40
Foreigners shall enjoy, within the Union, the rights and
freedc*-n stipulat in international charters which are in force
or in treaties and agreements to which the Union is party. They
shall be subject to the corresponding obligations.
Article 41
Every person shall have the right to suhnit ccinplaints to
the canpetent authorities, including the judicial authorities,
concerning the abuse or infringement of the rights and freedan
stipulated in this Part.
Article 42
Payment of taxes and public charges determined by law is a
duty of every citizen.
Article 43
Defence of the Union is a sacred duty of every citizen and
military service is an honour for citizens which shall be
regulated by law.
Article 44
Respect of the Constitution, laws and orders issued by
public authorities in execution thereof, observance of public
order and respect of public morality are duties incumbent upon
all inhabitants of the Union.
PART IJR 'NE 1N[ PunhitLTJJS
Article 45
The Union authorities shall consist of:-
1. The Supreme Council of the Union.
2. The President of the Union and his Deputy.
3. The Council of Ministers of the Union.
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4. The National Assembly of the Union.
5. The Judiciary of the Union.
APflR I - 'flIE JIRE4E OXRII1 P ThE t!IC
Article 46
The Supreme Council of the Union shall be the highest
authority in the Union. It shall consist of the Rulers of all
the Ehiirates canposing the Union, or of those who deputise for
the Rulers in their flmLrates in the event of their absence or if
they have been excused frcni attending.
Each Eknirate shall have a single vote in the deliberations
of the Council.
Article 47
The Supreme Council of the Union shall exercise the
following matters: -
1. Formulation of general policy in all matters invested in the
tJnion by this Constitution and consideration of all matters
which leads to the achievatnt of the goals of the Union and
the coniton interest of the member Eknirates.
2. Sanction of various Union laws before their pramflgation,
including the Laws of the Annual General Budget and the
Final Accounts.
3. Sanction of decrees relating to matters which by virtue of
the provisions of this Constitution are subject to the
ratification or agreement of the Supreme Council. Such
sanction shall take place before the pranulgation of these
decrees by the President of the Union.
4. Ratification of treaties and international agreements. Such
ratification shall be accanplished by decree.
5. Approval of the appointment of the Chairman of the Council
of Ministers of the Union, acceptance of his resignation and
his rroval fran office upon a proposal fran the President
of the Union.
6. Approval of the appointment of the President and Judges of
the Supreme Court of the Union, acceptance of their
resignations and their dismissal in the circumstances
stipulated by this Constitution. Such acts shall be
accanplished by decrees.
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7. Supreme Control over the affairs of the Union in general.
8. Any other relevant matters stipulated in this Constitution
or in the Union laws.
Article 48
1. The Supreme Council shall lay down its own bye-laws which
shall include its procedure for the conduct of business and
the procedure for voting on its decisions. The
deliberations of the Council shall be secret.
2. The Supreme Council shall establish a general Secretariat
which shall consist of an adequate number of officials to
assist it in the execution of its duties.
Article 49
Decisions of the Supreme Council on substantive matters
shall be by a majority of five of its members provided that this
majority includes the votes of the Ekriirates of bu Dhabi and
Dubai. The minority shall be bound by the view of the said
maj ority.
But, decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be
by a majority vote. Such matters shall be defined in the bye-
laws of the Council.
Article 50
Sessions of the Supreme Council shall be held in the Union
capital. Sessions may be held in any other place agreed upon
beforehand.
cApJ II- ThE EiiiJr ThE IQ MD HIS Y1Y
Article 51
The Supreme Council of the Union shall elect frau anong its
members a President and a Vice President of the Union. The Vice
President of the Union shall exercise all the powers of the
President in the event of his absence for any reason.
Article 52
The term of office of the President and the Vice President
shall be five Gregorian years. They are eligible for re-election
to the same offices.
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Each of them shall, on assuming office, take the following
oath before the Supreme Council:
"1 swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful to the
United Arab flnirates; that I will respect its Constitution
and its laws; that I will protect the interests of the
people of the Union; that I will discharge my duties
faithfully and loyally and that I will safeguard the
independence of the Union and its territorial integrity."
Article 53
Upon vacancy of the office of the President or his Deputy
for death or resignation, or because either one of them ceases to
be Ruler in his flnirate for any reason, the Supreme Council shall
be called into session within one month of that date to elect a
successor to the vacant office for the period stipulated in
Article 52 of this Constitution.
In the event that the two offices of the President of the
Supreme Council and his Deputy becane vacant simultaneously, the
Council shall be linnediately called into session by any one of
its rrnbers or by the Cnairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Union, to elect a new President and Vice President to fill the
two vacant offices.
Article 54
The President of the Union shall assume the following
powers: -
1. Presiding the Supreme Council and directing its discussions.
2. Calling the Supreme Council into session, and terminating
its sessions according to the rules of procedure upon which
the Council shall decide in its bye-laws. It is obligatory
for him to convene the Council for sessions, whenever one of
its members so requested.
3. Calling the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers
into joint session whenever necessity demands.
4. Signing Union laws, decrees and decisions which the Supreme
Council has sanctioned and pranulgating them.
5. Appointing the Prime Minister, accepting his resignation and
relieving him of office with the consent of the Supreme
Council. He shall also appoint the Deputy Prime Minister
and the Ministers and shall receive their resignations and
relieve them of office in accordance with a proposal fran
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the Pr:iine Minister of the Union.
6. ppointing the diplanatic representatives of the Union to
foreign states and other senior Union officials both civil
and military (with the exception of the President and Judges
of the Supreme Court of the Union) and accepting their
resignations and dismissing them with the consent of the
Council of Ministers of the Union. Such appointments,
acceptance of resignations and dismissals shall be
accanplished by decrees and in accordance with Union laws.
7. Signing of letters of credence of diplanatic representatives
of the Union to foreign states and organisations and
accepting the credentials of diplomatic and consular
representatives of foreign states to the Union and receiving
their letters of credence. He shall similarly sign
documents of appointment and credence of representatives.
8. Supervising the implementation of Union laws, decrees and
decisions through the Council of Ministers of the Union and
the caiipetent Ministers.
9. Representing the Union internally, vis-a-vis other states
and in all international relations.
10. Exercising the right of pardon and catinutation of sentences
and approving capital sentences according to the provisions
of this Constitution and Union laws.
11. Conferring decorations and medals of honour, both civil and
military, in accordance with the laws relating to such
decorations and medals.
12. ny other power vested in him by the Supreme Council or
vested in him in conformity with this Constitution or Union
laws.
P1 UI - ThE INIEL CF MINIS'IS CF ThE tECI
Article 55
The Council of Ministers of the Union shall consist of the
Prime Minister, his Deputy and a number of Ministers.
Article 56
Ministers shall be chosen fran anxng citizens of the Union
known for their caupetence and experience.
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Article 57
The Prime Minister, his Deputy and the Ministers shall,
before assuming the responsibilities of their office, take the
following oath before the President of the Union:-
"I swear by Almighty God that I will be loyal to the United
Arab Ehdrates; that I will respect its Constitution and
laws; that I will discharge my duties faithfully; that I
will completely observe the interests of the people of the
Union and that I will ociripletely safeguard the existence of
the Union and its territorial integrity."
Article 58
The law shall define the Jurisdiction of the Ministers and
the powers of each Minister: The first Council of Ministers of
the Union shall be cailposed of the following Ministers: -
1. Foreign Affairs
2. Interior
3. Defence
4. Finance, Economy and Industry
5. Justice
6 • Education
7. Public Health
8. Public Works and Agriculture
9. Catutunications, Post, Telegraph and Telephones
10. Labour and Social Affairs
11 • Information
12. Planning.
Article 59
The Prime Minister shall preside over the meetings of the
Council of Ministers. He shall call it into session, direct its
debates, follow up the activities of Ministers and shall
supervise the co-ordination of work between the various
Ministries and in all executive organs of the Union.
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The Deputy Prime Minister shall exercise all the powers of
the Prime Minister in the event of his absence for any reason.
l½rticle 60
The Council of Ministers, in its capacity as the executive
authority of the Union, and under the supreme control of the
President of the Union and the Supreme Council, shall be
responsible for dealing with all danestic and foreign affairs
which are within the cc*npetence of the Union according to this
Constitution and Union laws.
The Council of Ministers shall, in particular, assume the
following powers:-
1. Following up the implementation of the general policy of the
Union Government, both danestic and foreign.
2. Initiating drafts of Federal Laws and subititting them to the
Union National Council before they are raised to the
President of the Union for presentation to the Supreme
Council for sanction.
3. Drawing up the annual general budget of the Union, and the
final accounts.
4. Preparing drafts of decrees and various decisions.
5. Issuing regulations necessary for the implementation of
Union laws without amending or suspending such regulations
or making any exemption fran their execution. Issuing also
policy regulations relating to the organisation of public
services and administrations, within the limits of this
Constitution and Union laws. A special provision of the law
or the Council of Ministers, may charge the canpetent Union
Minister of any other administrative authority to pranulgate
sane of such regulations.
6. Supervising the implementation of Union laws, decrees,
decisions and regulations by all the concerned authorities
in the Union or in the flnirates.
7. Supervising the execution of judgements rendered by Union
Law Courts and the implementation of international treaties
and agreements concluded by the Union.
8. Appointment and dismissal of Union employees in accordance
with the provisions of the law, provided that their appoint-
ment and dismissal do not require the issue of a decree.
9. Controlling the conduct of work in departments and public
services of the Union and the conduct and discipline of
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Union employees in general.
10. Pny other authority vested in it by law or by the Supren
Council within the limits of this Constitution.
Article 61
Deliberations of the Council of Ministers shall be secret.
Its resolutions shall be passed by a majority of its members. In
the event that voting is evenly divided, the side on which the
Prime Minister has voted shall prevail. The minority shall abide
by the opinion of the majority.
Article 62
While in office, the Prime Minister, his Deputy or any Union
Minister, may not practise any professional, commercial or
financial occupation or enter into any cciiinercial transactions
with the Government of the Union or the Governments of the
Emirates, or canbine with their office the membership of the
board of directors of any financial or caiinercial canpany.
Furthermore, they may not canbine with their office more
than one official post in any of the Emirates and shall
relinquish all other local official posts, if any.
Article 63
The members of the Council of Ministers shall aim to serve
in their conduct the interests of the Union, the pramztion of
public welfare and totally renounce personal benefits. They must
riot exploit their official capacities for their own interests or
that of any person related to them.
Article 64
The Prime Minister and the Ministers shall be politically
responsible collectively before the President of the Union and
the Supre Council of the Union for the execution of the general
policy of the Union both dcinestic and foreign. Each of them
shall be personally responsible to the President of the Union and
the Supreme Council for the activities of his Ministry or office.
The resignation of the Prime Minister, his removal from
office, his death, or the vacating of his office for any reason
whatsoever shall involve the resignation of the whole Cabinet.
The President of the Union may require the Ministers to remain in
office temporarily, to carry out imnediate administration, until
such time as a new Cabinet is formed.
Appendix A	 - 391 -
Article 65
At the beginning of every financial year, the Council of
Ministers shall submLt to the President of the Union for present-
ation to the Supreme Council, a detailed statement of internal
achievements, on the Union's relations with other states and
international organisations, together with the recc*TITendations of
the Cabinet on the best and nost practical means of strengthening
the foundations of the Union, consolidating its security and
stability, achieving its goals and progress in all fields.
Article 66
1. The Council of Ministers shall draw up its n bye-laws
including its rules of procedure.
2. The Council of Ministers shall establish a general Secret-
ariat provided with a number of employees to assist it in
the conduct of its business.
Article 67
The Law shall prescribe the salaries of the Prime Minister,
his Deputy and the other Ministers.
QIAPflR IV - ¶E NTIcI,iAL ASSFi&.Y cP ThE tIC
Secticm 1- Gral Provisis
Article 68
The National Assembly of the Union shall be cc*nposed of
forty (4) members. Seats shall be distributed to member nirates
as follcs:-
Abu Dhabi	 8 seats
Dubaj	 8 seats
Sharjah	 6 seats
Ras Al Khaimah
	
6 seats
Ajman	 4 seats
tJnrnA1waifl	 4 seats
Fujairah	 4 seats
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Article 69
Each Emirate shall be-free to determine the method of
selection of the citizens representing it in the Union National
Assembly.
Article 70
A member of the Union National Assembly rmist satisfy the
following conditions: -
1. Must be a citizen of one of the Ehirates of the union, and
permanently resident in the Enirate he represents in the
Assembly.
2. Must be not less than twenty-five Gregorian years of age at
the time of his selection
3. Must enjoy civil status, good conduct, reputation and not
previously convicted of a dishonourable offence unless he
has been rehabilitated in accordance with the law.
4. Must have adequate knowledge of reading and writing.
Article 71
Membership of the Union National Assembly shall be
incompatible with any public office in the Union, including
Ministerial portfolios.
Article 72
The term of membership in the Union National Assembly shall
be tv Gregorian years ccinnencing fran the date of its first
sitting. When this period expires, the Assembly shall be
canpletely renewed for the tine remaining until the end of the
transitional period as laid down in Article 144 of this Constit-
ution.
Any member who has canpleted his term may be re-elected.
Article 73
Before assuming his duties in the Assembly or its
Carinittees, a member of the Union National Assembly shall take
the following oath before the Assembly in public session:-
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"I swear by Almighty Gx1 that I will be loyal to the United
Arab &idrates; that I will respect the Constitution and the
laws of the Union and that I will discharge my duties in
the Assembly and its Comittees honestly and truthfully."
Article 74
If, for any reason, a seat of any ineniber of the Assembly
becartes vacant before the end of the term of his membership, a
replacement shall be selected within two months of the date on
which the vacancy is announced by the Assembly, unless the
vacancy occurs during the three months preceding the end of the
term of the Assembly.
The new member shall canpiete the term of membership of his
predecessor.
Article 75
Sessions of the Union National Assettly shall be held in the
Union capital. Exceptionally, sessions may be held in any other
place within the Union on the basis of a decision taken by a
majority vote of the members and with the approval of the Council
of Ministers.
Article 76
The Assembly shall decide upon the validity of the mandate
of its members. It shall also decide upon disqualifying members,
if they lose one of the required conditions, by a majority of all
its members and on the proposal of five among them. The Assembly
shall be caupetent to accept resignation fran membership. The
resignation shall be considered as final fran the date of its
acceptance by the Assembly.
Article 77
A member of the National Assembly of the Union shall
represent the whole people of the Union and not merely the
Enirate which he represents in the Assembly.
Secticm 2 - Organisaticxi of Work in tI Assitly
Article 78
The Assembly shall hold an annual ordinary session lasting
not less than six months, commencing on the third week of
November each year. It may be called into extraordinary session
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whenever the need arises. The Assembly may not consider at an
extraordinary session any matter other than those for which it
has been called into session.
Notwithstanding the preceding paragraph, the President of
the Union shall sunrnon the Union National Assembly to convene its
first ordinary session within a period not exceeding sixty days
fran the entry into force of this Constitution. This session
shall end at the time appointed by the Supreme Council by decree.
Article 79
The Assembly shall be suirnoned into session, and its session
shall be terminated by decree issued by the President of the
Union with the consent of the Council of Ministers of the Union.
Any meeting held by the Council without a formal surmons, or in a
place other than that legally assigned for its meeting in accord-
arice with this Constitution, shall be invalid and shall have no
effect.
Nevertheless, if the Assembly is not called to hold its
meeting for its annual ordinary session before the third week of
November, the Assembly shall be ipso facto in session on the
twenty first of the said irnth.
Article 80
The President of the Union shall inaugurate the ordinary
annual session of the Assembly whereupon he shall deliver a
speech reviewing the situation of the country and the important
events and affairs which happened during the year and outlining
the projects and reforms the Union Government plans to undertake
during the new session. The President of the Union may depute
his Vice President or the Prime Minister to open the session or
to deliver the speech.
The National Assembly shall select, fran artong its members,
a carinittee to draft the reply th the Opening Speech, emhodying
the Asemb's observations and wishes, and shall sutxnit the
reply after approval by the Assembly to the President of the
Union for sulittission to the Supreme Council.
Article 81
Members of the Assembly shall not be censured for any
opinions or views expressed in the course of carrying out their
duties within the Assembly or its Carmittees.
Appendix A	 - 395 -
Article 82
Except in cases of "flagrante delicto", no penal proceedings
may be taken against any member while the Assembly is in session,
without the authorisation of the Assembly. The Assembly must be
notified if such proceedings are taken while it is not in
session.
Article 83
The President of the Assembly and its other members shall be
entitled, fran the date of taking the oath before the Assembly,
to a remuneration which shall be determined by law, and to
travelling expenses fran their place of residence to the place in
which the Assembly is meeting.
Article 84
The Assembly shall have a Bureau consisting of a President,
a First and Second Vice President and two controllers. The
Assembly shall select them all fran among its members.
The term of office of the President and the two Vice
Presidents shall expire when the term of the Assembly expires or
when it is dissolved in accordance with the provisions of the
second paragraph of Article 88.
The term of office of the controllers shall expire with the
choice of new controllers at the opening of the next ordinary
annual session. If any post in the Bureau becanes vacant, the
Assembly shall elect who shall fill it for the remaining period.
Article 85
The Assembly shall have a Secretary-General who shall be
assisted by a number of staff who shall be directly responsible
to the Assembly. The Assembly's standing orders shall lay down
their conditions of service and their powers.
The Assembly shall lay down its standing orders, issued by
decree pranulgated by the President of the Union with the Consent
of the Council of Ministers.
The standing orders shall define the powers of the President
of the Assembly, his two Vice Presidents and the Controllers and
shall define generally all matters pertaining to the Assembly,
its carmittees, its members, its Secretariat, its employees, its
rules and procedures of discussion and voting in the Assembly and
the Committees and other matters within the limits of the
provisions of this Constitution.
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Article 86
Sessions of the Assembiy shall be public. Secret sessions
may be held at the request of a representative of the Government,
the President of the Assembly or one third of its members.
Article 87
Deliberations of the Assembly shall not be valid unless a
majority of its members at least are present. Resolutions shall
be taken by an absolute majority of the votes of members present,
except in cases where a special majority has been prescribed. If
votes are equally divided, the side which the President of the
session supports shall prevail.
Article 88
Meetings of the Assembly may be adjourned by a decree
pranulgated by the President of the Union with the approval of
the Council of Ministers of the Union for a period not exceeding
one month, provided that such adjournment is not repeated in one
session except with the approval of the Assembly and for once
only. The period of adjournment shall not be ded part of the
term of the ordinary session.
The Assembly may also be dissolved by a decree pranulgated
by the President of the Union with the approval of the Supreme
Council of the Union, provided that the decree of dissolution
includes a summons to the new Assembly to come into session
within sixty days of the date of the decree of dissolution. The
Assembly may not be dissolved again for the same reason.
Sectia 3 - Pers of the National Assitly
Article 89
In so far as this does not conflict with the provisions of
Article 110, Union Bills, including financial bills, shall be
sukznitted to the National Assembly of the Union before their
sucinission to the President of the Union for presentation to the
Supreme Council for ratification. The National Assembiy shall
discuss these bills and may pass them, amend or reject them.
Article 90
The Assembly shall examine during its ordinary session the
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annual General Budget draft law of the Union and the draft law of
the final accounts, in accordance with the provisions in Chapter
Eight of this Constitution.
Article 91
The Government shall inform the Union Assembly of
international treaties and agreements concluded with other states
and the various international organisations, together with
appropriate explanations.
Article 92
The Union National Assembly may discuss any general subject
pertaining to the affairs of the Union unless the Council of
Ministers informs the Union National Assembly that such
discussion is contrary to the highest interests of the Union.
The Prime Minister or the Minister concerned shall attend the
debates. The Union National Assembly may express its recamiend-
ations and may define the subjects for debate. If the Council of
Ministers does not approve of these recainiendations, it shall
notify the Union National Assembly of its reasons.
Article 93
The Government of the Union shall be represented at sessions
of the Union National Assembly by the Prime Minister or his
deputy or one member of the Union Cabinet at least. The Prime
Minister or his deputy or the caetent Minister, shall answer
questions put to them by any member of the Assembly requesting
explanation of any matters within their jurisdiction, in
conformity with the procedures prescribed in the standing orders
of the Assembly.
Q]APiR 5 - '1E JUDICIARY IN 11E UIC AND ThE FMRA1E
Article 94
Justice is the basis of nile. In performing their duties,
judges shall be independent and shall not be subject to any
authority but the law and their wn conscience.
Article 95
The Union shall have a Union Supr Court and Union Primary
Tribunals as explained hereafter.
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Article 96
The Union Supreme Court shall consist of a President and a
number of judges, not exceeding five in all, who shall be
appointed by decree, issued by the President of the Union after
approval by the Supreme Council. The law shall prescribe the
number of the chambers in the Court, their order and procedures,
conditions of service and retirement for its members and the
preconditions and qualifications required of them.
Article 97
The President and the Judges of the Union Supreme Court
shall not be reiwved while they administer justice. Their tenure
of office shall not be terminated except for one of the following
reasons: -
1. Death.
2. Resignation.
3. cpiration of term of contract for those who are appointed
by fixed term contract or canpletion of term of secondment.
4. Reaching retirement age.
5. Permanent incapacity to carry the burdens of their duties by
reason of ill health.
6. Disciplinary discharge on the basis of the reasons and
proceedings stipulated in the law.
7. ppointment to other offices, with their consent.
Article 98
The President and the Judges of the Union Supreme Court
shall, before holding office, swear on oath before the President
of the Union and in the presence of the Union Minister of Justice
that they will render justice without fear or favour and that
they will be loyal to the Constitution and the laws of the Union.
Article 99
The Union Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction in the
following matters: -
1 • Various disputes between member Enirates in the Union, or
between any one nirate or more and the Union Government,
whenever such disputes are su1nitted to the Court on the
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request of any of the interested parties.
2. Examination of the constitutionality of Union laws, if they
are challenged by one or itore of the irates on the grounds
of violating the Constitution of the Union.
Examination of the constitutionality of legislations prcrnul-
gated by one of the Enirates, if they are challenged by one
of the Union authorities on the grounds of violation of the
Constitution of the Union or of Union laws.
3. Examination of the constitutionality of laws, legislations
and regulations in general, if such request is referred to
it by any Court in the country during a pending case before
it. The aforesaid Court shall be bound to accept the ruling
of the Union Supreme Court rendered in this connection.
4. Interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, when
so requested by any. Union authority or by the Government of
any Ekuirate. Any such interpretation shall be considered
binding on all.
5. Trial of Ministers and senior officials of the Union
appointed by decree regarding their actions in carrying out
their official duties on the demand of the Supreme Council
and in accordance with the relevant law.
6. Crimes directly affecting the interests of the Union, such
as crimes relating to its internal or external security,
forgery of the official records or seals of any of the Union
authorities and counterfeiting of currency.
7. Conflict of jurisdiction between the Union judicial
authorities and the local judicial authorities in the
flnirates.
8 • Conflict of jurisdiction between the judicial authority in
one Eknirate and the judicial authority in another Ekuirate.
The rules relating thereof shall be regulated by a Union
Law.
9. Any other jurisdiction stipulated in this Constitution, or
which may be assigned to it by a Union law.
Article 100
The Union Supreme Court shall hold its sittings in the
capital of the Union. It may, exceptionally, assemble when
necessary in the capital of any one of the Ekairates.
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Article 101
The j udgements of the Union Supreme Court shall be final and
binding upon all.
If the Court, in ruling on the constitutionality of laws,
legislations and regulations, decides that a Union legislation is
inconsistent with the Union Constitution, or that local
legislations or regulations under consideration contain
provisions which are inconsistent with the Union Constitution or
with a Union law, the authority concerned in the Union or in the
Emirate, accordingly, shall be obliged to hasten to take the
necessary measures to remove or rectify the constitutional
inconsistency.
Article 102
The Union shall have one or more Union Primary Tribunals
which shall sit in the permanent capital of the union or in the
capitals of some of the Emirates, in order to exercise the
judicial powers within the sphere of their jurisdiction in the
following cases:-
1 • Civil, carrnercial and administrative disputes between the
Union and individuals whether the Union is plaintiff or
defendant.
2. Crimes committed within the boundaries of the permanent
capital of the Union, with the exception of such matters as
are reserved for the Union Supreme Court under Article 99 of
this Constitution.
3. Personal status cases, civil and camiercial cases and other
cases between individuals which shall arise in the permanent
capital of the Union.
Article 103
The law shall regulate all matters connected with the Union
Primary Tribunals in respect of their organisation, formation,
chambers, local jurisdiction, procedures to be followed before
them, the oath to be srn by their judges, conditions of service
relating to them and the ways of appeal against their judgements.
The law may stipulate that appeals against the judgements of
these Tribunals shall be heard before one of the chambers of the
Union Supreme Court, in the cases and according to the procedures
prescribed therein.
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Article 104
The local judicial authorities in each nirate shall havejurisdiction in all judicial matters not assigned to the Unionjudicature in accordance with this Constitution.
Article 105
All or part of the jurisdiction assigned to the localjudicial authorities in accordance with the preceding Article may
be transferred by a Union law issued at the request of the
fluirate concerned, to the Primary Union Tribunals.
Circumstances in which appeals against judgements by the
local judicial authorities in penal, civil, cartnercial and other
litigations may be referred to the Union Tribunals, shall be
defined by a Union law provided that its decision in such appeals
shall be final.
Article 106
The Union shall have a Public Prosecutor who shall be
appointed by a Union decree issued with the approval of the
Council of Ministers, assisted by a number of members of the
Public Prosecutor's office.
The law shall regulate matters relating to the members of
the Union Public Prosecutor' s Office with respect to their method
of appointment, ranks, pratotion, retirement and the qualific-
ations required of them.
Besides, the Union Law of Criminal Procedure and trials
shall regulate the power of this body and its procedures and the
competence of its assistants from the police and the public
security officers.
Article 107
The President of the Union may grant pardon from the
execution of any sentence passed by a Union judicature before it
is carried out or while it is being served or he may carirnute such
sentence, on the basis of the recommendation of the Union
Minister of Justice, after obtaining the approval of a catmittee
formed under the chairmanship of the Minister and consisting of
six members selected by the Union Council of Ministers for a term
of three years which may be renewed. The members of the
committee shall be chosen from citizens of good repute and
capability.
Membership of the catinittee shall be gratis. Its deliber-
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ations shall be secret. Its decisions shall be issued by a
majority vote.
Article 108
No sentence of death imposed finally by a Union judicial
authority shall be carried out until the President of the Union
has confirmed the sentence. He may substitute it by an attenuate
sentence in accordance with the procedure stipulated in the
preceding Article.
Article 109
There shall be no general amnesty for a crime or for
specified crimes except by law.
The prcxnulgation of the law of amnesty shall consider such
crimes being deemed non avenu, and shall remit the execution of
the sentence or the remaining part of it.
PAR1 FIVE
tNEa tXISLA1'I( AND IEEFS AND 'NE AUIILRLTJJS HAVI
uiicric	 iaiaN
cAPflR I - r.ia LAWS
Article 110
1. Union laws shall be promulgated in accordance with the
provisions of this Article and other appropriate provisions
of the Constitution.
2. A draft law shall becane a law after the adoption of the
fol1ing procedure: -
(a) The Council of Ministers shall prepare a bill and su1nit it
to the Union National Assembly.
(b) The Council of Ministers shall submit the bill to the
President of the Union for his approval and presentation to
the Supr Council for ratification.
(c) The President of the Union shall sign the bill after ratif-
ication by the Supreme Council and shall pranulgate it.
3. (a) If the Union National Assembly inserts any amendment to
the bill and this amendment is not acceptable to the
President of the Union or the Supreme Council or if the
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Union National Assembly rejects the bill, the President of
the Union or the Supreme Council may refer it back to the
National Assembly. If the Union National Assembly
introduces any amendment on that occasion which is not
acceptable to the President of the Union or the Supreme
Council, or if the Union National Assembly decides to reject
the bill, the President of the Union may pranulgate the law
after ratification by the Supreme Council.
(b) The term "bill" in this clause shall mean the draft
which is sulmitted to the President of the Union by the
Council of Ministers including the amendments, if any, made
to it by the Union National Asse1y.
4. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the situation requires the
pranulgation of Union laws when the National Assembly is not
in session, the Council of Ministers of the Union may issue
them through the Supreme Council and the President of the
Union, provided that the Union Assembly is notified at its
next meeting.
Article 111
Laws shall be published in the Official Gazette of the Union
within a maximum of two weeks fran the date of their signature
and pranulgation by the President of the Union after the Supreme
Council has ratified them. Such laws shall becane in force one
nonth after the date of their publication in the said Gazette,
unless another date is specified in the said law.
Article 112
No laws may be applied except on what occurs as fran the
date they becane in force and no retroactive effect shall result
in such laws. The law may, however, stipulate the contrary in
matters other than criminal, if necessity so requires.
Q1AP1R II- t	 IS) BY I
Article 113
Should necessity arise for urgent pranulgation of Union laws
between sessions of the Supreme Council, the President of the
Union together with the Council of Ministers may prariulgate the
necessary laws in the form of decrees which shall have the force
of law, provided that they are not inconsistent with the Constit-
ution.
Such decree-laws must be referred to the Supreme Council
within a week at the maxiniumn for assent or rejection. If they
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are approved, they shall have the force of law and the Union
National Assembly shall be notified at its next meeting.
However, if the Supreme Council does not approve them, they
shall cease to have the force of law unless that it has decided
to sanction their effectiveness during the preceding pericxl, or
to settle in sane other way the effects arising therefran.
QF1R m - DflRY
Article 114
No decree may be issued unless the Council of Ministers has
confirmed it and the President of the Union or the Supreme
Council, according to their powers, has ratified it. Decrees
shall be published in the Official Gazette after signature by the
President of the Union.
Article 115
While the Supreme Council is out of session and if necessity
arises, it may authorise the President of the Union and the
Council of Ministers collectively to pranulgate decrees whose
ratification is within the power of the Supreme Council, provided
that such authority shall not include ratification of inter-
national agreements and treaties or declaration or rescission of
martial law or declaration of a defensive war or appointment of
the President or Judges of the Union Supreme Court.
PA SIX
ThE 4IRA1S
Article 116
The Ekmirates shall exercise all powers not assigned to the
Union by this Constitution. The flnirates shall all participate
in the establishment of the Union and shall benefit f ran its
existence, services and protection.
Article 117
The exercise of rule in each flnirate shall aim in particular
at the maintenance of security and order within its territories,
the provision of public utilities for its inhabitants and the
raising of social and econanic standards.
Appendix A	 - 405 -
Article 118
The member flnirates of the Union shall all work for the co-
ordination of their legislations in various fields with the
intention of unifying such legislations as far as possible.
Two or more Emirates may, after obtaining the approval of
the Supreme Council, agglanerate in a political or administrative
unit, or unify all or part of their public services or establish
a single or joint administration to run any such service.
Article 119
Union law shall regulate with utmost ease matters pertaining
to the execution of judgements, requests for commissions of
rogation, serving legal documents and surrender of fugitives
between rrnber tLrates of the Union.
PART SEVEN
DII7E(I (1? LEXISLTIVE, EX7IVE AND I!1]ThNNFICUAL
JtnusDIcrIcs BE'1WEE 'fliE WICN AND ¶E EtR1dS
Article 120
The Union shall have exclusive legislative and executive
jurisdiction in the follcMing affairs:-
1. Foreign affairs.
2. Defence and the Union Armed Forces.
3. Protection of the Union's security against internal or
external threat.
4. Matters pertaining to security, order and rule in the
permanent capital of the Union.
5. Matters relating to Union officials and Union judiciary.
6. Union finance and Union taxes, duties and fees.
7. Union public loans.
8. Postal, telegraph, telephone and wireless services.
9. Construction, maintenance and improvement of Union roads
which the Supr Council has determined to be trunk roads.
The organisation of traffic on such roads.
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10. Air Traffic Control and the issue of licences to aircraft
and pilots.
11. Education.
12. Public health and medical services.
13. Currency board and coinage.
14 • Measures, standards and weights.
15. Electricity services.
16. Union nationality, passports, residence and irrinigration.
17. Union properties and all matters relating thereto.
18. Census affairs and statistics relevant to Union purposes.
19. Union Information.
Article 121
Without prejudice to the provisions of the preceding
Article, the Union shall have exclusive legislative jurisdiction
in the following matters:-
Labour relations and social security; real estate and exprop-
nation in the public interest; extradition of criminals, banks;
insurance of. all kinds; protection of agricultural and animal
wealth; major legislations relating to penal law, civil and
catraercial transactions and ccinpany law, procedures before the
civil and criminal courts; protection of cultural, technical and
industrial property and copyright; printing and publishing;
import of arms and aninunition except for use by the armed forces
or the security forces belonging to any Emirate; other aviation
affairs which are not within the executive jurisdiction of the
Union, delimitation of territorial waters and regulation of
navigation on the high seas.
Article 122
The Emirates shall have jurisdiction in all matters not
assigned to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Union in accordance
with the provisions of the two preceding Articles.
Article 123
As an exception to paragraph 1 of Article 120 concerning the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Union in matters of foreign policy
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and international relations, the member flnirates of the Union nay
conclude limited agreements of a local and administrative nature
with the neighbouring states or regions, save that such
agreements are not inconsistent with the interests of the Union
or with Union laws and provided that the Supreme Council of the
Union is informed in advance. If the Council objects to the
conclusion of such agreements, it shall be obligatory to suspend
the matter until the Union Court has ruled on that objection as
early as possible.
The Emirates may retain their membership in the OPEC organ-
isation and the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting
Countries or may join them.
Article 124
Before the conclusion of any treaty or international agree-
ment which may affect the status of any of the Eknirates, the
competent Union authorities shall consult that Emirate in
advance. In the event of a dispute, the matter shall be
sulxn.itted to the Union Supreme Court for ruling.
Article 125
The Governments of the Emirates shall undertake the
appropriate measures to implement the laws pranulgated by the
Union and the treaties and international agreements concluded by
the Union, including the pranulgation of the local laws, regul-
ations, decisions arid orders necessary for such implementation.
The Union authorities shall supervise the implementation by
Emirates' Governments of the Union laws, decisions, treaties,
agreements arid Union j udgements. The canpetent administrative
and judicial authorities in the Emirates should forward to the
Union authorities all possible assistance in this connection.
PAIP EIQff
FINCIAL AFFAIRS	 E tVIC
Article 126
The general revenues of the Union shall consist of the
incane fran the follaing resources: -
1. xes, fees and duties imposed under a Union law in matters
within the legislative and executive jurisdiction of the
Union.
2. Fees and rates received by the Union in return for services
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member Emirates of the Union in the
Union in accordance with the article
4. Union incane fran its own properties.
Article 127
The member Emirates of the Union shall contribute a
specified proportion of their annual revenues to cover the annual
general budget expenditure of the Union, in the manner and on the
scale to be prescribed in the Budget Law.
Article 128
The law shall prescribe the mathod of preparing the general
budget of the Union and the final accounts. The law shall also
define the beginning of the financial year.
Article 129
The draft annual budget of the Union, cariprising estimates
of revenues and expenditure, shall be referred to the Union
National Assembly at least tx ricnths before the beginning of the
financial year, for discussion and submission of comments
thereon, before the draft budget is sulinitted to the Supreme
Council of the Union, together with those carinents, for assent.
Article 130
The annual general budget shall be issued by a law. In all
cases, where the budget law has not been promulgated before the
beginning of the financial year, temporary i&nthly funds may be
made by Union decree on the basis of one twelfth of the funds of
the previous financial year. Revenues shall be collected and
expenditure disbursed in accordance with the laws in force at the
end of the preceding financial year.
Article 131
All expenditure not provided for in the budget, all expend-
iture in excess of the budget estimates and all transfers of sums
from one part to another of the Budget must be covered by a law.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, in cases of extreme urgency,
such expenditure or transfer may be arranged by decree-law in
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conformity with the provisions of Article 113 of this
Constitution.
Article 132
The Union shall allocate in its annual budget a sum from its
revenue to be expended on building and construction projects,
internal security and social affairs according to the urgent
needs of some of the flnirates.
The execution of these projects and the disbursement thereon
shall be drawn from these funds, accomplished by means of and
under the supervision of the canpetent Union bodies with the
agreement of authorities of the flmirates concerned.
The Union may establish a special fund for this purpose.
Article 133
No Union tax may be imposed, amended or abolished except by
virtue of law. No person may be exempted from payment of such
taxes except in the cases specified by law.
Union taxes, duties and fees may not be levied on any person
except within the limits of the law and in accordance with its
provisions.
Article 134
No public loan may be contracted except by a Union law. No
ccninitment involving the payment of sums from Union Exchequer in
a future year or years may be concluded except by means of a
Union law.
Article 135
The final accounts of the financial administration of the
Union for the completed financial year shall be referred to the
Union National Assembly within the four nnths following the end
of the said year, for its comments thereon, before their
sutinission to the Supreme Council for approval, in the light of
the Auditor-General' s report.
Article 136
An independent Union department headed by an Auditor-General
who shall be appointed by decree, shall be established to audit
the accounts of the Union and its organs and agencies, and to
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audit any other accounts assigned to the said department for that
purpose in accordance with the law.
The law shall regulate this department arid shall define • its
jurisdiction and the canpetence of those working therein, and the
guarantees to be given to it, its head and the employees working
in it in order that they may carry out their duties in the nost
efficient manner.
PART NINE
A	 FS	 SEIT! FS
Article 137
Every attack upon any member Ekidrate of the Union shall be
considered an attack upon all the Ekmirates and upon the existence
of the Union itself, which all Union arid local forces will co-
operate to repel by all means possible.
Article 138
Only (5) the Union shall have army, navy and air forces with
unified training and catimand. The Cctmiander in Chief of these
forces and the Chief of the General Staff shall be appointed arid
dismissed by means of a Union decree.
The Union may have a Union Security Forces.
The Union Council of Ministers shall be responsible directly
to the President of the Union and the Supreme Council of the
Union for the affairs of all these forces.
Article 139
The law shall regulate military service, general or partial
mobilisation, the rights and duties of members of the Armed
Forces, their disciplinary procedures and similarly the special
regulations of the Union Security Forces.
Article 140
The declaration of defensive war shall be declared by a
Union decree issued by the President of the Union after its
approval by the Supreme Council. Offensive war shall be
prohibited in accordance with the provisions of international
charters.
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Article 141
A Supreme Defence Council shall be set up under the
chairmanship of the President of the Union. Aitong its members
shall be the Vice President of the Union, the Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of the Union, the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, Defence, Finance, Interior, the Carinander in Chief and
the Chief of the General Staff. It shall advise and offer views
on all matters pertaining to defence, maintenance of the peace
and security of the Union, forming of the armed forces, their
equipment and developmnent and the determination of their posts
and camps.
The Council may invite any military adviser or expert or
other persons it wishes to attend its meetings but they shall
have no decisive say in its deliberations. All matters
pertaining to this Council shall be regulated by means of a law.
Article 142 (6)
The member flmirates shall have the right to set up local
security forces ready and equipped to join the defensive
machinery of the Union to defend, if need arises, the Union
against any external aggression.
Article 143
Any Enirate shall have the right to request the assistance
of the Armed Forces or the Security Forces of the Union in order
to maintain security and order within its territories whenever it
is exposed to danger. Such a request shall be submitted
inmnediately to the Supreme Council of the Union for decision.
The Supreme Caincil may call upon the aid of the local armed
forces belonging to any Eknirate for this purpose provided that
the Eknirate requesting assistance and the flnirate to whan the
forces belong agree.
The President of the Union and the Council of Ministers of
the Union collectively, may, if the Supreme Council is not in
session, take any inmnediate measure which cannot be delayed and
considered necessary and may call the Supreme Council into
inTnediate session.
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FflL AND NSITIAL JVISIaS
Article 144
1. Subject to the provisions of the following paragraphs, the
provisions of this Constitution shall apply for a
transitional period of five Gregorian years beginning fran
the date of its entry into force in accordance with
provisions of Article 152 (7).
2. a) If the Supreme Council considers that the topmost
interests of the Union require the amendment of this
Constitution, it shall submit a draft constitutional
amendment to the Union National Assembly.
(b) The procedure for approving the constitutional amendment
shall be the same as the procedure for approving laws.
(c) The approval of the Union National Assembly for a draft
constitutional amendment shall require the agreement of two-
thirds of the votes of members present.
The President of the Union shall sign the constitutional
amendment in the name of the Supreme CcBmcil and as its
representative and shall pranulgate the amendment.
3. During the transitional period, the Supreme Council shall
adopt the necessary measures to prepare a draft permanent
Constitution to take the place of this temporary
constitution. It shall submit the draft permanent
Constitution to the Union National Assembly for debate
before prariulgating it.
4. The Supreme Council shall call the Union National Assembly
into extraordinary session at a time not more than six
rronths before the end of the period of validity of this
temporary Constitution. The permanent Constitution shall be
presented at this session. It shall be promulgated
according to the procedure laid down in paragraph 2 of this
Article.
Article 145
Under no circumstances, may any of the provisions of this
Constitution be suspended, except when Martial Law is in force
and within the limits specified by this law.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, sessions of the National
Assembly of the Union may not be suspended during that period nor
may the irirnunity of its members be violated.
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Article 146
In case of necessity defined by law, Martial law shall be
declared by a decree praiiulgated with the approval of the Supreme
Council on the basis of a proposal made by the President of the
Union with the consent of the Council of Ministers of the Union.
Such decree shall be notified to the Union National Assembly at
its next meeting.
Martial law shall be similarly lifted by decree issued with
the approval of the Supreme Council when the need, for which it
was imposed, no longer exists.
Article 147
Nothing in the application of this Constitution shall affect
treaties or agreements concluded by member Emirates with states
or international organisations unless such treaties or agreents
are amended or abrogated by agreement between the parties
concerned.
Article 148
All matters established by laws, regulations, decrees,
orders and decisions in the various member Emirates of the Union
in effect upon the caning into force of this Constitution, shall
continue to be applicable unless amended or replaced in
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.
Similarly, the measures and organisations existing in the
member Emirates shall continue to be effective until the
promulgation of laws amending them in accordance with the
provisions of the Constithtion.
Article 149
As an exception to the provisions of Article 121 of this
Constitution, the Emirates may pranulgate legislations necessary
for the regulation of the matters set out in the said Article
without violation of the provisions of Article 151 of this
Constitution.
Article 150
The Union authorities shall strive to issue the laws
referred to in this Constitution as quickly as possible so as to
replace the existing legislations and systems, particularly those
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which are not consistent with the provisions of the Constitution.
Article 151
The provisions of this Constitution shall prevail over the
Constitutions of the member Eknirates of the Union and the Union
laws which are issued in accordance with the provisions of this
Constitution shall have priority over the legislations,
regulations and decisions issued by the authorities of the
flnirates.
In case of conflict, that part of the inferior legislation
which is inconsistent with the superior legislation shall be
rendered null and void to the extent that rar,ves the inconsist-
ency. In case of dispite, the matter shall be referred to the
Union Supreme Court for its ruling.
Article 152
The Constitution shall take effect fran the date to be fixed
in a declaration to be issued by the Rulers signatories to this
Constitution.
Signed in Dubai on this day the 18th of July, 1971,
corresponding to this day the 25th of the month of Jarnad Awwal
1391.
(Signatures of the Rulers of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah,
Ajmari, Uirin Al Qawain, Fujairah). (8)
AeYiix A Footrk±es
This constitution is based, to a large extent, on the ndel
set by the Egyptian Constitution. A principal reason for. the
heavy influence of the Egyptian Constitution is the general
place which the Egyptian legal system occupies as a mel
for other Arab countries.
A second reason for the Egyptian influence was the
participation of a number of Egyptian legal advisers and
scholars in the process of drafting the U.A.E. Constitution.
Dr. Wahid Ra 'fat, the Egyptian scholar, was the main drafter
of the final version of this constitution.
The U.A.E. Constitution is also affected by British
influences in saie of its major characteristics. The federal
system adopted by this constitution is a system favoured by
the British for adoption by their former colonies and
protectorates.
2 Ras Al Khaimah joined the Union on the 10th of February,
1972.
3 The original signatories of the Constitution did not include
Ras Al Khaimah. which adhered to the Union on '10 February,
1972. A new paragraph was added by a Declaration of
Constitutional Amendment No. 1 (1972) which reads as
follows: -
"In the event of the acceptance of a new member joining
the Union, the Supreme Council of the Union shall
determine the number of seats which will be allocated
to that member in the National Assembly of the Union,
being in addition to the number sti*ilated in Article
68 of this Constitution."
4 Decision of the Supreme Council of the Union No. 3, 1972.
5 Added by Constitutional amendment No. 1 (1 976).
6 Depleted by Constitutional Amendment No. 1 (1976).
7 This paragraph has been amended three consecutive times, the
last of which was in 1981. The effect of the last amendment
is to make the term of this Constitution expire on 1 st of
Decriber 1 991.
8 Ras Al Khaimah joined the Union on the 10th February, 1972.
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aXIRT (1)(2)
Article 1
A Supreme Court shall be established in the United Arab
Emirates, this Court shall be called "The Union Supreme Court".
Reference will be made to it in this law as "The Supreme Court".
This Court shall be the supreme judicial authority in the
Union.
Article 2
The seat of the Supreme Court shall be in the capital of the
Union. The Court can hold its sessions in any of the capitals of
the Emirates whenever appropriate.
Article 3 (3)
The Supreme Court shall be canposed of a President and four
judges. A sufficient number of alternate judges can be appointed
to the Court. No more than one alternate judge can sit in the
Constitutional Chamber. Regulations concerning the judges of the
Supreme Court shall be applied to the alternate judges with the
exception of the matters specifically regulated for the alternate
judges.
Article 4
To be appointed to the Supreme Court a person has to satisfy
the following requirements: -
1. To be a citizen of the United Arab Emirates and of a
canpiete civil capacity.
2. To be at least thirty five years of age.
3. To hold a degree in the Islamic Shari'a and Law frau an
accredited University or a higher educational institution.
4. To have caupleted a period of work of at least fifteen years
in judicial or legal employment in a Court or an equivalent
employment in the public prosecution, or legal consulting
departments of the government; engagement in the represent-
ation of the government before the Courts; teaching of Law
or Islamic Sbari'a in an accredited University or higher
educational institution; practice in the legal profession as
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an attorney; or in any other employment which is equivalent
to the judicial employment.
Article 5
As an exception from the requirement of item 1 of the
preceding Article, citizens of Arab countries can be appointed to
the Court, provided that they fulfil the other requirements.
Appointments of such individuals should be by way of
secondment fran their governments or by contracts of employment
for limited and renewable periods.
All rules of this Law shall be applied to judges on second-
ment or appointed by contract.
Article 6
The period specified in item 4 of Article 4 shall be reduced
to half its length, and the age requirement contained in the
second item of Article 4 shall be reduced to thirty years, for
citizens of the Union who fulfil the other requirements for
appointment.
The application of the preceding paragraph shall continue in
the first seven years following the caning into force of this
Law.
Article 7
Appointment of the President and judges of the Supreme Court
shall be by decree, issued by the President of the Union after
approval by the Council of Ministers and ratification by the
Supreme Council of the Union. The seniority of the judges shall
be based on the date of the decree of appointment and in accord-
ance with the order in that decree.
Article 8
The President of the Court and its judges shall, before
assuming their responsibilities, take the following oath before
the President of the Union and in the presence of the Minister of
Justice: -
"I swear by Almighty God that I will decide in accordance
with justice, without fear or prejudice, and that I will be
faithful to the Constitution of the United Arab Enirates and
its Laws."
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Article 9 (4)
The Supreme Court shall have one Chamber for Constitutional
matters and other Chambers for consideration of other matters
included in this Law, Union Law Number 17 for the year 1978, or
any other Law. The Chambers shall be presided over by the
President of the Court or the irst senior judge. No alternate
judge shall be allowed to preside over any Chamber.
Decisions in matters included in the first seven items of
Article 33 of this Law shall be passed by a five-member Chamber
with a maximum of two alternate judges. Decisions in other
matters shall be passed by a three-member Chamber. In both
cases, decisions shall be taken by majority. However, decisions
of death sentence shall not be issued except by unanimous
decision.
Article 10
The Supreme Court shall have a plenum of all its judges
presided over by its President or acting president. The plenum
shall have jurisdiction in organising Chambers, distribution of
workloads between them, determining the number, dates and times
of sessions for each Chamber, in addition to all matters relating
to the organisation of the Court, its internal matters and all
other matters provided by Law.
Article 11 (5)
The plenum of the Court shall hold a meeting at the
beginning of every year, on the sunuons of the President of the
Court or its acting president. Additional meetings may be
arranged whenever such are felt necessary.
The Public Prosecution shall be called to the meetings and
its representative given the right to raise his opinion in
matters relating to its duties.
For the plenum's meetings to be quorate, at least three of
its original judges, including the President of the Court or its
acting president, have to be present. Decisions of the plenum
shall be taken by absolute majority of the present members. In
case of a split vote, the side of the President shall prevail.
The proceedings of the plenum' s meetings shall be recorded and
signed by the president of each meeting.
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Article 12
The Court shall have an annual judicial recess starting fraii
the beginning of July and ending at the end of August. The
recess shall be considered ordinary holiday for those who are not
assigned work during it.
The plenum of the Court shall organise holidays of judges
and the work of the Court during the annual judicial recess.
Judges shall not be given their annual holidays in periods other
than the annual judicial recess, unless such are necessary and
only within the possible limits allaed by the Court's work.
Permission for such holidays shall be given by the President
of the Court, and for a maximum of fifteen days.
Article 13
The Supreme Court shall have a technical office canposed of
a president and a sufficient number of members chosen from
members of the judiciary, public prosecution, consultation and
legislation authorities, or others who are employed in performing
works equivalent to the judicial employment.
In case of necessity, posts may be filled by way of second-
merit fran local judicial authorities or fran lawyers fran Arab
countries who acquire sufficient experience and ability.
The attachment of the members of the technical office shall
be by way of secoridinent or temporary employment according to a
decision fran the Minister of Justice, after suggestion fran the
President of the Court and approval of the authority f ran which
the member is seconded or given temporary leave.
A sufficient number of staff shall be attached to the
technical office.
Article 14
The technical office shall undertake the performance of the
follcMing matters: -
1 • The expedition of legal rules established by the Supreme
Court in its decisions, categorisation arid organisation of
such rules to simplify future reference to them.
2. Supervision of copying, printing and publishing of the
Court's decisions.
3. Preparation of research required by the President or any of
the Chambers of the Court.
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4. Supervision of the Court's schedules and registration of
cases, petitions and applications in these schedules.
5. Other matters referred to it by the President of the Court.
Article 15
The Supreme Court shall have a secretariat of clerks, and
another of sunuons servers, headed by a senior clerk and a senior
surirrons server respectively, and assisted by a sufficient number
of staff.
The clerks and sunirons servers shall take an oath before
assuming their duties, before a Chamber of the Court, to
discharge their duties honestly and faithfully. The oath shall
be recorded and kept in a special record. A copy shall be filed
in the employee's file.
In matters not regulated by the preceding paragraphs, the
Union Law of Civil Service shall apply in relation to these
employees.
Article 16
The President of the Court shall have the right to supervise
its judges and business, and the right to caution regarding
occurrences inccxnpatible with the duties and requirements of
office.
Article 17
The President of the Court has the disciplinary power
over civil servants and employees of the Court, that is given to
the Minister and Under-Secretary by the Union Law of Civil
Service.
Article 18
The tenure of office of the President and the judges of the
Supreme Court shall not be terminated except for one of the
fo1lcing reasons: -
1. Death.
2. Resignation.
3. Ecpiration of term of contract for those who are appointed
by fixed term contract or caupletion of term of secondment.
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4. Reaching retirement age.
5. Permanent incapacity to carry the burden of their duties by
reason of ill health.
6. Disciplinary discharge on the basis of the reasons and
proceedings stipulated in the Law.
7. Appointment to other offices, with their consent.
Article 19
The retirement age for the President and judges of the
Supreme ('curt shall be sixty five years. If such age is reached
within the period fran the first day of Ctober to the last day
of June, the member shall continue to hold office until the
latter date.
Whenever considered appropriate, extension of service of
members of the Court may be decided for a period or periods not
exceeding three years, provided that each period shall not be
less than one judicial year. Extension of service shall be by
the same means of appointment.
PARE '1W) 'IIUAL (P JER]QS AND 9-nrn IMCMiEN (6)
PAI ilaRE C4PE"]	 (P ThE ME4E (fl]RT
Article 33
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in the
follc 'dng matters: -
1 • Various disputes between member Eknirates in the Union, or
between any one or nre fluirates and the Union Covernment,
whenever such disputes are suhuitted to the Court at the
request of any of the interested parties.
2. Examination of the constitutionality of Union Laws, if they
are challenged by one or nore of the flnirates on the grounds
of violating the Constitution of the Union.
3. Examination of the constitutionality of legislations
pranulgated by one of the Eknirates, if they are challenged
by one of the Union authorities on the grounds of violation
of the Constitution of the Union or of Union Laws.
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4. Examination of the constitutionality of laws, legislations
and regulations in general, if such request is referred to
it by any Court in the country during a case pending before
it.
5. Interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, when
so requested by any Union authority or by the Government of
any Emirate.
6. Interpretation of treaties or international agreements, when
so requested by any Union authority, by any of the member
Enirates, or if such interpretation is the subject of a
dispute pending before any Court.
7. Trial of Ministers and senior officials of the Union
appointed by decree, regarding their actions in carrying out
their official duties on the demand of the Supreme Council
and in accordance with the relevant law.
8. Crimes directly affecting the interests of the Union, such
as crimes relating to its internal or external security,
forgery of the official records or seals of any of the Union
authorities and counterfeiting of currency.
9. Conflict of jurisdiction between the Union judicial
authorities and the judicial authorities of the Emirates.
10. Conflict of jurisdiction between a judicial entity in an
Emirate and a judicial entity in another Emirate, or anongjudicial entities in a single Emirate.
11. ny other jurisdiction stipulated in the Constitution or any
Union Law.
PARP xJR ThE UNI UIC rsaxrria NYThUUTY
(This Part includes establishment of the Public Prosecution
authority and its general regulations.)
PARP FIVE ThE I Xfl1RES iuu ThE 3I4E axr
Article 51
Until legislations regulating civil and criminal procedures
are passed, rules included in this Part and general adjudicative
rules shall be applied in relation to proceedings before the
Supreme Court.
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Article 52
Eccept in criminal actions, petitions to the Court shall be
brought by means of a menrandum. This merrorandum must include,
in addition to names of the parties, their capacities and
addresses, information about the subject of the petition and the
constitutional or legislative provisions relating to the
application of interpretation or the dispute besides
clarification of the suggested contradiction or vagueness in such
provisions, together with all elements of the case and documents
necessary. The menorandum shall be signed by the petitioner.
In the case of petitions brought by federal or local
authorities, signature shall be by their legal agents. If
petitions are brought by individuals, signature shall be by an
attorney accepted to appear before the Supreme Court.
The petitioner shall file with the original copy, additional
copies of the merx,randum and documents, of a number sufficient
for the other parties and the members of the Court.
Criminal actions shall be brought by the Prosecutor General
by way of suntioning the accused to appear before the Court. The
summons shall indicate the alleged offence and the legal
provisions stipulating the penalties, in regard to felonies a
list of the available evidence shall be served with the sunitons.
The surritons shall be served to the receiver in person or to
his danicile in accordance with the manner stipulated in Article
54.
Sunirons shall be served to prisoners in the presence of the
governors of the prisons or their deputies.
Surmons for members of the armed forces or the police shall
be served in the presence of their superiors or through the
authority entrusted with receiving such sunirons.
Article 53
The clerk secretariat of the Court shall record petitions in
the same day of receipt of their merroranda. Such recording shall
be in a special record and in the same subsequent order of their
receipt. Record of petitions shall be transferred to the
President of the Court to determine a session for consideration
of each, then he shall pass the record with a note for each
petition containing the date, number and session in which each
petition shall be considered.
The clerk secretariat shall expediently notify the concerned
parties. The case shall be considered starting fran the date of
its recording. Notification shall be carried out by the
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secretariat of summoners. Help may be sought from persons
designated for such purpose by the Minister of Justice. Motif ic-
action shall include, in addition to the special information
regarding the date and time of service of such notice, the name
and occupation of its server and the name and capacity of its
receiver.
No notice shall be served before sunrise or after sunset, or
in holiday or festivity days, except on occasions of urgency
provided that this is ordered by the President of the Court and
that he signs the original copy of the notice.
If the person serving notice encounters resistance or major
difficulties, he shall suspend his procedures and refer the
matter to the President of the Court for his orders about the
following actions.
The server shall return the original copy of the notice to
the clerk secretariat of the Court with the impression of what
has occurred.
Article 54
The person whose interests have been affected by a crime has
the right to act as a plaintiff requesting redress of his civil
rights before the Criminal Chamber of the Court considering the
action, unless the case contains an issue on which decision has
been reserved.
The civil action can be considered started by serving a
meiirandum containing requests to the Public Prosecution in order
to proceed with the criminal action. Claim of civil rights can
be initiated in the session of the Court considering the criminal
action, if the accused is present, otherwise the case shall be
adjourned until the accused has been informed of the claims of
the plaintiff, provided that the criminal action is not ccnpleted
and ready for decision.
The plaintiff can include in his action a person responsible
for the civil rights of the accused, and this person can
intervene in the action of the case on his own initiative at any
stage.
Article 55
Without prejudice to the preceding Article, the party harmed
by a crime has the right to refer to the Civil Court which has
jurisdiction, to request indemnity fran harm suffered because of
the crime.
Whenever such a route has been chosen, the plaintiff cannot
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refer his claim to the Criminal Chanter. If the civil action has
been started while the criminal action is still pending before
the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, the Civil Court shall
suspend its proceedings until the criminal action is decided.
Article 56
The criminal action shall be considered extinguished by the
death of the accused.
Article 57
Testiitny of witnesses of legal age shall be heard after
taking oath to testify according to the truth. ny witness who
refuses to appear before the Court despite notification, or
refuses to testify without justifiable cause, shall be liable to
a penalty of a maximum of one hundred Dirhams.
If a witness refuses for the second time to appear before
the Court despite notification he shall be liable to a penalty of
a maximum of two hundred Dirhains. The Court can at this time
order the police to caitpel him to appear if his appearance is
considered necessary.
In all cases the Court can relieve witnesses of penalties if
they appear and offer acceptable excuses.
Article 58
Applications for constitutional review that are raised
before the Courts in the course of their consideration of cases
pending before them, shall be referred to the Supreme Court by a
decision of the concerned court containing the grounds for
referral. The application shall be signed by the President of
the Circuit concerned and shall contain the provisions subject to
the review requested. This shall apply if referral is by the
initiative of the Court concerned.
If the referral to the Supreme Court has been caused by a
plea fran a party to the case and accepted by the Court, the
Court shall specify a time limit within which the interested
party can refer his request for review to the Supreme Court. If
such a limit elapses without proof of referral of the matter to
the Supre Court, the person shall be considered to have aband-
oned his plea.
In the case of refusal by the Court to accept the petition
to refer a question of constitutional review to the Supreme
Court, the decision of refusal shall be grounded. The concerned
shall have the right to appeal the decision with the remainder of
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the Court's decision to the Court which has jurisdiction,
provided that the decision is appealable.
The Court before which the original case is pending shall
suspend its proceedings until the Supreme Court issues its
decision in the constitutional application. The decision of
suspension shall be issued with the decision of referral
mentioned in the first paragraph of this Article or after the
actual referral to the Supreme Court mentioned in the second
paragraph.
Article 59
Applications for the interpretation of treaties which are
raised before the Courts in the course of their consideration of
cases before them, shall be referred to the Supreme Court by a
decision of the concerned Court according to the procedures
contained in the first paragraph of the preceding Article, that
is in the case in which referral has been started by the Court' s
in decision or by a serious petition fran one of the parties.
The rule contained in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article shall apply in this case.
Article 60
In the cases of conflict of jurisdiction between two or rtore
judicial authorities, that are mentioned in items 9 aitl 10 of
Article 33, in case none of these authorities relinquish
consideration of the case, or if all of these authorities
relinquish the case, or if conflicting decisions have been
issued, the application to determine the canpetent Court may be
brought by way of a menorarum f ran a party to the case or fran
the Prosecutor General.
The mroraxum shall be accanpanied by copies of merroranda
of conflicting cases or of the conflicting decisions.
As a consequence of filing the mentioned merrorandum with the
clerk secretariat of the Supreme Court, cases which are in
conflict shall be suspended until the canpetent Court has been
determined. The concerned Chamber of the Supreme Court may order
the suspension of the enforcement of all the conflicting
decisions until the applicable decision has been determined. The
President of the Supreme Court may order suspension of the
enforcement of the conflicting decisions until the matter is
considered by one of the Chambers of the Court.
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Article 61
The clerk secretariat of the Court shall sulimit the case to
the President of the Court to determine the Chamber which shall
consider the case.	 -
Except in criminal matters, the President of the Court shall
naninate a member of the Chamber assigned the case, to prepare it
for hearings.
The clerk secretariat shall notify the parties and the
public prosecution about the sessions of preparation of the case,
in order to attend before the judge responsible for such prepar-
ation. The judge responsible for peparing the case may request
the fulfilment of certain duties and procedures fran the public
prosecution in order to caitplete preparation of the case.
Article 62
After caitpletion of the preparation of the case, the judge
responsible shall file a report listing the facts and legal
issues raised by the case without including his own opinion
regarding them.
The clerk secretariat shall sulmit the report mentioned to
the President of the Chamber concerned, to determine the session
in which the case shall be considered. The clerk secretariat
shall inform those concerned about the date of the session in
which the case will be considered. After that, it becomes their
responsibility to foll .i the proceedings of the case.
The judge who prepared the case shall be the reporter of the
case, while others may be assigned this job by the President of
the Chamber.
Article 63
The judge who prepared the case shall read his report in the
session. Decisions shall be passed after hearing the requests of
the public prosecution, without argument of the case unless the
Court decides to seek clarification fran parties in person or
fran their legal representatives.
No decision shall be passed in criminal cases without
hearing defence of the accused.
Article 64
In cases other than those specified in this Law, it shall
not be a consequence of bringing of a case to suspend enforcement
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of a decision or judgement which is subject to the case.
Article 65
A Camiittee shall be established in the Supreme Court of the
President or his deputy and the four most senior of its judges,
provided that the number of alternate judges does not exceed two.
If any of the Chambers of the Court decides, in the course
of considering a case or petition, to depart fran a principle
previously established by the Court, except in constitutional
matters, or in the existence of conflicting principles previously
established by the Court, the Chamber shall refer the matter to
this Carinittee for decision.
Article 66
All civil, administrative arid judicial authorities in the
Union arid in the member Emirates shall provide the Court with the
information and documents it requests.
The Court shall have the authority to issue any order to
ensure the presence of any person or suhiiission of any document
it considers to be necessary to the determination of cases,
requests or petitions before it.
All the mentioned authorities shall endeavour, within their
respective powers, to fulfil any order issued to them by the
Court in order to help in performance of its duties.
PA1 SIX FINAL AND 'IIANSITIC1AL PAY1ISIS
Article 67
Decisions of the Suprre Court shall be final and binding on
all. No appeal of any kind may be heard regarding such decisions
except in decisions issued in absentia in criminal matters, in
which case special kinds of appeals included in Laws of Criminal
Procedures shall be applied.
Article 68
The basis for the determination of values of cases, the
charges payable and ways of appeal against such, shall be estab-
lished by decree. Petitions and applications of the Union
authorities or authorities of the member Emirates shall be
exempted fran payment of charges.
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Article 69
Expenses of cases shall be determined by the Court if
possible, otherwise such determination shall be by the President
of the Chamber which issued the decision, by means of an
unappealable order on a menrandum presented by the beneficiary.
Article 70
The President of the Court, or his designate, shall decide
in applications of postponement of payments of charges, bails or
relief therefrcfn. Such decisions shall be issued after review of
documents and hearing fran the applicants in case such hearing is
considered appropriate.
As a consequence of applications for relief fran payments of
charges, dates of cases shall be suspended.
Article 71
The decision shall be issued and enforced in the name of the
President of the Union.
Article 72
Until Federal Courts of First Instance are established, the
Supreme Court shall have canpetence to decide in civil, administ-
rative and cc*tiiercial disputes between the Union and individuals,
whether the Union is a plaintiff or defendant.
Decisions in these cases shall be passed by a panel of the
Court canposed of three judges.
Article 73
The copy of the decisions which is to becane the basis for
enforcement, shall be stamped by the seal of the Court and signed
by the designated employee of the clerk secretariat, after
entering the following phrase in writing on the copy: -
"All Ministers, heads of government establishments and
departments and all caietent authorities of the Union or
Member Emirates, shall endeavour without undue delay to
execute this decision and perform its orders. The
Prosecutor General, his representatives and other officials
mentioned, shall help enforce application of this decision,
even if they are required to use force in such application."
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Article 74
All decisions of the Supreme Court in constitutional cases,
applications for constitutional interpretation, arid for inter-
pretations of treaties and international agreements, shall be
made public without cost in the Official Gazette.
Article 75
The Supreme Court shall apply the Islamic Shari'a, Union
Laws and other Laws in force in the member Emirates of the Union
conforming to the Islamic Shari' a. Likewise, it shall apply
those rules of custan and those principles of natural law arid
canparative law which do not conflict with the principles of that
Shari 'a.
Article 76
All local authorities in the member Eknirates of the Union
shall transfer, without cost or request, all cases available with
them, which cane within the canpetence of the Supreme Court in
accordance with this Law.
The clerk secretariat of the Supreme Court shall undertake
performance of procedures required by this Law and carry notif-
ication for the parties about sessions designated for their
cases.
The two preceding paragraphs shall riot apply regarding cases
in which decisions have already been issued or those in which
arguments have been canpleted and, are held awaiting decisions.
Article 77
The Minister of Justice shall issue the necessary orders to
implement this Law. Ministers shall within their respective
pcers implement the rules of this Law.
Article 78
This Law shall be published in the Official Gazette arid
applied after two nonths of its date of publication.
Aendix B Footrvtes
1	 Published in the Official Gazette issue 12, August 1973.
2	 As amended by Union Law 14/1985, published 29.12.85
3	 Amended by Union Law 14/1985
4	 Amended by Union Law 14/1985
5	 Amended by Union Law 14/1985
6 Generally, hearings in trial of judges and their impeach-
merit, and decisions are passed by an impeachment council
canposed of the President and the two nst senior of its
judges or by the plenum of the Court in other cases.
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Justic	 Natimality tte of	 Ith of
Appointnit Release
Pde1 Younos (Pres)	 Egyptian
Ahmed Talat	 Egyptian
Jamal Al-Noumani	 Egyptian
Mahairuied Mahfouz
	
Egyptian
Ahm Al-Dewani.	 Egyptian
A1xu1-Maj Id Al-Garaybeh Jordanian
hmed Sultan	 Syrian
Mhanined Al-Muihem	 Syrian
Mustafa Al-Khalid (Alt) Syrian
bhamined Al-di
	
Egyptian
Mohairrned Al-Bagdadi 	 Egyptian
Othman Othman
	
Syrian
Miin Mazyad	 Syrian
Salah Al-Shash (Pres)	 Syrian
Derwish A1ul-Maj id	 Egyptian
Cnar Awad Sudanese
Moh'd Al-aizani (Alt) 'Dinisian
Mzh'd Al-Bajouri (Pres) Egyptian
Fahmj Al-Khayyat (Alt) Egyptian
Al-Husni Al-Kanani 	 Eyyptian
31 05 1973
31 05 1973
31 05 1973
31 05 1973
31 05 1973
30 07 1973
11 08 1975
26 08 1976
22 09 1978
24 09 1978
07 04 1979
10 09 1980
21 12 1980
03 02 1981
27 01 1983
01 09 1983
03 02 1988
17 02 1988
03 03 1989
03 03 1989
16 04 1975
03 05 1976
26 09 1973
01 06 1976
01 01 1980
29 07 1977
25 08 1980
25 09 1987
14 05 1987
09 09 1987
01 01 1984
21 09 1987
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